Steve LeVine covers foreign affairs for BusinessWeek. He previously was correspondent for Central Asia and the Caucasus for The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times for 11 years. His first book, The Oil and the Glory, a history of the former Soviet Union through the lens of oil, was published in October 2007. Putin’s Labyrinth, his new book, profiles Russia through the lives and deaths of six Russians. It was released this week.

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A Blog on Russia, Central Asia and
the Caucasus

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Guest Column: Khanna on the Pipeline War

Parag Khanna, the director of the global governance initiative at the New America Foundation, is the author of The Second World, which Random House is publishing next month. It's already getting much attention, including an essay on the cover of The New York Times Magazine two weeks ago. One thing I noticed immediately in the book galleys is Parag's very different take from my own on Russia and the Pipeline War. In an email exchange yesterday, Parag said he agrees with Paul Sampson's more optimistic take on a win-win outcome to the pipeline competition, published Sunday on this blog. Parag writes that he agrees with Paul "at least in terms of the long-term outcome of Gazprom remaining strong while the EU pursues a more stable energy relationship with Russia." We'll try to get more of both Paul and Parag on this blog in the coming month.

Here are the rest of Parag's remarks:

One has to wonder what strategies Europe can employ to increase its negotiating position before the 2025/30 estimates of reduced dependence on Russian gas.

For example, what would be the impact of restoring friendlier ties with Turkey in the coming years given its position as a pipeline conduit and its blossoming bilateral investment relationship with Russia?

What sorts of price stability and corporate governance demands can be brought to bear on Gazprom & Co. through [Italy's] Eni and/or other potential (e.g. Hungary) partners in the new operations?

Given Boris Tadic's re-election in Serbia, what kind of incentives can the EU offer to mitigate Gazprom's strength there even if they move ahead with the deal selling Gazprom 51% of NIS?

I'd welcome anyone's comments on the way ahead in getting Europeans on the same page (finally) on this issue.

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