Religiosity and the Meaning of the Shift on Missile Defense

One is pressed to name a technology attached to as much religious-like fervor as missile defense. We of course are not talking the type of fanaticism seen in the lines around the block to buy the latest iPod, but truly mob-like anger resembling the debate over evolution. It's been that way ever since Ronald Reagan gave missile defense national prominence in 1983. A quarter century later, while the defense industry continues to work toward a breakthrough that would make the technology reliable, the news in Eastern Europe and Russia brings missile defense back front and center in all its passion and vitriol -- Obama has canceled George W. Bush's planned missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic, and to the technology's advocates, that means heresy.

As we have discussed previously at O&G, Obama has been bound to make just this move simply because of the irrationality of attempting to persuade Iran or anyone else that Europe is held safe by a non-working technology. In a column today in The New York times, here's how Defense Secretary Robert Gates himself describes the attacks against him since the decision: "I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith."

So what is this lathered-up debate genuinely about? It is whether or not there will be any resulting dividends from Moscow as a result. Naturally, the Obama Administration denies any link to Russia, and technically that assertion is correct -- the cancellation I think would have taken place regardless of the friction with Russia.

But payback is nevertheless an issue -- Russia remains an outlier on extremely important matters, including the troubling arc of developments in Iran. Looked through that lens, Obama can be expected to act to eliminate other irritants, too, that have no legitimate U.S. strategic value.

Hence, look next for a trade opening with Moscow -- there's no valid reason to block Russia from the World Trade Organization if it meets the criteria. But don't expect the U.S. to back down in Georgia -- among other factors, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline continues to link Georgia strategically to the West. The U.S. will probably also continue to pursue the strategic Nabucco natural gas pipeline despite the lack of enough fuel to make it work.

While both of Russia's leaders -- President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- suggest that they will be more attentive now to U.S. concerns, my friend Masha Lipman at Carnegie in Moscow remarks that "anything that looks like a concession can be viewed by the Russian side as a sign of weakness."

Generally speaking, Lipman is right. But the reduction in the points of friction between Washington and Moscow is still arguably a valid approach to getting Russia on side.

A Front-Row Seat to Momentous Events. The Oil and Glory Interview: Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha

Albania has had a prime view of some of the most dramatic events in Europe of the last decade and more. Most recently, they have included the West's showdown with Russia over Kosovo's independence, which led directly to Moscow's effective absorption of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition, while Russia has opposed further expansion of NATO, Albania along with Croatia became the alliance's newest members three weeks ago.

When I was last in Albania – during NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbian troops in Kosovo – I had a great time, but the country was overrun with criminal gangs. There were Mercedeses everywhere – all of them absent license plates since Albania served as the way-station for stolen vehicles traversing Europe. It also was a smuggling route for people of all sorts seeking to migrate illegally to Europe; I watched a couple of boatloads of these migrants traveling fast late one evening on to Italy. Today, with the country a NATO member and seeking to join the EU, those old days seem largely gone.

Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha has traversed this entire period. A 65-year-old trained cardiologist, he was Albanian president for five years during the 1990s, before losing the post in a huge investment scandal. After ten years in the opposition, he returned to power in 2005. I called Berisha in his Tirana office. The edited interview:

O&G – The International Monetary Fund calls Albania “highly vulnerable.” Yet it is one of the few economies in the world expected not to shrink this year. How is the country withstanding the financial crisis? How are remittances from Albanians abroad holding up?

Berisha – I have high esteem for the IMF. But it should not [encourage] a panic. It’s not helpful, in my view. I told them, ‘Look, you’re a very, very crucial institution. I’m glad that the G20 provided you with a new role.’ But many governments are hesitant to work with them because their scheme at a time of social unrest could create more problems than it solves. I don’t consider the [Albanian] economy as highly vulnerable. It’s a real economy. Remittances are not coming [to the same degree] because of the loss of jobs in Greece and Italy. But we are encouraging tourism.

Q – Is NATO membership a right? Russia, while opposing Kosovo independence, for instance, has vigorously opposed NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, and made that a benchmark for good relations with the West.

A – For my country, NATO membership was the most important achievement since independence day. Albania suffered more than any country from security problems. It suffered from isolation and self-isolation. It was an orphan nation. Now it’s part of an alliance. We have all the potential to build freedom. It means high credibility for Albania in the world. It is high credibility for investors. Albania will never walk alone.

Q – Is NATO membership a right?

A – For a free nation, yes. NATO proved to be a shield of nations. NATO has faced no difficulty adapting to the new situation. It has brought freedom everywhere.

Q – Is it valid for Russia to make good relations with it contingent on opposing NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine?

A – I know no country that is afraid of Russia. I know only countries that are willing to work with Russia. Based on some imperial heritage, if you go into their history, expansion is in their psychology. What effect would Georgia or Ukraine have on Russia? What effect would NATO expansion have on Russia? [The assertion of a NATO threat to Russia] is nonsense. It will take time, but with realism [Georgian and Ukrainian membership] will happen.

Q – The decisive factor in deciding who should be a member of NATO is whether it would send troops to defend that country, Article V of the NATO charter. Would NATO defend Ukraine or Georgia if need be?

A – Is Russia intending to attack Ukraine or Georgia? If Russia intends to partake an aggression, NATO must firmly stand, because that would mean the new Russification of Europe.

Q – What is your view of the August war between Russia and Georgia?

A – Who attacked first is unclear. But a [Russian] scenario was there to invade Georgia. The Russians moved not only into Ossetia. They moved into Abkhazia, and toward Tbilisi. Russia probably wanted to occupy Georgia. The stand of the international community worked.

Q – How will Albania respond to President Obama’s call for more NATO troops in Afghanistan?

A – Albania is sending a new company, doubling our current number of troops. We also sent 20 nurses and doctors.

Q – Is Afghanistan a threat for NATO countries?

A – Afghanistan and Pakistan must both be helped. It is difficult terrain. Politics at home aren’t easy. But I think the strategy will be effective. The U.S. sent a man over there who is highly skilled in negotiations.

Q – [Richard] Holbrooke?

A – Yes. Holbrooke. It’s very important to promote peace there.

Q – Unlike elsewhere in Europe, President Bush seemed highly popular when he visited Albania in 2007. Can you explain why?

A – First, he was the first U.S. president to visit my country. Second, we suffered more than any country from dictatorship. So we definitely support toppling dictators, including Saddam Hussain and [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar. Third, he came with great messages here – support for Kosovo independence, and NATO membership for us.

Afghanistan: Central Asia Takes Center Stage Again

With the Taliban having made Pakistan an insecure supply route for war materiel headed into Afghanistan, NATO and the U.S. are looking again to Central Asia for help.

Thom Shanker of The New York Times has filed a piece this morning detailing talks with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan about serving as alternate supply routes. The talks also include Russia, which exerts considerable influence in the former Soviet region.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were primary staging grounds for the 2001 dislodging of the Taliban from Kabul. Since then, the U.S. has created some distance from those regimes, in Uzbekistan's case because of its horrendous human rights record.

Look for Washington to argue that engagement is the best way to get some moderation in Uzbekistan. That will be no more true now than it was the dozen other times over the past decade and a half that the U.S. has employed that logic.

However, if the U.S. is intent on a surge of some 30,000 troops in Afghanistan, which appears to be its plan, fresh agreements may be the only way to supply them. Today, for instance, Pakistan itself closed off the Khyber Pass as it carried out a new offensive against militants based in the border area.

Georgia: (Not Yet) All the Facts

Last week, Russia got a big p.r. boost when Chris Chivers and Ellen Barry wrote a detailed page-one piece in The New York Times backing up its version of how the five-day August war in Georgia began. In a nutshell, the piece concluded that the Georgians started it.

The war was momentous in a number of ways -- it all-but shut off the possibility that Georgia will get into NATO; it put a cloud of doubt over U.S. influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia; it may have accelerated the flight of western capital from Russia; and it turned the heaviest dose of western invective on Russia since the 2006 polonium murder of Alexander Litvinenko.

But now RFE-RL says it's more complicated than that. The Georgians may have fired before Russian troops arrived, according to a report today by Eka Tsamalashvili and Brian Whitmore, but their assault came days after South Ossetians began to shell local Georgian villages. The report says it's based on dozens of eye-witness accounts by RFE-RL reporters.

Both reports are worth reading. Together, they mean that, not surprisingly, there's much in the way of indignant showmanship to the claims by both sides. I haven't seen a definitive report as yet.

The Sweep of Georgia's Impact

I'm just back from two weeks in Kazakhstan, looking at the ripples from the events in Georgia. The short takeaway is that Russia's short, victorious war will be felt for years to come all the way from Central Asia to western Europe. Here is the piece in this week's Business Week.



What doesn't seem to be much appreciated is that the main problem isn't really Georgia. It's that Georgia is the thread hanging off the tattered sweater; you pull it, and the sweater falls apart. Not counting the suddenly transformed politics of the Eurasian continent, but just economics, will Azerbaijan and Georgia manage to widen the Caucasus energy corridor to accommodate another 1.5 million barrels a day of Kazakh oil over the coming years, as Kazakhstan would like? What of hopes to diversify Europe's natural gas supply? The answer to both is "perhaps," but that Russia will have to be accommodated.

What would Russia want in exchange for allowing the corridor expansion to go through? For starters, as it's made plain, it wants all of the Azerbaijan state's natural gas supply, the very same volumes that the State Department is pushing President Ilham Aliyev to ship to Europe. As for Kazakhstan, it's not clear what it will be asked -- President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the balancer of great powers, has already been so deferential to Vladimir Putin that one wonders what more there is to surrender. From Europe, Putin would like continued demand for Russian gas at current or greater volumes.

One thing that's sure is that Russia doesn't have to use its Army again. Having deployed it once, Putin has made his point. Besides, Russian energy pipelines provide it all the leverage it needs without its army.

After Georgia, A Day of Reckoning For Washington

Russia says it will start withdrawing its troops from Georgia tomorrow. If that truly happens -- and there are contrary signs -- a new, probably far more important stage of the Georgian crisis will begin. That's the assessment of the affair by the arc of countries -- from Europe, swinging south and east to the edge of western China -- that are directly affected by what Russia does.

How these countries perceive the U.S. response to the war in Georgia will determine whether Russia has effectively crippled a hard-fought, 15-year-old American effort to inject itself as a power in Russia's backyard.

So far, much ink has been spilled over whether the U.S. and Russia are in a new Cold War. In Washington, we hear that the era of a post-Soviet U.S.-Russia alliance is over. The Kremlin counters that the West is intent on provoking it, and thwarting its natural rights as a great power.

The truth is that Moscow's presumptions are essentially correct -- the U.S. has conducted a definitively anti-Moscow policy on Russia's western and southern rims, one dressed up as reformist- and energy-minded, but nonetheless centrally designed to contain Russia within its borders.

But this policy well-suits American security aims, and those of the West as a whole. Conceived in the Clinton administration, it foresaw this very day, when then-forlorn Russia would regain its feet and possibly threaten the independence of its traditional colonial backyard.

One thing to keep in mind is that Russian disgruntlement with Georgia didn't originate with NATO expansion, Kosovo independence, Russia's resurgent petro-power, or Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's alleged jokes about Vladimir Putin's height.

Russia's first military attack on Georgia was not ten days ago but in 1993, when Moscow backed Abkhazia in its military separation from Georgia. In the subsequent years, then-Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze was twice nearly assassinated, attacks that, in interviews with me and others, he blamed on Russia and his insistence on Georgia becoming the strategic transit route for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

In other words, there's strong reason to believe that nothing Saakashvili did, short of capitulation to Russian domination of Georgia, would have satisfied Moscow. Friends tell me that Shevardnadze finally found an accommodation with Russia. If so, it was an accommodation that included the threat of assassination if he went too far.

Georgia wasn't the rationale behind American policy. But the Caspian Sea policy, conceived, as O and G readers know, by a today-forgotten National Security Council officer named Sheila Heslin, did attempt to get Russia accustomed to living within its own borders, and not threatening its neighbors.

The policy was dual. It involved a continuation of the expansion of NATO initiated by President George H.W. Bush, in order to prevent a future, resurgent Russia from gobbling up pieces of the former Soviet bloc in eastern and central Europe. And, on the Caspian, to the south of Russia, the U.S. promoted the construction of energy pipelines to link the Caucasus and Central Asia to the West, and provide them the financial wherewithal to withstand any Russian economic pressure. As a transit point for three of the new pipelines, otherwise-isolated Georgia, situated right on Russia's border, became a U.S. strategic partner.

After 9/11, the Bush administration -- carrying the policy further -- established military bases in Central Asia for the assault on Afghanistan, and then left them in place after the Taliban were dispersed.

The policy made sense considering U.S. interests. The West had a stake in making sure that Russia did not again become a threatening power; by encouraging Russia not to expand back into its former Soviet lands, it might express its nationhood in other ways, such as in business. (For those who see all policy as oil-generated, remember that there was no oil shortage in the 1990s; oil was much-discussed, but it was an instrument of policy -- how to give the Caucasus and Central Asia some breathing room from Russia -- rather than the rationale for it.)

Many of the eight presidents of the region embraced the U.S. agenda. At once, there was a lever against centuries-old Russian dominance.

But ten days ago, Russia put that declaration to the test. With its assault on Georgia, it seemed to expose the U.S. policy as a superpower vanity.

And it seemed true that Washington was caught off-guard. It seemed either to have forgotten the rationale behind its Caspian Sea policy, or, more probable, to have staked its policy on the hope that by now Russia had changed, and would not rotely use its military in the face of a perceived challenge.

Whichever the case, Russia's invasion of Georgia threatens the very real gains of these 15 years. If Russia is seen to have come out ahead, the U.S. may retain its influence in Europe, where Moscow could even suffer a backlash -- Europe could decide after all to build new pipelines to diversify away from Russian natural gas. But America's carefully built role as a great power in Russia's south would be in jeopardy.

The Central Asian and Caucasus leaders are watching.

I myself wonder now whether it matters if Russia in fact does withdraw all the way into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which I doubt. I think Russia will maintain at least some troops outside the territories. It seems improbable that Russia will entirely give up the ground it gained within Georgia proper.).

Russia has demonstrated that it can and might cross borders of its former Soviet colonies when it sees fit. In Russia's view, these are not international borders; they are Georgia, they are Kazakhstan, they are Azerbaijan -- not real independent states, but former Russian territories.

Ultimately, Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev, Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev and Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov -- the stewards of the region's great energy wealth -- understand the language of power.

They understood when a parade of American officials visited and argued that it was wise to cultivate a relationship with the most powerful nation on Earth.

The trouble is that, these days, it's not clear any longer that the U.S. is very powerful in its declared zones of strategic interest.

Georgian Update: A Different War

Russian envoys say that one of Russia's objectives in attacking Georgia is to remove its president, Mikheil Saakashvili.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made the statement in a phone conversation with Condoleeza Rice, the American secretary of state, saying that Saakashvili "must go." And Russia's envoy to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, confirmed the gist of it publicly afterward in a conversation with Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy to the U.N.

If they are representing Moscow's true intentions -- they could simply be floating a trial balloon, or engaging in traditional local bombast -- the West is facing an entirely different foreign policy crisis. That is, the forcible change of a Western-backed, democratically elected leader hosting highly strategic Western economic assets.

Other reports: The New York Times reports that Russian ground troops have left South Ossetia proper, and are marching on the Georgian-held town of Gori. Another (Russian language) report is that -- in the western part of the country near Abkhazia, Georgia has agreed to allow Russian peacekeepers to conduct joint patrols with the United Nations and Georgia of the town of Zugdidi. Both reports also suggest an important shift in this two-day old conflict.

Huffing and Puffing in Georgia

With so much hyperbole flowing in the conflict in Georgia -- on numbers of casualties, on the aims of the opposing sides -- where should one focus one's attention?

I remain tuned to Georgia proper, and not South Ossetia itself, or even the town of Gori to the south that has been bombed by Russian jets.

Specifically, Georgia claims that Russian naval carriers are in position off Georgia's Black Sea coast, and are readying to offload troops. If accurate -- I've seen no confirmation -- and these troops do occupy ground in Georgia itself, and not simply within the pro-Moscow separatist enclave of Abkhazia, this will be a different war. This would be Russia declaring who is in charge, a message that would be intended not just for Georgia, but for the West, which has been considering absorbing Georgia into NATO.

It would be the same were the scores of Russian troop carriers reported to have poured into South Ossetia to cross into Georgia proper.

A far more remote possibility would be Russian bombing of the trans-Georgian oil or natural gas pipelines. Georgia claims that Russia has already targeted -- but missed hitting -- the 1,000-mile Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, but I doubt the account. Such an attack would be regarded in the West as a direct assault on Western interests.

As long as the conflict remains in and around South Ossetia, the fighting can be seen as a bloody uptick in the Caucasus version of huffing and puffing. But it is containable.

The Spy Plane Over Abkhazia

Was Russia justified in shooting down an unmanned Georgian spycraft flying over the separatist Georgian region of Abkhazia last month? Probably not. If it were, Moscow would be crowing about its action, not denying it, as it has been doing.

Yesterday, the results of a United Nations investigation into the April 20 downing were released. The report concludes that Moscow did shoot down the Georgian plane, which was doing reconnaissance over the Black Sea strip of land that broke away in a war 15 years ago. The news of the report, rejected by Russia as biased, was in most of the major papers, such as this article. The U.N. said that Georgia should not have been stoking tensions with such a flight, and that it violated the terms of a peace agreement between the sides. But it also said that Russia had no business shooting down the drone, and raised doubts about Russia's legitimacy as a neutral peacekeeper, the role it serves in the region.

As I saw time and again when I visited both sides of the conflict during the 1990s, the feelings of the Georgians and Abkhazians are one understood by ethnically rivalrous people the world over -- the Armenians and Azeris, the Kurds and Turks, the Serbs and Kosovars, the Palestinians and Israelis. There is very little rationality in their deeds and words. And, in the case of the Abkhaz and Georgians, it likely will take many, many years before they can figure out how to live together normally. Perhaps they will never figure it out.

Which is why the Russians should not be stirring the pot. Back when the drone went down, Georgia and Moscow-backed Abkhazia seemed at the brink of a return to war.

So why did Russia do it? Georgia in general serves as one of Russia's main punching bags. Russia has blockaded Georgia economically, and Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders frequently lash out at leader Mikheil Saakashvili. Most recently, Georgia has been the vehicle for Putin to demonstrate his ire over Western recognition of Kosovo independence. Putin responded to Kosovo by granting effective political recognition to Abkhazia and Georgia's other breakaway region, South Ossetia.

Dmitry Medvedev doesn't seem like a bully. On the other hand, neither did Putin in his very first days.

Photo: Chesi - Fotos CC

Rights: Creative Commons

Georgia: An Exercise in Image-Building

Six days before Dmitri Medvedev takes over the helm of Russia, Vladimir Putin has put the country on a war-footing with its favorite punching bag, the neighboring nation of Georgia. Putin has shifted troops to the seaside Georgian region of Abkhazia -- just in case, Moscow says, Georgia mounts a military attack against the separatist region.

As readers recall, Georgia and Abkhazia fought a brutal war during the early 1990s that left the two divided.

Igor Yurgens, a brainy and urbane Medvedev adviser who is making the rounds in Washington, London and Paris, told me in a phone chat yesterday that Moscow "will not use military force" in order to absorb Abkhazia, whose citizens already have been given Russian citizenship.

Yet Putin is still in a lather over the West's decision to recognize Kosovo's independence from Serbia, and this most recent flareup of tensions with Georgia seems to me of a different order from the countless previous flareups between the two over the last seventeen years. Putin is sticking his chin out.

NATO ambassadors said yesterday that the move "risks undermining stability." But Yurgens doesn't seem swayed. "We are not going to be pushed and bullied on this question after Kosovo, that's for sure," he told me.

What is Russia's move really all about? Surely it's not concern over Abkhaz security -- a Georgian military attack in order to bring the region back into the Georgian fold verges on ludicrous, mainly since Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili knows he would lose, either to the Abkhaz themselves or a predictable Russian counter-offensive.

Is Putin simply demonstrating yet again that Russia won't be pushed around? Is he bestowing an image-building conflict on his successor, in the way that Chechnya built up Putin's own nationalist credentials when he took power in 1999 with a popularity rating of 2%? Perhaps Putin simply couldn't resist lest anyone forget what he has done for Russia's feeling of well-being? According to Itar-Tass, he is leaving office with an almost 85% approval rating.

When pressed on its general foreign policy, Russia says the West is mired in Cold War thinking, and that its strategy is straightforward and not political. If that's true, one wonders why Putin been unable to strike win-win deals with Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltics.

The prevailing wisdom is that nothing will change under Medvedev, whom experts think will keep the wheel straight and hope that things turn out as well for him as they did for Putin. Nothing Medvedev has said seems to argue otherwise.

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Let’s be friends, Guys

Vladimir Putin's remark just about sums up the NATO Summit that ended today in Bucharest. "Let’s be friends, guys, and be frank and open,” he told reporters on the topic of whether a new cold war was in the making. The sentiment will carry over into Sunday's meeting between Putin and President Bush in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, where the two leaders will sign an affable "Strategic Framework" agreement.

As those familiar with the ways of Moscow know, such empty, toothless pacts -- known as the "protocol" in that part of the world -- are what companies and countries sign when they can't agree to anything conclusive.

In short, the NATO gathering ended with the U.S. attempting to dress up a setback against Putin as by and large a show of unity by Europe.

Bush put much on the line by announcing that he would seek to push forward Ukraine's and Georgia's bids to join NATO. But what did he walk away with? European agreement to a missile defense system that doesn't work. European agreement to add troops to a conflict -- Afghanistan -- about whose merits there's almost no disagreement anywhere in the world.

On the question of Ukraine and Georgia, Europe buckled, at least for now, to Putin's objections to their obtaining so-called MAP -- or Membership Action Plan -- status.

So Putin closed out another week of diplomatic triumphs. There will be no advance for now in NATO's expansion to the Russian border. And, with Bush's appointment of a harmless old family friend this week as Eurasian energy czar, there will be no serious challenge to Putin's policy of dominating European energy.

As for the Strategic Framework agreement to be signed Sunday, it's Putin's stated sentiment on paper -- gosh, can't we be friends?

I personally think that Georgia and probably Ukraine will eventually join NATO as full members. But it could be going more smoothly.

For a solid commentary on the spectacle from the perspective of Germany, this piece by Ulrich Speck at RFE-RL is highly recommended reading.

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Rights: Creative Commons

Showdown in Bucharest

After the spectacle and fireworks of recent years, we're about to see the latest picture of the balance of power in Russia-West relations. The venue will be the NATO summit that begins tomorrow in Bucharest. The issue is whether to advance Georgia and Ukraine's applications to join the military alliance.

The two former Soviet countries want to push forward their status to what’s called MAP – a Membership Action Plan. True membership would come down the road, once they meet the various necessary qualifications. France and Germany oppose moving to a MAP for the two. "France will not give its green light to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia," French Prime Minister Francois Fillon told France-Inter radio. "We are opposed to Georgia and Ukraine's entry because we think that it is not the correct response to the balance of power in Europe, and between Europe and Russia."

Stephen Fidler and Stefan Wagstyl of the Financial Times rang up Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili, who has a reputation as a hothead, but sounds eminently sensible on this issue. "No matter what some Europeans might be thinking, it's basically giving [Russia] direct veto rights, because that's how they'll perceive it," Saakashvili told the FT.

Saakashvili has that right. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, suggests that Georgia will use NATO membership to force the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into the Georgian fold. This is a red herring – it’s absurd to suggest that NATO would commit troops to crushing Abkhazian or South Ossetian politics. It can't even raise sufficient troops for Afghanistan.

Instead, the issue is simple -- Vladimir Putin wishing to demonstrate Russia’s influence now, and to retain its pressure points on its former colonies in the future.

Saakashvili has done smart political spadework. He has offered power-sharing to Abkhazia, and 500 Georgian troops to Afghanistan. The latter move at minimum could quiet France’s objections.

The ultimate decision will indicate whether Putin has at last succeeded in shifting the balance of power more toward Russia's direction.

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Rights: Creative Commons

Putin: Still in Pursuit of Respect

How far will Vladimir Putin push his rejection of Kosovo independence? My own feeling is not very. And even if he does go through with his implicit threat -- to recognize breakaway regions of his favorite punching bag, Western ally Georgia -- Russia and perhaps Belarus will probably be the only nations to do so.

President Bush has announced U.S. recognition of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence yesterday. The largest European countries are likely to follow. Why? Because of Serbia's murderous rampage through Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Putin asserts that territorial integrity is supreme and that, in order to create a separate nation, the country from which it is separating must approve. As an example, he cites the two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which pulled away during the early 1990s when nationalism was sweeping through the former Soviet Union.

There are only academic and polemical links between these Georgian regions and Kosovo.

I covered the Abkhaz fighting from both sides. While there was brutality, the scale nowhere approached Serbia's pathological violence against its neighbors. And in the end, in 1993, it was the Abkhaz -- backed by Moscow -- who applied ethnic cleansing after vowing not to. They simply put the Georgians in their midst on foot out of the seaside region, and occupied their homes.

One thing I learned from my time in the former Soviet Union is that pride is king when it comes to nationalities. No one wants to feel he or she are under anyone's thumb. In the case of the Abkhaz and the Ossets, the Georgians stirred the pot with their own nationalism. Then the Russians came in with military backing, which continues to this day.

What are Putin's and Russia's genuine beef? That their view isn't accepted in the West. Ultimately, that isn't very compelling. Putin will no doubt continue to protest. And, regarding Georgia as the West's soft underbelly because of the energy pipelines running through the republic and the West's backing for President Mikheil Saakashvili, he'll keep punching there.

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Note on Putin

Reporters in Moscow are weighing in on Vladimir Putin's latest anti-Western broadside. Peter Finn of the Washington Post has this account of Putin's attack today against his political opponents as pawns of the West.

It's rooted in Russia's traditional seige mantra -- the country is surrounded by enemies, and infiltrated by traitors, the story goes. Yet it's also uncanny how Putin has morphed smoothly from a failed junior KGB officer into a politician of the first rank.

The West will have years to figure out how to reach a modus vivendi with him.

Photo: Opendemocracy
Photo rights: Creative Commons

The Down Side of Leaving the Nest

A piece in The New York Times today demonstrates that a growing general grasp of the new hard geopolitics on the Eurasian dual continent, driven by economics -- in particular oil and natural gas -- rather than the traditional movement of armies.

In the story, Adam Ellick writes that "Russian power is rapidly returning to the Baltics, only this time the weapons are oil and money, not tanks."

That's an essential point, since the United States has yet to show that it fully comprehends that the nature of conflict, at least in this part of the world, has changed under its feet (see Josh Foust's excellent latest post on the pipeline war), and that Russia with its financial muscle is leading the charge.

But there's a larger point for the small nations crusading most vigorously to be shielded from the hostilities: For the up side of independence, you have to leave the nest entirely.

Which brings us to the Baltic republics' self-serving posture on the proposed Russian-German-Dutch Nord Stream natural gas pipeline. The Balts oppose Russia's resolution for its continuous disputes with the pesky neighbors that stand between it and its European oil and natural gas customers. Russian-controlled Nord Stream would go through the Baltic Sea, bypassing Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

There are reasons for apprehension over the total of three new natural gas lines through which Moscow proposes to export Central Asian and Russian gas into Europe. As I'll discuss in the last stop of the book tour tomorrow and Tuesday in New York, Moscow has a record of using its petro-power for political and economic leverage.

But the Baltic states want it both ways. They want NATO and European Union protection from possible Russian aggression, but also the cheap fuel and pipeline tariffs they get as a channel for Russia's energy.

But, like the rest of Europe, they will have to fend for themselves.


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Did Georgia Shoot Down A Russian Plane?

Georgia says there is a fire in a thick, isolated section of forest in the north of the country. That's relevant because the country's interior minister also said a few hours ago that the Georgian military fired on an aircraft that it believed to be Russian. A search may start tomorrow to determine the source of the fire. So far Russia says it is missing no planes. The upshot: If it is a Russian military aircraft, there will probably be a significant escalation of tensions in the already much-strained relationship between the two neighbors.

Here is the top of the Reuter's story: Georgian forces fired at a plane they believed was Russian after it violated the Caucasus republic's airspace on Wednesday, a senior interior ministry official said. The incident marks an intensification of a row between the two countries in which Georgia has accused Russian planes of violating its border and of dropping a missile near Tbilisi. Russia called the Georgian statement a provocation. It has not reported any plane missing, and when asked specifically about the Georgian statement an official denied Russian aircraft had violated Georgian airspace. Rest of story.

Steve's comment: Russia and Georgia have had a tense relationship since the Soviet breakup. Under Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia was dismembered when Russia backed separatists in the Black Sea region of Abkhazia, which used Moscow's sophisticated military to successfully break away.

More recently, Georgia has accused Moscow of a few violations of Georgian air space, including the firing of a missile. Western inspectors traveled to Georgia and backed up its claim about the missile.

Russia has been enraged by the charge, and the western position toward it. But if Georgia actually shot down one of Russia's planes, that could change the complexion of the tension. Russia's Putin stands almost entirely on a nationalistic platform of toughness bordering on belligerence toward the outside world. If it is indeed what the Georgians suggest, that will color his response.

Russia in the Air

The Central Asia republics joined their two paternalistic neighbors -- Russia and China -- in a military show yesterday. The climax was President Putin's announcement that Russia had resumed long-range flights by its nuclear bombers, and a U.S. announcement that NATO aircraft had scrambled the aircraft. The upshot: The message was not warlike, but it was belligerent. Russia is attempting to demonstrate that its global ambitions are not limited to refineries and pipelines.

The first paragraph of the L.A. Times account: Russian President Vladimir V. Putin on Friday announced reinstatement of the Soviet-era practice of having nuclear bombers routinely make long-distance flights that bring them within striking distance of the United States and its allies. "Today just after midnight, 14 strategic missile aircraft, with support and fuel planes, took off from seven airfields across Russia," Putin said in televised remarks. "Combat duty began in which a total of 20 planes are taking part. From today, combat duty of this kind will be carried out on a regular basis." Read story

Steve's comment: Russia's bomber flight is reminiscent of a similar show that the U.S. put on almost precisely 10 years ago. On Sept. 15, 1997, the U.S. 82d Airborne flew from the U.S. all the way to Kyrgyzstan for a Central Asia military exercise. It was the longest such airborne mission in history, capped by a parachute landing.

It was intended to demonstrate not that the U.S. intended to invade, but that it had the reach and will to get to the region. No one anticipated that, four years later, that would be illustrated in fact with the establishment of a semi-permanent military presence there.

The Russian flight was farce in the sense that Moscow lacks the capability to mount a massive long-range military assault. But in military language, image can be crucial. Russia is saying that it intends over the coming years to take its previously formidible military out of mothballs, and turn it into something of use. That use is surely regional, but given the neighborhood it is something that bears watching.

Here is the first paragraph of a Reuters account of the Shanghai military exercises: CHEBARKUL, Russia - Russia and China staged their biggest joint exercises on Friday but denied this show of military prowess could lead to the formation of a counterweight to NATO. Read story