Guest Column: Khanna on the Pipeline War
Parag Khanna, the director of the global governance initiative at the New America Foundation, is the author of The Second World, which Random House is publishing next month. It's already getting much attention, including an essay on the cover of The New York Times Magazine two weeks ago. One thing I noticed immediately in the book galleys is Parag's very different take from my own on Russia and the Pipeline War. In an email exchange yesterday, Parag said he agrees with Paul Sampson's more optimistic take on a win-win outcome to the pipeline competition, published Sunday on this blog. Parag writes that he agrees with Paul "at least in terms of the long-term outcome of Gazprom remaining strong while the EU pursues a more stable energy relationship with Russia." We'll try to get more of both Paul and Parag on this blog in the coming month.
Here are the rest of Parag's remarks:
One has to wonder what strategies Europe can employ to increase its negotiating position before the 2025/30 estimates of reduced dependence on Russian gas.
For example, what would be the impact of restoring friendlier ties with Turkey in the coming years given its position as a pipeline conduit and its blossoming bilateral investment relationship with Russia?
What sorts of price stability and corporate governance demands can be brought to bear on Gazprom & Co. through [Italy's] Eni and/or other potential (e.g. Hungary) partners in the new operations?
Given Boris Tadic's re-election in Serbia, what kind of incentives can the EU offer to mitigate Gazprom's strength there even if they move ahead with the deal selling Gazprom 51% of NIS?
I'd welcome anyone's comments on the way ahead in getting Europeans on the same page (finally) on this issue.
Here are the rest of Parag's remarks:
One has to wonder what strategies Europe can employ to increase its negotiating position before the 2025/30 estimates of reduced dependence on Russian gas.
For example, what would be the impact of restoring friendlier ties with Turkey in the coming years given its position as a pipeline conduit and its blossoming bilateral investment relationship with Russia?
What sorts of price stability and corporate governance demands can be brought to bear on Gazprom & Co. through [Italy's] Eni and/or other potential (e.g. Hungary) partners in the new operations?
Given Boris Tadic's re-election in Serbia, what kind of incentives can the EU offer to mitigate Gazprom's strength there even if they move ahead with the deal selling Gazprom 51% of NIS?
I'd welcome anyone's comments on the way ahead in getting Europeans on the same page (finally) on this issue.
Labels: Gazprom, khanna, natural gas, nord stream, Putin, Russia, second world, turkey

