Russian History and the Passing of the Utility of Pipeline Politics

The Harvard historian Richard Pipes has triggered an interesting debate on the Internet with a long piece that leads the Weekend section of The Wall Street Journal. The piece lays out familiar Russian history -- how and why Moscow is so vexed by independent-minded neighbors; why its people go along with political repression; and its dogged pursuit of a status as "a force to be reckoned with, a country to be respected and feared." Pipes goes on to suggest policy prescriptions, including a recognition that Russians are likely to react badly to a feeling of encirclement, and a renewed attempt to persuade Moscow to adopt western political and economic values.

The piece is important not because it's perfectly presented -- I'm puzzled for example by the continued notion that somehow Russians are going to become like the West -- but because we get someone of Pipes' stature laying out once again the historical record. I myself hear dismay from Russia watchers get up in arms over the suggestion that some recent events there -- the impunity of murderers, and the public acquiescence to it all -- follow an arc going back several centuries. To them, I suggest a fresh read of Pipes. Below, I'm posting a video from a speech I just delivered at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco, arguing that time has perhaps passed by the utility of current U.S. oil policy on Russia, specifically that of pipeline politics.



At the American Conservative, Daniel Larison argues inaccurately that Pipes is merely advocating a continuation of two-decade-long U.S. policy. For instance, Larison takes Pipes to task for failing to insist on a break in NATO expansion, when the piece in fact suggests the opposite.

At the Squirrel's Nest, we get an attempt at the long view from Terry McGarty, a Massachusetts startup investor and one of Pipes' former Cambridge colleagues. McGarty quotes a well-known criticism of NATO expansion by George Kennan, one of the best diplomats the U.S. ever turned out. Kennan asserted that, among other things, NATO expansion would restore the atmosphere of the Cold War, and impale Duma ratification of Start II. Today, no one can project backward with certainty how events would have unfolded absent NATO expansion, but, in the context of Russian history, as Pipes well lays out in his piece, even in the most optimistic of circumstances there would have been at minimum the danger of Moscow creeping back into the vacuum of its former Eastern European satellites. And in a more pessimistic turn of events, eastern and central Europe could have been in similar circumstances to Ukraine and Georgia today, confronting an angry, assertive Russia at their border. Finally, Kennan wholly misjudges the Russian position on nuclear arms. Russian politics could change down the road, but since Mikhail Gorbachev the country has favored almost any nuclear arms control deal; none of the serious nuclear arms accords discussed in the post-Soviet era was ever imperiled as far as Moscow's signature was concerned. Kennan had that backwards -- they were upended in the U.S., by the Bush administration.

What Biden in Ukraine and Georgia Shows: Making Up (With Russia) Is Hard to Do

In a two-day swoop, Vice President Joe Biden has single-handedly signaled something about the reset button: While the idea of rapprochement with Russia that he ostentatiously suggested five months ago is romantic, getting back together usually isn't a good idea for divorced couples. They tend to go back to the same old aggravating habits.

In this case, Biden first went to Ukraine, which he assured that Washington isn't recognizing Russia's claimed entitlement to influence over its neighbors. He said that if Ukraine decides to join NATO, the U.S. is behind it. (Thanks to RealClearPolitics for posting the transcript.)

Then today, Biden flew south to Georgia, where he said the same thing: "We understand that Georgia aspires to join NATO. We fully support that aspiration," Biden said.



Almost nothing is guaranteed to raise the hackles of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin more than the suggestion that Georgia should be permitted to join NATO; a close second would be the same formulation for Ukraine. Russia regards both nations as its own. Indeed, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin responded by saying that Georgia is "remilitarizing" after being pummeled by Russia in a five-day war last August, and saying that Moscow might move to stop it.

So why did the Obama administration choose to put irritating language into Biden's mouth? The answer is realpolitik. Washington truly does want calmer, more constructive relations with Russia. It knows that neither Ukraine nor Georgia are capable of meeting NATO requirements; it also knows that the two aren't welcome as members by much of Europe, which -- there is no delicate way of putting it -- allows Russia to call the shots on issues including further NATO enlargement and the direction of new natural gas pipelines.

Yet, putting aside for now the question of whether NATO in fact should expand further, for reasons of politics and appearances, Washington cannot be seen to be acceding to Russia's wishes. So you have speeches like Biden's in Ukraine and Georgia.

It's true that Biden tried to soften the sting by also suggesting that both Ukraine and Georgia could improve their political systems. Biden also refrained from agreeing to Saakashvili's request for a replenishment of armored weapons, which Georgia all-but exhausted in the August war.

Some of the blogosphere is alight with accusations that Washington threw "another ally under the bus," as Pamela Geller over at Atlas Shrugs put it. Others, such as Robert Antonio Hussain, go the other way. "Why must VP Joe Biden stir up the pot all over again about Georgia, Russia, NATO and Georgian Pres. Saakashvili?" wrote Hussain.

The answer to Geller: No he didn't.

The answer to Hussain: Because he must.