Satellite-Streaming Into Iran

Over at Mother Jones, David Corn posed the question the other day on whether the U.S. could frustrate Tehran's Internet jamming by beaming broad-band service into the country by satellite. He reported that the question was asked of White House spokesman Robert Gibbs, who did not know the answer.

O&G's own Sasha Meyer answered this question in a post last month. There does not appear to be a currently available, off-the-shelf technology. But Meyer describes a satellite system being put in orbit by Google-backed o3b whose target is to beam high-speed Internet service from space starting the end of next year. Alcatel-Lucent is developing a similar system with SkyTerra.

Meyer suggested such systems as a way to bring tamper-free Internet to Central Asia. It's not fail-safe. As Charles Recknagel over at RFE-RL suggests, the Iranians and Central Asians can jam the signal; they also could simply prevent possibly necessary base stations from being installed. But it is technologically possible.

For the West, One Loss, One Gain

Short of a bolt of lightning from Qom, there will be no game-changing opening between the West and Iran. The politics in neither Tehran nor Washington will allow one, not after all the bloodletting, both past and what is still to come. Yet, all is not lost. Kyrgystan's agreement to allow U.S. use of a military base is a reversal for Moscow, and a comparatively less-important but still an unexpected boon for Washington.

In Iran, some reporting -- over at Eurasianet, for instance -- has had it that a highly irritated former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has been in the holy city of Qom, working to persuade its powerful clerics to turn against paramount leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Unless they do -- and this report frankly appears to reflect wishful thinking by regime critics rather than a credible news leak -- there is no logical reason to anticipate any change in the current crackdown, and thus any thaw of U.S.-Iran relations.

There simply is no political scenario in which either the Obama administration, or Tehran, can be seen locally as making concessions to the other side. That includes talks on Iran's nuclear program. According to a report by Barbara Slavin in The Washington Times, the Obama administration sent a letter last month to Khamenei suggesting "cooperation in regional and bilateral relations." But the events since June 12th put the kabbosh on this notion.

Not incidentally, the Iranian crackdown about shuts off the last ray of hope for the Nabucco pipeline, the leading western option for balancing off Russian petro-power in Europe.

Then there is Kyrgyzstan. Since the Soviet collapse, U.S. influence has been on the ascent in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Kyrgyzstan has no natural resources to speak of, but managed to grab western attention by embracing the free market earlier and more tightly than anyone else; the cliche became that this nation bordering China was the Switzerland of Central Asia. That link to the west was cemented by 9/11/, when the U.S. opened the Manas Air Base to serve troops in Afghanistan.

Yet in February, Kyryz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev went to Moscow and, while standing next to Dimitri Medvedev, announced that the U.S. was out; and Russia would now get the base. Oh, and incidentally Moscow was granting $2 billion in economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan.

The loss of the base was another blow in U.S. influence in the region after the Russian defeat of Georgia in last August's war. There seemed to be no arresting the slide, either.

Knocked back on its heels, the U.S. didn't see much wiggle room. Yesterday, though, both sides confirmed that the U.S. will keep the base. The base's name will change to a "transit center," and the U.S. will pay a lot more ($60 million a year outright, in addition to various other sweeteners, compared with $17 million previously).

Over at RFE-RL, Bruce Pannier quotes Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev as putting down the shift to the turbulence in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

"Unfortunately, it needs to be stated that despite the efforts of forces of the government of Afghanistan and forces of the international coalition, the situation in [Afghanistan], especially in light of the events in the Swat Valley of Pakistan, show a tendency toward becoming worse. And in the event of instability in the future, this could have an effect on the security situation in the states of Central Asia, in particular on Kyrgyzstan."

Is Sarbayev providing the whole, or even any, of the genuine reason for the shift? That's impossible to say. Other elements of the Kyrgyz decision must have been after-the-fact remorse over losing its careful U.S.-Russia balance by lurching to one side. In Moscow itself, the Kremlin is trying to put the best face on the shift, with one official claiming that Russia itself agreed to the quick-switch.

Whatever the case, the bigger picture is how rapidly events can shift in the region. It also underscores that, though most events seem to point to lessening U.S. influence in the region, Washington remains an important player.

Iran: 'I'm Not So Sure I Want to Die Yet'

A simple calibration underlies the diminishing of protests in Tehran: The regime's bet -- correctly -- that those unhappy with the June 12th election results aren't prepared to pay the ultimate price for the right to express their opinion.

As an example, my former Wall Street Journal colleague Farnaz Fassihi quotes a 33-year-old woman who is rethinking her participation in the street demonstrations of the last week: "It's now crossed the line. If you come out it means you are ready to become a martyr. And I'm not so sure I want to die yet," the woman says.

While his dispatch isn't poetry, Sky News correspondent Tim Marshall has it about right: "In the short term it still looks like game over; in the medium term it looks like game on."

Like Russia, Uzbekistan and other dictatorship-based governments, this regime has learned from the mistakes of brethren in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and is seeking as a priority to knock out the pillars of any resistance before they are set in place.

Indeed, in his long public speech last Friday denouncing the protesters and their alleged foreign supporters, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei explicitly cited the 2003 uprising that ousted Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze. Foreigners backing the Iranian demonstrators “thought Iran is Georgia," Khamenei said. "Their problem is that they don’t know this great nation yet.”

So, the regime has threatened to execute and try alleged offenders of public order; it has interfered with communications between would-be protesters by blocking Internet, telephone and television; and it has blocked mourning of those killed. The regime understands the last item most profoundly since the actions leading to the 1979 revolution were in part sustained by 40-day mourning periods for victims of the Shah.

Karin Laub of The Associated Press reports that on the possible show trials. Quoting state-run radio, she writes that Ebrahim Raisi, a top judicial official, said, "Elements of riots must be dealt with to set an example. The judiciary will do that."

Yet small demonstrations of defiance continue. "Protesters came up with new techniques, such as turning on the lights in their cars at certain hours of the day and honking their horns or holding up posters," Laub writes. She quotes an unidentified Tehran resident whom the AP staff got on the phone saying, "People are calmly protesting, more symbolically than with their voices."

The most frequent report in terms of next steps that one hears involve a general strike -- the shutting down of industries, public transportation, shops in the bazaars, for instance. Reports say that Mousavi's own Facebook page calls for a general strike, though I don't see this notice there. Such strikes could be effective since they would be far harder to stop than protests.

One notable aspect of these events is that, contrary to reporting leading up to the elections, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is no rogue or loose cannon. The remarks by Khamenei last Friday, along with subsequent comments by the Revolutionary Guards, eerily resemble the president's.

So that when Ahmadinejad trails off on yet another incoherent diatribe on foreign conspiracies and perfidy -- the outbursts that many, including at O&G, regarded as the main impediment to a diplomatic breakthrough with the West -- he has simply been parroting his bosses.

The Second Victim in Iran

As we look for a picture of how long it will take for a resolution of Iran's brittle- and tension-filled politics, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's legitimacy is just one victim of the week-long events in Tehran.

The second victim is the already long-shot chance of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement.

Short of a remotely possible, far-reaching concession by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, there is now no near- or medium-term chance of a new day in Middle East and European politics and economics -- both of which seemed possible before the current bloody crackdown.

At O&G, it had specifically seemed possible to foresee a change in the balance of petro-power in Europe. If Russian dominance of Europe's energy picture is to be tempered, there needs to be a fresh, new supply of natural gas from somewhere. Iran seemed to be the best candidate. But for the last couple of years, Ahmadinejad's voluble belligerence has ruled out a lowering of the temperature with the U.S.: Diplomatic traction requires domestic political consent in both countries, and that's not possible when one or both sides is provoking jingoism.

A Mir Hosain Mousavi-led government would not have brought a qualitatively different policy, which was too much to expect given Iranian politics. But that also wasn't necessary. All diplomacy really needed was the leadership of both countries to shift to quiet diplomacy, which would have opened the door to finding areas of agreement.

Now that Khamenei has shed blood -- at least 12 are said to have been killed yesterday alone -- President Barack Obama cannot possibly enter into serious talks. Even if he were so inclined -- a considerable improbability -- U.S. domestic politics would not allow him to.

Iran: Out From Behind the Screen

The news from Tehran is that the confrontation no longer involves President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who it's clear is a pawn in events. The brinksmanship is squarely between the supporters of opposition leader Mir Hosain Mousavi and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has stepped boldly from behind the screen in an attempt to assert control. This is clear in the outbreak of violence today (thanks to those who continue to post raw videos -- see below -- from the scene).

Yesterday, Khamenei finally made his position clear -- he will not compromise with Iranians who claim the June 12 presidential election was rigged. He ordered Iranians to stop street protests. Today the opposition replied by doing so anyway; this included a suicide bombing near a shrine to the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

By pushing events this way, Khamenei has lost the battle of perceptions. By cracking down, and doing so without at least a facade of legitimacy -- meaning a stamp of approval by the Guardian Council -- he sacrifices the mantle of leading by popular consent. Indeed, there may be no one in control now.

Iran: The Virtue of Clarity

To be sure, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is a gambler. Yet, by making clear that he intends to crack down hard should street protests continue over the June 12 presidential elections, Iran's supreme leader has also done a service by clearing up confusion about the direction of events. By reiterating that the election was fair -- and doing so before an official reply to his request for a verdict on the polling from an oversight board -- Khamenei also underscored that the issue isn't whether the votes were counted correctly; rather, it's the sanctity of his own authority.

He intends to stay in power. And he intends for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to remain president.

The ball is now in the court of opposition candidate Mir Hosain Mousavi, and the hundreds of thousands of green-clad protesters who have marched through Tehran for the last week. A new rally is scheduled tomorrow after a one-day interregnum.

If the crowds return to the streets in the same numbers, they provide their own clarity.

Brinksmanship in Iran

Yesterday, a close friend told me that he ultimately expects the Iranian regime to crush the street protests in Tehran using "a Tiananmen." One can validly reach that conclusion, hearing government officials threatening execution of protesters, and continuing to raise the specter of the Velvet Revolution to describe what they clearly regard as a mob.

Yet, the government continues to concede ground to the protesters; despite the blockage of Internet and so forth, the Guardian Council -- the body designated to investigate allegations of election fraud last Friday, has offered a meeting the day after tomorrow with the opposition presidential candidates including Mir Hosain Mousavi.

And then there are the compellingly large, continued street demonstrations.

Since brinksmanship is not a matter of simple arithmetic, there in fact is no way to project how this ends up.

In a smart analysis At RFE-RL, the perspicacious Geneive Abdo sees a power shift coming from the tumult, but the balance of power remaining in current hands for at least another decade -- until the leaders of the 1979 revolution leave political life. Support of Hamas and Hezbollah will remain, in addition to development of nuclear technology. What do the younger generation want once they do have power? Not "a government that shuns Islamic principles or even a state that does not include clerics, as some in the West might think," writes Abdo.

"Instead, they want free and fair elections to choose their own leaders; social freedom, now denied them by strict interpretations of Islamic law; and they want Iran’s militias to stay out of their private lives. They also want uninterrupted access to technology, which includes the Internet and social networks."

Update: The Wall Street Journal's Jerry Seib, who has deep experience in Iran, weighs in with a list of possible outcomes, both optimistic and pessimistic. Seib, too, thinks the situation is impossible to predict.

Iran: The Power of Memory

As suggested in previous days, the decisive factor in who prevails in Iran is command of public perception. Regardless of the true result of last Friday's election, if Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can persuade sufficient numbers of Iranians that he is the legitimate victor, the game is over. If he cannot, the opposite is true -- he and the entire clerical and military edifice behind him are in trouble. Defensive measures would then be required in order to save the regime.

Events of the last two days appear to show that Ahmadinejad is losing this battle. This is why we are witnessing such astonishingly rapid-fire concessions from the heretofore stone-faced government. That includes supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's order that the election be probed, the subsequent repetition of this order every 15 minutes over state-controlled radio, and the announcement today of a partial vote recount.



So what is in the minds of Khamenei, the powerful clerics who stand alongside him, and the rest of the regime?

It has to be 1979. It is the subtext of the entire drama in Iran.

Both those backing Ahmadinejad and those behind Mousavi recall viscerally that they once brought down a seemingly immovable regime, that of Shah Reza Pahlavi. And the youth who are too young themselves to have observed or participated in the taking down of the Shah have heard sufficiently detailed stories about it from relatives, friends and teachers to possess vicarious experience of the event.

Knowing and feeling how it was once done -- quite recently indeed -- makes both sides grasp what those crowds numbering in the hundreds of thousands mean. Once you've done it once, the usual doubts about capability -- from one side, can we really do it; from the other side, there is no way that mob can unseat us -- vanish.

What unfolds next will be reaction to this potent memory.

Listening to Contrarian Voices on Iran

Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty conducted a fascinating poll of Iranian voters prior to Friday's presidential election. Published as an op-ed in today's Washington Post, it concludes that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's official triumph isn't as outlandish as some think. Three weeks ago, the Iranian president was leading by a 2-1 margin, according to this poll.

Whether or not the poll accurately reflects what happened on election day -- the authors are credible; Doherty for instance is from the New America Foundation. They say the poll was financed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund -- it suggests that caution is in order for those convinced of rigging.

For an excellent take on what the election says about Iran's ultra-emboldened power structure, have a look at this piece by New York Times executive editor Bill Keller and reporter Michael Slackman. Keller is reporting in Tehran.

While leading contender Mir Hosain Mousavi spent the last several weeks alarming powerful clerics by challenging social mores and urging his followers to take to the streets, Ahmadinejad has continued his careful cultivation of supreme leader Ali Khamenei. He has made himself the indispensibly "shrewd and ruthless front man for [Iran's] clerical, military and political elite," Keller and Slackman write.

The Associated Press is making much of Khamenei's order today for the Guardian Council to evaluate Mousavi's charges of rigging. AP writers Anna Johnson and Ali Akbar Dareini call the move "stunning." Read the text. To my ear, it sounds equally possible as an off-handed sop to Mousavi.

Iran: A Matter of Appearances

Is there the possibility that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did win re-election Friday? The answer is yes. But it isn't the most important question. Neither, really, is whether the winner was his chief opponent, Mir Hosain Mousavi.

The most crucial question is the appearance of legitimacy. Whether or not Ahmadinejad in fact did win the most votes, if sufficent numbers of Iranians conclude that the result was fair, he and the clerical circle surrounding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are probably secure for the next four years.

But if Iranians conclude the opposite, the ruling class could lose the veneer of legitimacy. Considering Iran's history -- in particular how the regime itself came to power -- that could be perilous for its survival.

The government seems to perceive this danger. As Ahmadinejad's landslide triumph collided with the pre-election expectations of many Iranians, the government detained dozens of opposition leaders and members, and continued to sever social networking among Iranians -- text-messaging, Facebook and so on. As for Mousavi, though he issued a statement today -- calling for the election result to be overturned -- he has vanished from the public eye.

This space has argued for the last week that the pre-election public anointment of Mousavi -- on the streets of Tehran and in the columns of blog and newspaper writers -- was premature. All alert Iranians are aware that their electoral system is tightly controlled by Khamenei's circle. Mousavi was open-eyed to the prospect of a staged result; hence his declaration of victory before any vote totals were announced, a move that makes sense only as an attempt to seize the post-election initiative. Mousavi either knew or should have known that this result was possible, and should have been prepared for it. If he wasn't, he doesn't deserve to be president.

The battle for legitimacy is already under way. As one data point, Al-Jazeera's Teymour Nabili points out that Ahmadinejad was declared the victor even in Mousavi's native city of Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan. Mousavi himself is Azeri, who are "among the tightest ethnic groups in the country, unfailingly voting along ethnic lines," Nabili wrote. "In the 2005 presidential election, Mohsen Mehralizadeh was a largely unknown and wholly unsuccessful candidate. He came in seventh and last, and yet he still won the Azeri vote in the Azerbaijani provinces."

This phenomenon -- that of opposition supporters purportedly failing to vote for their own candidate on election day -- is an age-old indicator of a stolen election. My own first experience of this was in the Philippines. I recall one witty parliamentary candidate in notorious Ilocos Norte who was thumped by the incumbent, 100%-0%. In explanation of how this was possible, he responded that even he didn't vote for himself.

Carnegie's Sadjadpour doesn't think the protests so far are "significant enough to cause any type of existential threat to the regime." Khamenei's circle, he says, probably presumes that opposition unhappiness will peter out after a week or so.

That could be a safe bet. Yet legitimacy is a precious commodity. Once one loses it, the rest is a running battle.

Updates: Mousavi issued a statement saying he is under house arrest and is banned from appearing in public, according to the Wall Street Journal's Farnaz Fassihi. A previous such report turned out to be false, and Fassihi notes that the government has not confirmed this one. Separately, I just ran across Nader Uskowi's excellent news blog on Iran. I highly recommend it for those interested in straight-forward coverage, videos and insidery news.

What Ahmadinejad's Declared Victory Means

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's officially declared re-election today may reflect the following not-altogether-surprising calculus by the nation's ruling circle: Victory by Ahmadinejad was validation of pre-eminent ruler Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his clique; a triumph by any of his rivals, conversely, was revolution.

Supporters of Ahmadinejad's chief rival, Mir Hossain Mousavi, appear not to be giving up -- they are issuing full-throated declarations that Mousavi won.

What happens from here can't be predicted. But the regime's attitude -- meaning the context in which events will play out -- is crucial. Leaders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards the last few days have equated Mousavi's apparent surge of popular support to an incipient "velvet revolution." As noted previously, the analogy to Czechoslavakia's 1989 overthrow of Communism is striking. It means, as suggested above, that a Mousavi victory was rejected in leading circles -- it would not be genuine election by popular vote, but rather an invalid seizure of power.

That is not surprising, since it is precisely how most leaders in the region regard political opponents.

The ruling circle surrounding Khamenei predicted that Mousavi's people would go to the streets were he to lose. Therefore, look for a violent crushing of protests if they do. Again as previously discussed, the models to look at are Uzbekistan 2005 and Putin's Russia.