Talk is Cheap, and Now So Is Satellite-Internet Streaming into Iran

By Sasha Meyer

Iran keeps making headlines, and some experts say the crackdown there could fuel repression in Central Asia. Stateside, there's a public debate on what to do. An op-ed in The Wall Street Journal suggests, among other things, giving the Iranians satellite phones by smuggling the handsets into the country. This might work as a quick fix. But, if willing, the West can do a lot more: It can bring censorship-free Internet to everyone's laptop in the region. As noted previously, the idea is already technologically feasible.

On July 1, TerreStar, an American company, launched a satellite through which it will offer phone and Internet service directly to pocket-sized phones, PDAs and laptops in the U.S. and Canada, eliminating the need for conspicuous satellite dishes. The service will start before the end of the year in partnership with AT&T, and consumers will use a dual-mode smartphone that connects both to the satellite and the ordinary cellular network. A competitor – SkyTerra – plans to offer similar services next year, after placing two spacecraft into orbit.

Putting a similar satellite over the other side of the globe would go a long way toward helping to ensure a free flow of information in Iran and Central Asia. How affordable the idea would be depends on two trends.

First, launches are becoming cheaper as private space companies begin their operations. One of them – SpaceX – wants to slash costs 90%, and it's already half way there: On July 13th, it launched Malaysian RazakSAT for $8 million, 50% off the industry average for the same type of technology.

Secondly, dual-mode phones could become commonplace in the next couple of years, which would make launching SkyTerra-like services elsewhere in the world cheaper and less risky. Qualcomm, a major supplier of mobile phone chips, plans to integrate satellite capability into its mass market products. Infineon, another big maker of mobile phone processors, has something similar in the works.

This option of adding extra functionality to their products at little or no extra cost will be attractive to handset makers. The opportunity would be especially appealing to those like Taiwan's HTC and its Japanese competitors that are otherwise big in size, but want to expand their tiny U.S. market share. The former manufactures cell phones for many of the world's biggest brands. The latter make the world's most innovative phones. Both suffer from weak brand recognition in the U.S. Offering a dual-mode handset might be a way to remedy that.

The Thread that Binds the Unrest in Iran and China

A common thread runs through the current hard-line crackdowns in Iran and western China. It's business -- in the case of Iran, the personal fruits of the country's entire economy; in that of China, just ordinary livelihood.

Starting with Iran, Michael Slackman of The New York Times contributes a strong profile on why the Revolutionary Guards are so intent on their man – Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – retaining power after the disputed June 12^th presidential elections. It’s the “military-based conglomerate” that they control, a “multi-billion-dollar empire reaching into nearly every sector of the economy,” Slackman writes. That includes oil, car-making, and road-and-bridge building. Since he came to power in 2005, Ahmadinejad has awarded the Guards 750 oil and natural gas development projects, Slackman writes.

Not that Ahmadinejad initiated a new practice by enriching the group that’s primarily keeping him in power. A year before his 2004 murder in Moscow, Forbes correspondent Paul Klebnikov wrote a brilliant investigative piece on how the family of former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had grabbed control over vast swaths of the economy. Today, Rafsanjani fashions himself as a reformer defending voters cheated in the June 12^th election; during the election campaign itself, he threatened to sue Ahmadinejad for accusing him and his family of corruption. Klebnikov doesn’t document corruption; he only lays out the family’s financial rise from poor obscurity.

All this adds up to is what those familiar with the region already know – there are no innocents in the race for power around the Caspian Sea. In the remote chance that Ahmadinejad were swept from power, would a new Iranian regime be clean of such pocket-lining? If the past is any teacher, the answer has to be a firm no. Slackman’s story doesn’t declare otherwise, only that the Guards have much to gain if Ahmadinejad remains in place.

Which brings us to China. Slackman notes that Iran remained conspicuously silent on the Chinese crackdown on Muslim Uighurs this month. One possible reason? One of the Guards’ main trading partners is China, he writes.

In China, my former Wall Street Journal colleague Ian Johnson weighs in with a penetrating piece on the subtext of ordinary business in the violence in Xinjiang. The rioting that killed almost 200 people was triggered in an immediate sense by the murder of two Uighurs, Johnson writes.

But he adds that the undercurrent is seething Uighur anger over the takeover of traditional industries by the majority Han Chinese – the bazaars, even the preparation of halal meats consumed by the Uighurs.

The Grand Bazaar in the regional capital of Urumchi is now run by Han. So is the main marketplace downtown. As for halal meats, Johnson describes a business owned by Huo Lanlan, a Han who runs one of Xinjiang’s largest halal food processors. Of 300 workers, Lanlan employs just a few Uighurs, including a cleaning lady.

So that when the Uighurs rioted, it wasn’t just over a murder. The Uighurs see Chinese prosperity creeping in to Xinjiang, but largely enjoyed by Han from elsewhere.

Iran: Politics and Stirring Up Internet Cyberspace

By Sasha Meyer

A recent op-ed piece in the San Francisco Chronicle urges the Silicon Valley to help the Iranians. The author, Cyrus Farivar, suggests providing censorship-free Internet access by means of terrestrial or airborne base stations deployed near Iran's borders. Farivar is on the right track – Silicon Valley can and should help. But this particular approach might not work.

The reason is that the adjacent countries are either war zones or run by governments that might not be keen on hosting such facilities. As their reaction to the outcome of Iran’s June 12th president election suggests (they all promptly congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his official re-election), their view seems to be that the crackdown is an internal issue. Thus they would likely avoid involvement in a project that would support the reformers.

What way might work? The Silicon Valley, Western NGOs and the general public could lease bandwidth from Google-backed O3b Networks, a satellite Internet company, give it to users in Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and pay for it themselves via crowd funding. The rationale for doing so regionally rather than focusing on a single country is twofold: It would create disincentives for any single government to tamper, since that might upset its neighbors. Likewise, some of the countries are inextricably linked to a larger foreign policy puzzle, which also could discourage interference.

O3b's service, slated to start next year, will cover the Earth's surface up to 45 degrees north of the Equator. That includes all of South and Central Asia, except the northern parts of Kazakhstan. Although the initial focus is on providing up to 10 Gbps to local telecoms, plans also include 2 Mbps connectivity for consumers equipped with a 0.5-1 meter dish. That is a size possessed by many ordinary residents of the region.

Google and O3b emphasize that the service will be affordable, so it might be feasible to pay for it via online fund raising, a strategy that has proven successful in recent elections elsewhere. A complementary method could be the click-to-give ad-supported route used effectively by sites like HungerSite. Hollywood stars might be willing to help promote the effort, since they are championing an increasing number of causes.

Secondly, the Western public can help develop an inexpensive DIY (do it yourself) satellite modem for use with O3b services. An efficient and efficacious approach would be an open source hardware (OSH) project. The term refers to the engineers and tinkerers who are doing for electronics what programmers have done for software – creating free and open source products like Firefox and Linux to collapse the cost of innovation. They create and share devices by posting all the schematics and know-how online for anyone to use and modify.

Clubs like NYC Resistor and HacDC engage in OSH projects, and companies – Bug Labs, Adafruit and Arduino – make OSH products. The public can call on these modern day mad scientists to design the modem and fund the project via the Open Source Hardware Bank, which opened earlier this year.

The response in the region (at least among Central Asians) is likely to be positive thanks to a strong DIY mindset there, stemming from a combination of reasonably high educational levels and low incomes.

One promising idea that OSH talent could pursue is software defined radio (SDR). In a conventional radio, all the processes are handled by single-purpose circuits whose functionality can't be altered or upgraded. Hence the high cost and the need for a multitude of radio gadgets – the walkie-talkie, the garage door opener, FM radio and so on – that all look and work differently. With SDR, you have a multifunctional radio device because most of the work is done through software. It can seamlessly switch from one function to another by simply starting up a different piece of software. Upgrades are not just possible but are easy. As a result, SDR can cut costs by 90%.

Not surprisingly, this approach has been embraced by big players like Nokia, Samsung and Intel. But it's the grass roots efforts that are most relevant here, such as the USB device developed by a team led by Matt Ettus. It's a universal radio peripheral that can work as a GPS receiver, TV decoder, GSM base station and radar. Presumably, one would need just another piece of software to turn it into an O3b satellite modem.

Finally, as described here in a previous post, the Americans and Europeans could lobby their governments to build a satellite that would bring a massive amount of bandwidth to the region, much as Japan is doing for East Asia and the Pacific.

On Obama's Plate in Moscow: Iran and Breakfast With Putin

The philosophical underpinning of President Obama's arms-control agenda in Russia next week is that -- by allowing Moscow to preen on-stage, reviving its former role as a superpower state, ostensibly regulating peace in the world -- Russia will be more amenable to persuasion on other topics.

But does this reasoning hold? Will Moscow see things Washington's way on the Caspian, on Georgia, and on the balance of petro-power in Europe?

More important at the moment, could Moscow decouple from Iran, with which it has maintained an alliance of poking-fingers-in-the-U.S.-chest? Now that the chances for a game-changing U.S. opening with Iran have been all-but eliminated by the after-election crackdown in Tehran, is there anything to be done before Israel, for instance, decides it can no longer wait for Iran to become a nuclear state?

I've surveyed some old Russia and foreign policy hands from the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations, and the answer comes back that, at least on Iran, Moscow either can't or won't be able to help restrain Tehran. As for petro-power and the Caspian -- Moscow is capitalizing on the global financial crisis to re-assert power in its struggling neighborhood, and will push back on any attempt to deny it regional domination.

Steve Sestanovich, ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union under President Clinton and now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me that Moscow is already effectively cooperating with U.S. aims on Iran -- while it committed to finishing Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor and providing S-300 missiles, Moscow for years has failed to deliver either. "Their policy is to avoid annoying anybody too much," Sestanovich says. "The middle ground allows them to make a lot of money. And they hold in reserve a role as a possible diplomatic mediator if the U.S. or Iran indicate they are reconsidering their position."

Georgetown Professor Angela Stent, a former State Department and National Intelligence Council expert on the region, just got off the plane from Moscow yesterday. She says that Russian officials and experts have a mixed view of Iran -- the latter say that Russia can live with a nuclear Iran, just as it lives with a nuclear Pakistan and India; and the former say they don't believe that Tehran is anywhere near obtaining nuclear capability.

Whatever the case, seeking Russian help on Iran is misguided, Stent suggests. "Russia doesn't have the power to deliver Iran," she says.

A former Bush administration official who preferred to speak not for attribution said that any stiffer sanctions -- even if the Europeans and Russia were to agree -- "would not work quickly enough." "They are on the threshold" of nuclear capability, this official said, and this again raises the possibility of an attack by Israel on Iran.

Interestingly, Obama administration officials still talk of the possibility of negotiations with Iran. That seems to ignore political reality both in Iran -- Sestanovich notes that Iranian officials themselves seem publicly at least not to welcome further talks -- and the U.S., where Obama could face a buzz-saw of criticism should he be seen as equivocating after the bloody aftermath to the June 12th Iranian presidential election.

Obama will spend some 10 hours with President Dmitry Medvedev while in Moscow. But on Tuesday, Obama is also going to have a private breakfast for an hour or an hour-and-a-half with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Obama told The Associated Press that Putin "has one foot in the old ways," while Medvedev understands "that the old Cold War approaches to U.S.-Russian relations are outdated." This is a nice public relations setup, but not likely to result in any progress -- Medvedev has done nothing so far to indicate any separation from Putin on foreign policy, and there's no reason I can think of to believe that he will.

The former Bush administration official asserted that Obama shouldn't dignify Putin's behind-the-curtain grip on power by spending time with him; technically speaking, only Medvedev is on the same protocol level, this thinking goes. For that reason, this former official told me, Bush didn't meet with Putin once he was no longer president and began serving as prime minister. That's technically correct but disingenuous. In fact, just prior to Putin's stepping down, Bush violated his own rule precluding meetings with other heads of state unless there was a concrete deliverable to be achieved: Bush did so by flying out to Putin's vacation home at Sochi, hence delivering much prestige to the Russian leader but nothing for the U.S.

Stent says rightly that it's not realistic to ignore Putin. "To move the agenda forward, you have to meet with both of them," she told me. "It wouldn't make sense not to meet with Putin."

Indeed, rolling back a few years earlier, when Bush's father went to Moscow as U.S. president, he met with both Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his antagonist-for-Soviet-power, Boris Yeltsin, who was then the mere president of the component state of Russia.

Putin is not ignorable, any more than Russia, as usual, keeps itself in the diplomatic game by its willingness to play the outsider.

Satellite-Streaming Into Iran

Over at Mother Jones, David Corn posed the question the other day on whether the U.S. could frustrate Tehran's Internet jamming by beaming broad-band service into the country by satellite. He reported that the question was asked of White House spokesman Robert Gibbs, who did not know the answer.

O&G's own Sasha Meyer answered this question in a post last month. There does not appear to be a currently available, off-the-shelf technology. But Meyer describes a satellite system being put in orbit by Google-backed o3b whose target is to beam high-speed Internet service from space starting the end of next year. Alcatel-Lucent is developing a similar system with SkyTerra.

Meyer suggested such systems as a way to bring tamper-free Internet to Central Asia. It's not fail-safe. As Charles Recknagel over at RFE-RL suggests, the Iranians and Central Asians can jam the signal; they also could simply prevent possibly necessary base stations from being installed. But it is technologically possible.

For the West, One Loss, One Gain

Short of a bolt of lightning from Qom, there will be no game-changing opening between the West and Iran. The politics in neither Tehran nor Washington will allow one, not after all the bloodletting, both past and what is still to come. Yet, all is not lost. Kyrgystan's agreement to allow U.S. use of a military base is a reversal for Moscow, and a comparatively less-important but still an unexpected boon for Washington.

In Iran, some reporting -- over at Eurasianet, for instance -- has had it that a highly irritated former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has been in the holy city of Qom, working to persuade its powerful clerics to turn against paramount leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Unless they do -- and this report frankly appears to reflect wishful thinking by regime critics rather than a credible news leak -- there is no logical reason to anticipate any change in the current crackdown, and thus any thaw of U.S.-Iran relations.

There simply is no political scenario in which either the Obama administration, or Tehran, can be seen locally as making concessions to the other side. That includes talks on Iran's nuclear program. According to a report by Barbara Slavin in The Washington Times, the Obama administration sent a letter last month to Khamenei suggesting "cooperation in regional and bilateral relations." But the events since June 12th put the kabbosh on this notion.

Not incidentally, the Iranian crackdown about shuts off the last ray of hope for the Nabucco pipeline, the leading western option for balancing off Russian petro-power in Europe.

Then there is Kyrgyzstan. Since the Soviet collapse, U.S. influence has been on the ascent in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Kyrgyzstan has no natural resources to speak of, but managed to grab western attention by embracing the free market earlier and more tightly than anyone else; the cliche became that this nation bordering China was the Switzerland of Central Asia. That link to the west was cemented by 9/11/, when the U.S. opened the Manas Air Base to serve troops in Afghanistan.

Yet in February, Kyryz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev went to Moscow and, while standing next to Dimitri Medvedev, announced that the U.S. was out; and Russia would now get the base. Oh, and incidentally Moscow was granting $2 billion in economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan.

The loss of the base was another blow in U.S. influence in the region after the Russian defeat of Georgia in last August's war. There seemed to be no arresting the slide, either.

Knocked back on its heels, the U.S. didn't see much wiggle room. Yesterday, though, both sides confirmed that the U.S. will keep the base. The base's name will change to a "transit center," and the U.S. will pay a lot more ($60 million a year outright, in addition to various other sweeteners, compared with $17 million previously).

Over at RFE-RL, Bruce Pannier quotes Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev as putting down the shift to the turbulence in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

"Unfortunately, it needs to be stated that despite the efforts of forces of the government of Afghanistan and forces of the international coalition, the situation in [Afghanistan], especially in light of the events in the Swat Valley of Pakistan, show a tendency toward becoming worse. And in the event of instability in the future, this could have an effect on the security situation in the states of Central Asia, in particular on Kyrgyzstan."

Is Sarbayev providing the whole, or even any, of the genuine reason for the shift? That's impossible to say. Other elements of the Kyrgyz decision must have been after-the-fact remorse over losing its careful U.S.-Russia balance by lurching to one side. In Moscow itself, the Kremlin is trying to put the best face on the shift, with one official claiming that Russia itself agreed to the quick-switch.

Whatever the case, the bigger picture is how rapidly events can shift in the region. It also underscores that, though most events seem to point to lessening U.S. influence in the region, Washington remains an important player.

Iran: 'I'm Not So Sure I Want to Die Yet'

A simple calibration underlies the diminishing of protests in Tehran: The regime's bet -- correctly -- that those unhappy with the June 12th election results aren't prepared to pay the ultimate price for the right to express their opinion.

As an example, my former Wall Street Journal colleague Farnaz Fassihi quotes a 33-year-old woman who is rethinking her participation in the street demonstrations of the last week: "It's now crossed the line. If you come out it means you are ready to become a martyr. And I'm not so sure I want to die yet," the woman says.

While his dispatch isn't poetry, Sky News correspondent Tim Marshall has it about right: "In the short term it still looks like game over; in the medium term it looks like game on."

Like Russia, Uzbekistan and other dictatorship-based governments, this regime has learned from the mistakes of brethren in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and is seeking as a priority to knock out the pillars of any resistance before they are set in place.

Indeed, in his long public speech last Friday denouncing the protesters and their alleged foreign supporters, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei explicitly cited the 2003 uprising that ousted Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze. Foreigners backing the Iranian demonstrators “thought Iran is Georgia," Khamenei said. "Their problem is that they don’t know this great nation yet.”

So, the regime has threatened to execute and try alleged offenders of public order; it has interfered with communications between would-be protesters by blocking Internet, telephone and television; and it has blocked mourning of those killed. The regime understands the last item most profoundly since the actions leading to the 1979 revolution were in part sustained by 40-day mourning periods for victims of the Shah.

Karin Laub of The Associated Press reports that on the possible show trials. Quoting state-run radio, she writes that Ebrahim Raisi, a top judicial official, said, "Elements of riots must be dealt with to set an example. The judiciary will do that."

Yet small demonstrations of defiance continue. "Protesters came up with new techniques, such as turning on the lights in their cars at certain hours of the day and honking their horns or holding up posters," Laub writes. She quotes an unidentified Tehran resident whom the AP staff got on the phone saying, "People are calmly protesting, more symbolically than with their voices."

The most frequent report in terms of next steps that one hears involve a general strike -- the shutting down of industries, public transportation, shops in the bazaars, for instance. Reports say that Mousavi's own Facebook page calls for a general strike, though I don't see this notice there. Such strikes could be effective since they would be far harder to stop than protests.

One notable aspect of these events is that, contrary to reporting leading up to the elections, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is no rogue or loose cannon. The remarks by Khamenei last Friday, along with subsequent comments by the Revolutionary Guards, eerily resemble the president's.

So that when Ahmadinejad trails off on yet another incoherent diatribe on foreign conspiracies and perfidy -- the outbursts that many, including at O&G, regarded as the main impediment to a diplomatic breakthrough with the West -- he has simply been parroting his bosses.

The Second Victim in Iran

As we look for a picture of how long it will take for a resolution of Iran's brittle- and tension-filled politics, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's legitimacy is just one victim of the week-long events in Tehran.

The second victim is the already long-shot chance of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement.

Short of a remotely possible, far-reaching concession by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, there is now no near- or medium-term chance of a new day in Middle East and European politics and economics -- both of which seemed possible before the current bloody crackdown.

At O&G, it had specifically seemed possible to foresee a change in the balance of petro-power in Europe. If Russian dominance of Europe's energy picture is to be tempered, there needs to be a fresh, new supply of natural gas from somewhere. Iran seemed to be the best candidate. But for the last couple of years, Ahmadinejad's voluble belligerence has ruled out a lowering of the temperature with the U.S.: Diplomatic traction requires domestic political consent in both countries, and that's not possible when one or both sides is provoking jingoism.

A Mir Hosain Mousavi-led government would not have brought a qualitatively different policy, which was too much to expect given Iranian politics. But that also wasn't necessary. All diplomacy really needed was the leadership of both countries to shift to quiet diplomacy, which would have opened the door to finding areas of agreement.

Now that Khamenei has shed blood -- at least 12 are said to have been killed yesterday alone -- President Barack Obama cannot possibly enter into serious talks. Even if he were so inclined -- a considerable improbability -- U.S. domestic politics would not allow him to.

Iran: Out From Behind the Screen

The news from Tehran is that the confrontation no longer involves President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who it's clear is a pawn in events. The brinksmanship is squarely between the supporters of opposition leader Mir Hosain Mousavi and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has stepped boldly from behind the screen in an attempt to assert control. This is clear in the outbreak of violence today (thanks to those who continue to post raw videos -- see below -- from the scene).

Yesterday, Khamenei finally made his position clear -- he will not compromise with Iranians who claim the June 12 presidential election was rigged. He ordered Iranians to stop street protests. Today the opposition replied by doing so anyway; this included a suicide bombing near a shrine to the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

By pushing events this way, Khamenei has lost the battle of perceptions. By cracking down, and doing so without at least a facade of legitimacy -- meaning a stamp of approval by the Guardian Council -- he sacrifices the mantle of leading by popular consent. Indeed, there may be no one in control now.

Iran: The Virtue of Clarity

To be sure, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is a gambler. Yet, by making clear that he intends to crack down hard should street protests continue over the June 12 presidential elections, Iran's supreme leader has also done a service by clearing up confusion about the direction of events. By reiterating that the election was fair -- and doing so before an official reply to his request for a verdict on the polling from an oversight board -- Khamenei also underscored that the issue isn't whether the votes were counted correctly; rather, it's the sanctity of his own authority.

He intends to stay in power. And he intends for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to remain president.

The ball is now in the court of opposition candidate Mir Hosain Mousavi, and the hundreds of thousands of green-clad protesters who have marched through Tehran for the last week. A new rally is scheduled tomorrow after a one-day interregnum.

If the crowds return to the streets in the same numbers, they provide their own clarity.

Brinksmanship in Iran

Yesterday, a close friend told me that he ultimately expects the Iranian regime to crush the street protests in Tehran using "a Tiananmen." One can validly reach that conclusion, hearing government officials threatening execution of protesters, and continuing to raise the specter of the Velvet Revolution to describe what they clearly regard as a mob.

Yet, the government continues to concede ground to the protesters; despite the blockage of Internet and so forth, the Guardian Council -- the body designated to investigate allegations of election fraud last Friday, has offered a meeting the day after tomorrow with the opposition presidential candidates including Mir Hosain Mousavi.

And then there are the compellingly large, continued street demonstrations.

Since brinksmanship is not a matter of simple arithmetic, there in fact is no way to project how this ends up.

In a smart analysis At RFE-RL, the perspicacious Geneive Abdo sees a power shift coming from the tumult, but the balance of power remaining in current hands for at least another decade -- until the leaders of the 1979 revolution leave political life. Support of Hamas and Hezbollah will remain, in addition to development of nuclear technology. What do the younger generation want once they do have power? Not "a government that shuns Islamic principles or even a state that does not include clerics, as some in the West might think," writes Abdo.

"Instead, they want free and fair elections to choose their own leaders; social freedom, now denied them by strict interpretations of Islamic law; and they want Iran’s militias to stay out of their private lives. They also want uninterrupted access to technology, which includes the Internet and social networks."

Update: The Wall Street Journal's Jerry Seib, who has deep experience in Iran, weighs in with a list of possible outcomes, both optimistic and pessimistic. Seib, too, thinks the situation is impossible to predict.

Why Fear of Velvet (Roses, Oranges, Tulips and other Colored Threats) Could Influence the Outcome of Iran's Elections

On the eve of tomorrow's Iranian presidential election, a senior officer in the influential Revolutionary Guards has come right out and expressed the conservatives' fear: Opponents of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are trying to mount a "color revolution."

If Ahmadinejad wins re-election, the likelihood for game-changing U.S.-Iranian diplomacy -- including a break in the Moscow-Tehran diplomatic alliance that frustrates pipeline and other economic advances in the region -- will be dampened. That's because Ahmadinejad isn't likely to tone down his often-belligerent rhetoric sufficiently to allow normal diplomacy to take place.

Hence the import of the latest reporting out of Tehran. As The Washington Post's Thomas Erdbrink reported today, Gen. Yadollah Javani, head of the political office of the Revolutionary Guards, said, "Any movement for a velvet revolution in Iran will be nipped in the bud."



Javani of course is referring to the 1989 Czech Velvet Revolution that ushered out Communism, in addition to the clutch of uprisings it helped to inspire -- Georgia's Rose Revolution of 2003; Ukraine's Orange Revolution of 2004; and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution of 2005. (On the latter, my former Wall Street Journal colleague Alan Cullison has an excellent page-one piece today on Russia's gain and the U.S. loss as the Kyrgyz revolt has turned sour. )

For the dictators of the world, these revolts were shuddering events. In response, Russia's Vladimir Putin formed his thuggish nationalist movement called Nashi. According to some, the revolts were one reason for Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov's murderous crushing of the 2005 Andijan protests.

And now we know that Iran's ruling class feels similarly. What specifically appears to have triggered Javani's remarks are the enormous, green-clad crowds that have marched through the streets of Tehran in support of Mir Hossain Mousavi. Ahmadinejad has attracted his own large crowds; he is an excellent campaigner, a populist who knows the power of pork-barrel politics, enjoys blanket coverage by state-run television, and appears to enjoy the direct backing of paramount leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The New York Times' Robert Worth writes today that former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was defeated by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 elections, is operating a war room to help prevent official cheating. Rafsanjani is dispatching an army of election monitors around the country

(Note to Rafsanjani: The most pernicious election-cheating around the world occurs not during voting, but long afterward, indeed after the local counting. Specifically, it occurs in the computer rooms of the central election commissions that are both responsible for tallying up the count, and answerable to the country's incumbent leaders.)

Given the general belief that Iran's democracy is a relatively regulated one, what will be the impact of this apparent attitude toward the turnovers of power in the above-mentioned nearby countries? If Mousavi does as well as many predict -- if he wins outright, or forces a second round of voting -- will the announced count reflect this result?

Officials like Javani assert that this gets at their beef -- the opposition, they assert, are prepared to strongly protest the election results regardless of whether Ahmadinejad genuinely wins. That could be true.

Reporters on the spot are calling this Iran's most vigorously contest election since the 1979 revolution. They say, for instance, that it's the first time that women have been so centrally involved. These facts lay on the opposite side of the equation from the official fear of colored revolution as Khamenei decides how to respond tomorrow as the election results come in.

Iran's Election, and the Tehran-Moscow Alliance

Would a new Iranian president change the complexion of relations with the United States?

That’s the conventional wisdom. It’s also the hope in Washington and elsewhere. With Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in another term as president after the June 12th elections, the thinking goes, there will simply be more nationalist and anti-Semitic bombast; in contrast, a new president will doubtlessly continue to embrace uranium enrichment, but will be less reliant politically on an antagonistic relationship with the U.S.

Whatever the case, the president ultimately is not Iran’s principal power. That position in society is held by Ayatollah Ali Khameini, who ultimately balances Iran’s various religious, commercial and political forces, and forms the consensus that we see as Iranian policy. He is whom President Barack Obama is directing his diplomacy.

That’s more or less what was laid out today by Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian-American Council and author of the award-winning Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States.

Parsi addressed a small group at the National Foreign Trade Council in Washington, where he argued against any further hardening of economic sanctions against Iran (there is a push to block refined oil products from Iran, whose refineries product far less fuel than the country requires). Parsi argued that such a move would work against U.S. interests, driving Iran away from the negotiating table, while doing nothing to loosen its resolve to go its own way on nuclear development, Hezbollah and so on.

I filmed a clip of Parsi’s reply to a question on Iran and Russia’s tactical alliance. While he didn’t predict the disintegration of the alliance, he did note that it’s built on soft sand, given the two nations’ long and deep distrust.

In the post-Machiavellian World, Economics, Not War, Rule

The outlines of the Obama administration's foreign policy are becoming plain. And they are as audacious as his domestic policies.

Among the interconnected aims so far are: Engineer fully normalized relations with Syria and a strategic partnership with Russia, paving the way to a rapprochement with Iran, and shaking up the power equation in the Middle East.

You can be forgiven for rolling your eyes, but wait. We've discussed previously how the financial crisis potentially changes the chessboard in numerous ways. But there's also something qualitatively different in the administration's approach from its predecessors' -- how far it appears willing to go.

Among ideas under consideration, last Friday the Financial Times's Daniel Dombey reported that Washington could allow Iran to enrich uranium as long as it's under strict observation; and it's been clear that the administration is willing to delay or even cancel the George W. Bush-era plan to station missile defense positions in Poland and the Czech Republic, as long as Russia offers up something equivalent in exchange (according to a report by the Washington Post's Craig Whitlock, the Czechs may pull out of the plan unilaterally in any case). In terms of Syria, read Seymour Hersh's exhaustive account of American diplomacy and what it could bring in last week's New Yorker.

Interestingly, helpful offers are coming from elsewhere to ease this process. Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev, for instance, is offering to host a "nuclear bank" of fissile material that nations such as Iran could tap in order to feed nuclear reactors without having to develop their own enriched uranium, report the Wall Street Journal's Jonathan Weisman and Marc Champion. According to the WSJ story, President Obama is seriously considering the offer, which seems reasonable: Kazakhstan is a stable country, and the offer is part of its continuing efforts to get back in the West's good graces after its years of pummeling on political rights grounds. Over at Registan, Josh Foust rightly says the jury is out on whether the bank will actually be created. Yet the fact that it's even getting such consideration demonstrates the administration's will to wedge into a thaw with Iran.

Against this backdrop, Leslie Gelb, the uber-analyst who formerly ran the Council on Foreign Relations, weighs in with a new book, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. The book, which has been reviewed well elsewhere, is written as a letter to Obama.

Gelb's narrative explicitly jumps off from Machiavelli's The Prince, arguing that for much of five centuries, a national leader's main power has ultimately rested on fear of what he might and could do militarily. Yet Gelb is at heart a pragmatist. Gelb -- last week, I attended a talk by him before a small group of think-tank types and reporters over at the Council's Washington office -- has no time for ideologues or idealists who "ensnare our leaders into thinking about what they 'must' do, rather than about what they can do." He skillfully weaves the current tapestry of global events into the history of what brought us here.

Yet what I found most interesting in the book was Gelb's steady description of how power in the world has changed fundamentally since Machiavelli wrote his job application to Lorenzo de' Medici. Today, economics, and not warmaking, are at the center of power, a point that we discussed last week with Paul Kennedy.

Over at The National Interest, Daniel Drezner writes that this is a problem with the book. Drezner says Gelb fails to handle the economics portion well. I disagree. While Gelb is obviously more comfortable with the politics, the message on economics is clear and, more important, spot on.

I have my own problems with the book, primarily that Gelb seems not to consider that a nation's power can stem not only from its basic military or economic strength, but also from its capacity to muck up the works. In the talk, Gelb called Iran "a third-rate power," verging on fourth-rate, suggesting that it thus shouldn't be looked at as a central player in the Middle East or elsewhere. But what about Iran-supported Hezbollah and Hamas, and their threat to Israel and stability in Lebanon? Iran does occupy a pivotal place, specifically because of its nuisance value.

Conversely, both Iran and Russia -- another nation that delights in confounding U.S. initiatives abroad -- showed in the wake of 9/11 that they are willing and able to work within the construct of international consensus. Both nations played crucial roles in the U.S. dislodging of the Taliban in October 2002.

Russia's Vladimir Putin intuitively grasps the shift in global affairs. That's demonstrated in his energy policy, which despite the financial crisis continues to work to shift Russian power into Europe through the construction of natural gas pipelines and the purchase of energy infrastructure.

But, as Gelb suggests, the U.S. still seems locked into Machiavelli's world:

The linking of trade, investments, and resources to foreign policy and military affairs has been second nature to most nations for centuries. But this has not been the case in America, where principle and politics unite to 'protect' economics and business from government intrusion (except where needed), where the departments of State and Treasury still avoid collaborating on policy, and where intellectual apartheid separates economics and politics departments at universities.

Power Rules gets the new rules right.

Reset: Russia, yes; Iran, Kinda

Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation, will be the chief U.S. negotiator for nuclear arms reductions with Russia. The goal is to sign a completed deal by Dec. 15, when Start I expires.

That's not a surprise -- Gottemoeller negotiated one of Washington's single most-important successes in the post-Soviet era, which was the removal during the Clinton administration of 4,000 nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

It's also not a surprise that presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev today made the re-negotiation of Start I the core of a reset of U.S.-Russia relations. Arms reduction, highly favored in Russia, "is the most productive vehicle to start with," Angela Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University, told me by phone. "It doesn't mean we will be finished by December, but the statement provides which systems will be included" in the talks.

Yet in a post-mortem with reporters, two senior U.S. officials seemed downright giddy after today's meeting between Obama and Medvedev in London, where the Group of 20 summit will be held tomorrow. One reason was that the two leaders were even able to agree on a final agenda going forward; and second was a stronger agreement on how to deal with Iran's nuclear program.

All of this has an economic component -- energy. Geopolitics in the region are highly inter-connected: Better relations with Russia can help fertilize the ground toward a thaw of U.S. relations with Iran, which could then significantly improve global natural gas supplies, particularly to Europe, which is highly dependent on -- who else? -- Russia. It's all fairly circular. Iran has the world's second-largest natural gas reserves, and whenever the financial crisis tamps down, Europe's energy thirst is going to resume its rise.

What Obama officials said on the four-page Obama-Medvedev statement itself: "I'll tell you honestly, I was not optimistic when we started this process of negotiating this that we would get it done for this meeting. ... It started very differently several weeks ago, and that he got his government to engage in it in a very serious way and get it done in time for our meeting today I think is a statement of the possibilities in U.S.-Russian relations."

And on the statement's position on Iran: "I've dealt with [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov over the last several weeks and they've always said Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon -- 'We have no evidence of that; show me that this is there.' And this was a different tone than that."

The two sides will continue to meet ahead of a planned Obama trip to Moscow in July.

In a blog post at Democracy Arsenal, Adam Blickstein seems as delighted as the Clinton officials. Matthew Yglesias is of a similar mind.

On Iran, progress isn't as clear-cut. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made much of a brief conversation yesterday in The Hague between U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhundzadeh. The diplomats were all there as part of a parlay on Afghanistan.

Michael van der Galien of PoliGazette blogged on that the encounter was significant, as simple as it was. John Boonstra at UN Dispatch thinks it's good news that Iran is even "in the mix."

Alas today, Iran denied that the Holbrooke-Akhunzadeh encounter took place. The political ground in Tehran is apparently not as far along toward a thaw than it is in the U.S.

This must be why experts say a true rapprochment between Washington and Tehran will be years away.

New Washington Team and a Fresh Game in Russia, Iran and the Caspian

After much gnawing over the notion, the Bush administration decided last year to issue a White House invitation to Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. That was wise -- this trained dentist is one of a handful of indispensable players in Eurasian energy.

Alas, the invitation was also late -- geopolitical rival Vladimir Putin had marked up a several-year-long head start of mutual state visits between Moscow and Ashgabat. And it was clumsy: the Turkmen leader was asked to come after the November presidential election. In other words, after Bush was officially a lame duck.

Understandably, Berdymukhamedov declined.

Today, the Obama administration is trying to lower the temperature in U.S. relations with Russia, what it calls a "reset." In two weeks, President Obama will meet with President Medvedev in London. As part of the warming-up exercise, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is cobbling together a basic agreement for the presidents' perusal on replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in December.

At the same time, the administration is forming its foreign policy team for Eurasia, the former Soviet Union, and energy. Russia has largely regained the upper hand in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which Washington had treated as a region of U.S. strategic interest since it backed construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline connecting the Caspian and Mediterranean seas in the 1990s. Washington called it the East-West Energy Corridor.

Will the Obama administration get its timing better in terms of inviting Berdymukhamedov to the White House? If so, he might become friendlier toward the parade of U.S. diplomats and oil company executives who call and email me and others regularly with tales of woe regarding their reception in Ashgabat.

Members of the new team include Mike McFaul, the long-time Russia hand who co-wrote a prescient analysis of the Russian economy in Foreign Affairs a year ago. McFaul is running the Russian and Eurasian Affairs desk at the National Security Council. Also at the NSC is Liz Sherwood-Randall, a key architect of the U.S. embrace of Uzbekistan dictator Islam Karimov in a stint at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration, who will watch the rest of the former Soviet Union. The talk is that NSC chief James Jones will also establish a new NSC slot for global oil, but I've heard the names of no firm candidates. At the State Department, the administration is losing Steven Mann, the ultra-experienced Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy, who was offered various posts, but instead is leaving to go into the private sector. Stepping back into Eurasian energy is Dick Morningstar, who served as Caspian czar during the 1990s before leaving to teach law at Harvard and Stanford.

In addition, there's talk in Washington of deputizing Vice President Joe Biden as a direct, regular interlocutor with Putin, along the lines of the Al Gore-Viktor Chernomyrdin Commission of the 1990s, which scored numerous successes on political and commercial issues.

In terms of energy itself, the Obama administration has signaled a break with previous administrations by naming a team focused on climate change and alternative fuels. But, in the case of Eurasia, policy can't be one-size-fits-all. Fossil fuels are king there, and Putin has recently handily bested U.S. diplomacy in that sphere. The final act of his triumph was the five-day Russian-Georgian war last August, which revived Russia's premier great power status throughout the former Soviet Union.

Recently, the U.S. has struck back with an West-East corridor. Turning the trans-regional corridor into a two-way route, West-East is a railroad route to supply U.S. troops in Afghanistan with non-lethal commercial supplies -- food, toilet paper and the like. Want to sell something that the troops can use? This is the way to get it there.

The context is the apparent U.S. loss of the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, and the uncertainty of the overland supply route from Pakistan through the Khyber Pass.

After Russia helped to persuade the Kyrgyz to eject Manas, it told Washington that it was willing to pick up some of the slack. (One alternative overland route starts in the Baltics, runs through Russia, and on through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan; traffic on this route could be expanded, Russia points out).

But the last 16 years in the region have been all about the uncanny power of alternative routes on geopolitics. So the U.S. appears to have politely declined and, in addition to the trans-Russia route, begun to run the West-East corridor through Georgia and Azerbaijan, across the Caspian to the Kazakhstan port of Aktau, then on to the Uzbekistan city of Termez and Afghanistan.

The ultimate game-changer in the region would be a U.S. diplomatic breakthrough with Iran. Clinton has tried to set the stage by inviting Iran to a March 31 conference in The Hague on Afghanistan to be attended by her and ministerial-level officials from some 75 countries.

As part of the attempted thaw with Moscow, Clinton is also trying to get Russia to help forge a breakthrough with Iran. There's talk of an Obama trip to Moscow in July.

Though Clinton is focused on other benefits to be gained by normalized relations with Iran -- mainly a better chance for Middle East peace -- such a change would also open up a new source of oil and natural gas. And that would change the geopolitics of Europe by diversifying its natural gas supply. That makes the Iran policy in part a new Russian policy.

The Game-Changing Financial Crisis

We already know how the financial crisis has changed the landscape around us. After a drumbeat of reckoning that has brought low the titans of Wall Street and Citibank, today we hear that the venerable American International Group is breaking itself up. The crisis also provided the opening for President Obama to seek all his main campaign pledges at once -- universal health care, education reform, carbon-emissions trading, a green economy, and a reordering of the tax code.

Investors, businessmen and diplomats who poured in to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe two decades ago are familiar with how upheaval creates opportunity. Today, I have a piece in Business Week on how today's crisis has shaken up the economic equation abroad, creating potential openings where little chance of progress previously existed.

Three examples are China and climate change; Iran and Russia. On all three, the U.S. the West, and the countries themselves can or already are capitalizing on the changed atmosphere to their own advantage. In the case of the latter two, the financial crisis could alter the natural gas chessboard in Europe.

As in the case of the investment banks, the financial crisis also holds much potential peril for economies abroad. I wrote a piece over the weekend on how development banks are trying to stave off potential dangers of the crisis in Eastern Europe. The New York Times' Steve Erlanger, my former colleague in Moscow, has a good piece explaining the fears of a fresh East-West divide in Europe.

Guest Column: Iran's Cold Winter

By Paul Sampson

Iran is in the grip of an energy crisis that has left homes without heating and electricity, forced the temporary shut-down of power plants, and even led National Iranian Oil Co to stop re-injecting gas into its onshore oilfields. How could this happen in a country with the world's second-largest oil and gas reserves, you might ask?

First, this year's winter has been the coldest in a half century; Turkmenistan cut gas supplies to Iran at the beginning of the year in a pricing dispute; and, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reacted very slowly to a national emergency.

Iranians I've spoken to say the trouble with Turkmenistan was entirely avoidable. Last autumn, Turkmenistan said that in 2008 Iran would have to remit much more than the $75 per 1,000 cubic meters, the extremely low price it had been paying. But rather than deal (what even Russia's Gazprom when the Turkmen raised the same gripe), the Iranians dug in their heels and -- hey presto -- had the taps turned off.

The Turkmen pipeline supplies remote northern Iran villages that are cut off from the mainland, so there was always going to be a problem. But, as the freezing weather started to bite, the problem became a full-blown crisis.

For Ahmadinejad, whose handling of the economy has been woeful at a time Iran is being squeezed by US-led sanctions, the energy shortages should be an embarrassment. Some analysts predict he'ill pay for his shortcomings with a hammering in next month's parliamentary elections, where his conservative rivals are expected to gain ground.

But don't bet on it; friends in Tehran have said over the past few days that Ahmadinejad is as confident as ever and, backed by the all-powerful Supreme Leader and his friends in the Revolutionary Guards, is setting his sights on being re-elected in June.

For some Iranians, that would be the last straw.

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Russia's New Abbott and Costello Defense

Vladimir Putin -- listen up.

You now have an airtight defense against those who have savaged you ever since you temporarily cut off natural gas shipments to Europe a couple of years ago in a pricing dispute with Ukraine. It would make Abbott and Costello proud.

Last week, Turkmenistan made news by cutting off natural gas supplies to Iran. The Central Asian nation, the runt forever being picked on by neighborhood bullies, had been shipping 23 million cubic meters a day to Iran, but is tired of being short-changed by Russia and Iran for its natural gas and wants more money. Russia is now paying $130 a thousand cubic meters (versus $350 it plans to charge Europe); Turkmenistan presumably wants at least that much from Iran.

Here's where the story gets wind. You see, even though Iran buys natural gas, it also sells it. But this is an incredibly cold winter, and Iranians are freezing. The country needed those Turkmen imports. So it has cut off Turkey, which was supposed to receive 30 million cubic meters a day from Iran but is only getting about 5 million.

Except it's also mighty cold in Turkey. So it has cut off Greece.

The poetic coda? The rescue squad is from Russia. Gazprom, the lightning rod for things that go wrong across Eurasia, is shipping an extra 8 million cubic meters of natural gas a day to Turkey and 1.5 million cubic meters a day to Greece.

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Finally, Some Sanity on Missiles

The U.S. proposal to install an anti-ballistic missile shield in eastern Europe appears unlikely to advance under the watch of its conceiver, President Bush. The new Polish government says it won't permit the shield right now because it's not clear that the next U.S. president will want it, and meanwhile it's not worth aggravating Russia.

Bush wants to place components of the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia's Vladimir Putin has opposed it, and Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski has provided his government's position in an interview with the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. They were kindly passed on in an article yesterday by Judy Dempsey at The New York Times.

Poland's shift is gratifying news for those like myself who think that there are so many divisive issues on the table with Russia that there's no reason to add another, especially when the shield is unreliable at best when decoys are used. When the shield definitely works, let's talk deployment.

The Polish position is built on multiple levels. It's tied up with Moscow's plans to build the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, crossing the Baltic Sea and averting nations with which Russia has tense relations, like Poland.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk wants Russia to reconsider Nord Stream. If the gas continues to cross Poland, Russia would find it harder to cut off the country during predictable periods of strained relations. Poland has also raised environmental concerns about installing a pipeline in the Baltic.

Anti-Missile Defense and Iran's Nuclear Intentions

Two bits of news deserve the rubric: How far do you intend to push this game of chicken?

Missile Defense: U.S. anti-missile defense policy has been misguided. It continues to argue the system’s merits for placement in Poland and the Czech Republic despite the failure of the technology so far when decoys are employed. Yet Russia has been similarly imprudent. Its latest rhetorical fusillade comes from Armed Forces chief Yuri Baluyevsky, who said over the weekend that any missile fired from the anti-ballistic system could inadvertently trigger an automated strike by Russia’s own defenses. Vladimir Putin has been vocal but articulate. Baluyevsky’s remarks, by contrast, are Soviet-era blather.

Iran: And now is the news that Russia has delivered the first nuclear fuel rods to an Iranian power station that’s at the center of Western concerns regarding the country’s enrichment of uranium. In statements today, Russia and Iran confirmed the shipment to the plant near the city of Bushehr. The plant can start six months after the final shipment is made, and it’s not clear when that will be. Meanwhile there’s talk in Russia and the West that this is part of Putin’s plan to get Iran to cooperate with international inspectors, and stop enriching uranium. I’ve argued previously that Putin would like to win the diplomatic prestige to be accorded any person who can resolve the Iranian-Western standoff. Putin must be confident of what he’s doing. But it’s a perilous game.

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Blow to Bush: Russia Says No New Sanctions on Iran

Russia today joined China in a public rejection of the Bush administration's effort to increase sanctions on Iran. In Moscow, Russian and Iranian officials announced that they moved closer to finalizing Russian construction of a $1 billion nuclear power plant near the southern Iranian city of Bushehr.

The agreement in itself is unimpressive -- another of those interim pacts in which the parties agree to do something later, in this case to finalize a timetable for completing the plant, which is at the heart of Western concerns about Iran's uranium enrichment program.

But it puts meat on Vladimir Putin's resistance to further Iranian sanctions after a U.S. intelligence estimate last week said Iran had stopped trying to develop nuclear arms four years ago. The Bush administration has continued to push for stepped-up sanctions, saying the new intelligence doesn't mean that Iran is less dangerous.

The Russian position makes it even harder for Bush to get agreement since China on Sunday made its feelings on the matter known when Sinopec, the Chinese oil company, signed a $2 billion oil contract with Iran.

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China Replies: No New Sanctions Against Iran

China has replied to President Bush’s request for a tougher global stand against Iran. Sinopec, the Chinese company, today signed a $2 billion contract to develop a supergiant Iranian oilfield called Yadavaran.

The field is impressive, with an estimated 3 billion barrels of recoverable reserves. But the lousy terms show that Iran is still in the driver’s seat. Still insisting on fixed profit rather than the industry-standard big-risk-big-possible-reward formula, Iran gave Sinopec just a 14.98% rate of return.

In addition, production will be extremely slow. The contract calls for just 185,000 barrels a day. By comparison, the BP-led developers of next-door Azerbaijan's offshore – which contains just under twice Yadavaran's reserves – plan to ship 1.5 million barrels a day when it’s at maximum production in the next decade.

But the message is clear. The U.S. has lost the punch of its main claim against Iran – that it’s trying to build a nuclear bomb; a fresh intelligence estimate says that Tehran stopped doing so four years ago. So that has made it difficult for Bush to step up the isolation of Iran in what he asserts is the best way to get it to halt its enrichment of uranium.

China’s action shows that Iran will find ways around the western embargo.

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Diplo-Capitalism: Bush's Clintonian Iran Strategy

One needn't be a gene physicist to see that President Bush looks a lot like -- gulp -- former President Clinton these days. He's hosting Israeli-Palestinian talks, speaking with Syria, and now we hear that he's opened a pen-pal exchange with the mother of all totalitarians, North Korea's Kim Jong Il.

As my former Wall Street Journal colleague Jay Solomon notes today, neo-con John Bolton hates this shift. "Our foreign policy is in free-fall at the moment," the former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and advocate of uni-polar diplomacy tells Solomon. Engaging dictators, Bolton says, will only "diminish our prestige and influence."

Bah humbug.

So what's next in Bush's embrace of the foreign policy he's spent seven years deriding? Adoption of Clinton's diplomatic two-step with corporate America?

As readers of this blog know, I see one of America's most triumphant foreign policies of the last decade as the successful linking of the Caspian and Mediterranean seas through the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. When this million-barrel-a-day came on line last year, it cemented a decade-long challenge to Russian suzerainty in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

And it was all a joint diplomatic-commercial effort of Clinton administration officials and Big Oil, specifically BP, Pennzoil and a few other companies. It was cutting-edge stuff -- geopolitics at the intersection of diplomacy and commerce.

Now it seems Bush is following the same tack. Today my friend Dean Rose was kind enough to pass along a transcript of Bush's news conference this week on the fresh intelligence that in fact Iran stopped seeking development of a nuclear weapon four years ago.

Bush said he's working to get companies both in the U.S. and abroad to help persuade Iran to stop enriching uranium. One presumes Bush was talking about oil companies -- what other type of company would he be describing?

Here's Bush's direct language when asked what's next in U.S. policy on Iran:

"And I believe now is the time for the world to do the hard work necessary to convince the Iranians there is a better way forward. And I say, hard work -- here's why it's hard. One, many companies are fearful of losing market share in Iran to another company. It's one thing to get governments to speak out; it's another thing to convince private sector concerns that it's in our collective interests to pressure the Iranian regime economically.

"So I spend a fair amount of time trying to convince our counterparts that they need to convince the private sector folks that it is in their interests and for the sake of peace that there be a common effort to convince the Iranians to change their ways, and that there's a better way forward."

This is not to mock Bush but simply to note the dovetailing of long-standing foreign policy practices.

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Russia: Note to Presidential Candidates

This week's U.S. reversal on Iranian nuclear aims is a wake-up call on multiple fronts for those who will run American foreign policy for the next few years.

Among them is this: Vladimir Putin isn't a simple gadfly. Instead, he's one of the most important leaders the U.S. can cultivate over the next few years. Why? Because he's engaging and challenging the U.S. on issues that both countries care about, and happens to get it right -- and the U.S. wrong -- at important times.

As we learned this week, Iran is one. For years the U.S. tried to stampede him into supporting ever-escalating sanctions, leading to possible war, against Iran. But he resisted, asserting that President Bush's claims about Iran's nuclear weapons capability were overblown, and according to the new U.S. intelligence estimate it is Putin's judgment that was correct.

The new Iran intelligence highlights another needed correction: Putin in fact isn't inaccurate -- nor belligerent -- when he asserts that the U.S. presumes to know the only way on foreign policy.

U.S. policy on Russia currently amounts to this: You hurt my feelings.

It would be better to focus on issues, and the main one is energy, the foundation of Russian -- and Putin's -- power, how he's asserting Moscow's prerogatives in Europe and elsewhere.

As readers of this blog know, I think that one of the most potent instruments of power in Europe today is control of the flow of oil and natural gas. Putin has learned the lesson of the momentous U.S. foreign policy triumph last year with the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and is conducting his own, much more ambitious pipeline policy.

Putin's strategy is market-oriented -- to cement and increase Russia's current control of 30% of Europe's natural gas market. It so happens, in my opinion, that that aim is incompatible with European and U.S. interests in a more diversified natural gas supply so that no one can dictate terms.

The U.S. is attempting to counter the Russian pipeline thrust, but is late to the game. U.S. energy bureaucrats led by Steven Mann are meeting in Sofia tomorrow and Friday to talk over how the U.S. can polish its strategy, and it'll be interesting to know the outcome.

I personally think that the new intelligence assessment on Iran -- like the previous one -- sounds too smugly certain. Anyone who has read Tim Weiner's excellent Legacy of Ashes can see that the intelligence business is barely manageable at best, like herding cats as the saying goes. But the fact that the intelligence services did not have rock-hard evidence before on Iran's intentions gives little comfort to those reading this week's abrupt, contrary assertions.

And it's equally discomfiting to those who have watched American policy on Russia amount to finger-pointing.

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Stalking the Caspian Horse

Back in July, a New Zealand page called Horsetalk ran out an interesting story on a British woman named Pat Bowles and her personal efforts to save and spread a breed of horse re-discovered in the 1960s in Iran and dubbed the Caspian. I missed the piece, and thanks to a horse specialty web page called Simply Marvelous for reprinting it this week.

As the story goes, an American woman named Louise Firouz who had married into Iranian aristocracy found this lilliputian-size horse -- average height about 11.2 hands -- trotting around a place called Amol, about 13 miles south of the Caspian Sea. It turned out that it was a long-lost breed that in past times was used to pull chariots. The locals were using them as work horses.

Firouz set out to save them -- she reckoned there were around fifty at the time -- and now there are well over a thousand around the world. One of the main U.S. breeding centers, the Kristull Caspian Ranch, run by Francie and Chuck Stull in Brenham, Texas, sold its last Caspians (except for two family pets) in September, and the couple retired. But there are other ranches selling them in the U.S., Britain, and elsewhere.

Pat Bowles, the woman profiled in the New Zealand story, is another of the horse's saviors, based in England.