George Keller 1923-2008

George Keller, the former Chevron chairman, who died yesterday in Palo Alto, was an archetype of the intuitive, gambling, technologically driven men who formerly made up the spine of the oil industry. It's not sentimentality to say that one of Big Oil's biggest problems is that today there are none like him at the helm of the five or six top companies.

Keller is famous for the nervy play that created Chevron -- the 1984 purchase of legendary Gulf Oil, described vividly in Daniel Yergin's The Prize. But Keller's vision didn't end there. Just three years later, he made the decision that took Chevron into the Soviet Union, and later into Kazakhstan's Tengiz oilfield, the company's biggest single oil property on the planet.

In other words, when you look at Chevron, you are looking at the house that George Keller built.

Keller was essential to the early research that produced O and G. In the late 1990s, he sat down with me for several hours in his San Francisco office (at the time I was writing for The New York Times out of the former Soviet Union, and he delivered an age-old complaint of parents of grown children everywhere -- he didn't get to talk much to his son Bill, the Times editor, he said. A few years later -- while I was writing O & G at Stanford -- I ran into Bill in downtown Palo Alto; he was in town visiting his father).

Keller told me about the double-knee replacement he just underwent; he planned on being on the tennis courts in a few months. He talked about Chevron's pioneering of Saudi Arabian oil. And he told me about the day in 1987 when he got a call from his much-trusted investment banker, Nicholas Brady, about a fellow named Jim Giffen who had an interesting concept. Keller should give Giffen a hearing, Brady said.

A few days later, Giffen -- a little-known New York promoter of business in the Soviet Union -- arrived in Keller's office. He proceeded to describe to the Chevron boss and his lieutenants how they might acquire an oilfieild in the off-limits Soviet Union -- what Ronald Reagan at the time called the Evil Empire.

Few oilmen would have trusted a fellow like Giffen, who belonged to a class of businessmen -- middlemen -- who usually earned their money by getting between oilmen and the oilfield. But Keller did. He ordered his men to go with Giffen to Moscow. And so began Chevron's sojourn into the Soviet Union.

As in the Gulf deal, if Keller hadn't had the sure instincts of a winning gambler, Chevron would not be the company it is today. Indeed, it might very well have been swallowed up in the waves of mergers that have roiled the industry since.

Worried About the Wave; Refinery Remorse

Tidal Wave: We’re hearing that one of the most popular topics at this year’s meeting of uber-egotists in Davos, Switzerland, is sovereign wealth funds – the hundreds of billions of dollars in oil profits abroad awaiting investment in assets around the world.

Many of the world's petro-states, such as Russia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and most recently Saudi Arabia, have formed such investment funds to hold their oil profits and turn them into diversified assets. According to Morgan Stanley, these funds, now totaling some $2.5 trillion in assets, stand to skyrocket in size over the next dozen or so years until they are at $28 trillion in 2022, or twice the size of the current U.S. economy.

All this cash in the hands of countries that perhaps have different agendas from the West's is behind a call from some quarters for an unspecified "code of conduct" among such funds. The implication is that, short of unspecified "transparency," recently even inserted as an issue into the presidential campaign by Hillary Clinton, Washington would put its foot down.

How is Washington going to put its foot down when it's not the funds, but the likes of Morgan Stanley and CitiGroup that are pleading to be saved by these funds because good, solid Americans like Warren Buffett don't see the upside?

The truth is that control over global finance is shifting East, largely to these petro-states but also to other countries such as Singapore that manage their wealth better than the U.S. has. And the U.S. isn't going to have much control over it.

Refining backsliding: It's a sign of how far matters have deteriorated that $87 oil is regarded as a blessing. Could oil fall as low as $70 a barrel if there's a severe, prolonged recession such as Larry Summers has predicted for months over at the Financial Times? And would prices at the pump drop commensurately? Sure. But that's still a historically high number.

And one of the biggest reasons for expensive oil is a shortage of the right kind of refineries around the world. Meaning that there's plenty of really bad quality oil -- so-called heavy oil, laden with sulfur that must be removed. But there aren't enough refineries capable of rapidly processing it. So you get a backup of this surplus crude, and a runup in prices of the light, low-sulfur crude that the refineries can process.

In short, $87 oil is really the price of that much-demanded light, low-sulfur crude, not the heavier stuff. If there was a way to process the heavier stuff, the price of all crudes would drop.

The Saudis themselves have been among the chief gripers about this state of affairs.

The bad news is stated in an analysis in the venerable Middle East Economic Survey. There are huge delays in a planned near doubling of refinery capacity in the Saudi kingdom. The report was posted by Engineerlive.com.

The Saudis currently can refine about 2.1 million barrels of oil a day. And they have another 1.8 million barrels a day of new capacity on the drawing boards. Their partners in these refineries are ConocoPhillips and France's Total, both of which according to this report are getting cold feet about cost overruns. Will they come on line by late 2012 -- almost five years from now? -- perhaps.

Which brings me to India. Why is it that Mukesh Ambani's Reliance Petroleum can put up a completely new, world-class refinery capable of processing the worst crudes on the planet in just 18 months, and ConocoPhillips, Total and Aramco cannot?

Ambani is set to complete a near doubling of his 660,000 barrel-a-day refinery in Jamnagar, in southern India, by the end of December. That's a turbo-charged pace.

It's also more proof of why Big Oil is on the decline. It has trouble competing with the aspirations of people like Ambani.

Photo: thelastminute
Rights: Creative Commons

What $100 Oil Means

Yesterday's runup in oil prices was a mere blip -- two publicity-seeking traders appear simply to have sought barroom talk as the guys who made history's first buy over $100, then quickly sold at a small loss. But, coming the first business day of the new year, it's dramatized the new energy world in which we live.

I recommend an excellent piece today by my former colleagues at The Wall Street Journal -- Neil King, Chip Cummins and Russell Gold -- that sums up the themes we've been discussing on this blog, and takes them further.

In the hundred-dollar carbon fuel world, Big Oil is no longer in charge. Exxon, Shell and Chevron have been overtaken by Gazprom, Aramco and Qatar Petroleum. If you're an investor, the best long-term bets are some of these majority state-owned energy companies, and the technology-rich oil services companies being hired to work for them.

One takeaway point from the Journal piece is that Exxon -- the most successful of any of the Big Oil giants -- has only the 13th-largest oil reserves among the world's oil companies. The twelve biggest are all state-owned. This is a hugely important factoid -- Wall Street bases its valuations of oil companies on the reserves they own. So, logically speaking, they are headed for lower valuations. "Western oil companies now control only about one in ten barrels of the world's proven reserves," the piece says.

Another point is the enormous shift of wealth to these petro-states from consuming nations such as the U.S. At current prices, the Middle Eastern and Central Asian producers will earn around $750 billion this year.

For motorists, all of this means that, short of a recession, gasoline prices aren't likely to go down this year, but only up. If there's a hard hurricane season, they're likely to go extremely high.

The causes are an enormous increase in demand from China and India, along with only slowly rising production from the petro-states. There's actually a lot of oil sloshing around the world, but much of it is the wrong kind. It's heavy and sulfur-laden crude, which most refineries can't process. New refineries that can are on the way, but it'll be three or four years before they come on line.

Photo: gjofili
Rights: Creative Commons

For Motorists, 2008 Starts Out With Bad Omen

For motorists, the good news could be if former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers is right and we're headed for a huge, deep, global recession. Otherwise, 2008 looks like another expensive year on the road.

An uptick in violence in distant Nigeria helped to send crude oil prices through the roof today. A couple of crudes meant for delivery next month are at or near triple digits -- West Texas Intermediate rose to $100 a barrel, and Brent to $99.35. (Wall Street Journal piece)

This again highlights the global shortage of the types of light crude that most refineries can process into gasoline, something that won’t change until more flexible refineries come on line in three or four years. Unless demand drops -- the Summers scenario -- we're going to continue to have the tight supplies that are keeping gasoline prices high at the pump.

Meanwhile, an article in a journal published by OPEC says the world shouldn’t expect long-term relief from the Middle East. Ayoub Kazim, executive director of Dubai Knowledge Village, a government-run education center, wrote the article in the December issue of the OPEC Review. (abstract)

Carbon fuel optimists usually point to Middle East reserves as evidence that the world needn't worry about declining production in other leading petro-states, including Russia. But Kazim says that, between 2024 and 2048, OPEC countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others will be unable to satisfy their part of global demand.

If true, Kazim’s analysis would conform with the notion of an “oil plateau,” in which various constraints on production, such as equipment, manpower and expense, put an effective ceiling on total daily supply.

I’ve spoken with a number of plateau advocates, and their arguments are rational.

Photo: gothick matt
Rights: Creative Commons

Sign of the Times

Russia has provided evidence for the direction in which Big Oil is headed: smaller and humbler.

This indication comes with Russia's announcement that it's selling a 24% stake in one of its most strategic natural gasfields -- Shtokman -- to Norway's Statoil. Read AP report on WSJ.com

That deceptive news release by the Kremlin hides a bitter fact for the company -- the likelihood that Statoil will be a mere contractor; it will not occupy the accustomed role of developer.

The fine print is what the industry calls booked reserves. These are the standard underpinning of an oil company's worth -- how much oil and natural gas they themselves control, and thus can sell at some point at, say, $90 a barrel or $260 a thousand cubic meters.

In the Russian case, Moscow is denying the companies the right to book the reserves. Hence, there is no real reason to celebrate. That's the deal that France's Total got in July, when the Kremlin gave it a 25% stake in the operating company developing the field, and though no details were released on the Statoil deal, one would expect them to get the same terms.

Why do the companies go along? Because they are desperate for any entree into places like Russia, and hope (without basis) for better terms later.

This is a blueprint for how Big Oil is likely to be increasingly treated around the world. Somewhere between 80% and 90% of the world's oil and natural gas is controlled by countries like Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Russia, not Exxon, Shell or BP. And, over the next two or so decades, those countries are going to turn the big oil companies into employees.

Is that bad or good for the buyers of the actual end product -- motorists and homeowners? It could very well mean even higher prices than Big Oil commands since the countries are not under the same competitive or cost pressures as the companies.

The Old Game is the New Game in Big Oil

Russell Gold, my former colleague at The Wall Street Journal, has an interesting piece today describing how, as contrarian as it can possibly appear, the Middle East is open for business to the oil majors. The upshot: Russia and the Caspian states have a lot of leverage, but not wholesale negotiating power with the western oil companies, which do have options in terms of replenishing their reserve base.

The first paragraph of Russell's piece: Since the 1970s, major oil companies have been shut out of oil production in much of the Middle East. Now, the doors to foreign investment are opening again, this time for natural gas. Read rest of story

Steve's comment: Russia in particular but also Kazakhstan have been wringing concessions from the western oil companies, which have fewer and fewer places to go around the world for new reserves as national oil companies and ministries take control of their own energy supplies.

Though the big-earning companies will deservedly generate little public sympathy, they have been on the front lines of the combat under way at the intersection of geopolitics and commerce.

But the willingness of countries like Qatar and the UAE to grant equity shares in their natural gas fields to western majors is a poke in the eye of the former Soviet petro-states.

Why after making such a fuss over their economic independence are the Middle Eastern countries willing to go back into an equity relationship with the previously expeled majors? In an e-mail exchange, Russell says the majors are "very wary" of Russia now, along with Venezuela, while in their view the Middle East offers some welcome stability.

Russell goes on: "Most of the natural gas projects open to western investment are technically challenging, including Abu Dhabi's $10 billion sour gas project and BP's work in Oman. The Saudi exploration isn't so much technically challenging, but offers the Saudis an opportunity to cement ties with a number of companies from powerful nations, including Shell (UK/Netherlands), Lukoil (Russia), Sinopec (China), Eni (Italy). Add in the big export refinery projects under consideration and you have ties with Total (France) and ConocoPhillips (the U.S.). That's most of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council."