The Spy Plane Over Abkhazia

Was Russia justified in shooting down an unmanned Georgian spycraft flying over the separatist Georgian region of Abkhazia last month? Probably not. If it were, Moscow would be crowing about its action, not denying it, as it has been doing.

Yesterday, the results of a United Nations investigation into the April 20 downing were released. The report concludes that Moscow did shoot down the Georgian plane, which was doing reconnaissance over the Black Sea strip of land that broke away in a war 15 years ago. The news of the report, rejected by Russia as biased, was in most of the major papers, such as this article. The U.N. said that Georgia should not have been stoking tensions with such a flight, and that it violated the terms of a peace agreement between the sides. But it also said that Russia had no business shooting down the drone, and raised doubts about Russia's legitimacy as a neutral peacekeeper, the role it serves in the region.

As I saw time and again when I visited both sides of the conflict during the 1990s, the feelings of the Georgians and Abkhazians are one understood by ethnically rivalrous people the world over -- the Armenians and Azeris, the Kurds and Turks, the Serbs and Kosovars, the Palestinians and Israelis. There is very little rationality in their deeds and words. And, in the case of the Abkhaz and Georgians, it likely will take many, many years before they can figure out how to live together normally. Perhaps they will never figure it out.

Which is why the Russians should not be stirring the pot. Back when the drone went down, Georgia and Moscow-backed Abkhazia seemed at the brink of a return to war.

So why did Russia do it? Georgia in general serves as one of Russia's main punching bags. Russia has blockaded Georgia economically, and Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders frequently lash out at leader Mikheil Saakashvili. Most recently, Georgia has been the vehicle for Putin to demonstrate his ire over Western recognition of Kosovo independence. Putin responded to Kosovo by granting effective political recognition to Abkhazia and Georgia's other breakaway region, South Ossetia.

Dmitry Medvedev doesn't seem like a bully. On the other hand, neither did Putin in his very first days.

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Showdown in Bucharest

After the spectacle and fireworks of recent years, we're about to see the latest picture of the balance of power in Russia-West relations. The venue will be the NATO summit that begins tomorrow in Bucharest. The issue is whether to advance Georgia and Ukraine's applications to join the military alliance.

The two former Soviet countries want to push forward their status to what’s called MAP – a Membership Action Plan. True membership would come down the road, once they meet the various necessary qualifications. France and Germany oppose moving to a MAP for the two. "France will not give its green light to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia," French Prime Minister Francois Fillon told France-Inter radio. "We are opposed to Georgia and Ukraine's entry because we think that it is not the correct response to the balance of power in Europe, and between Europe and Russia."

Stephen Fidler and Stefan Wagstyl of the Financial Times rang up Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili, who has a reputation as a hothead, but sounds eminently sensible on this issue. "No matter what some Europeans might be thinking, it's basically giving [Russia] direct veto rights, because that's how they'll perceive it," Saakashvili told the FT.

Saakashvili has that right. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, suggests that Georgia will use NATO membership to force the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into the Georgian fold. This is a red herring – it’s absurd to suggest that NATO would commit troops to crushing Abkhazian or South Ossetian politics. It can't even raise sufficient troops for Afghanistan.

Instead, the issue is simple -- Vladimir Putin wishing to demonstrate Russia’s influence now, and to retain its pressure points on its former colonies in the future.

Saakashvili has done smart political spadework. He has offered power-sharing to Abkhazia, and 500 Georgian troops to Afghanistan. The latter move at minimum could quiet France’s objections.

The ultimate decision will indicate whether Putin has at last succeeded in shifting the balance of power more toward Russia's direction.

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Guest columnist: Lawrence Sheets on Uranium Smuggling

Apologies to O and G readers for the long absence. I've been trying to finish up the Russia book. That's no excuse, so here we go.

We have as a guest Lawrence Scott Sheets, who will be taking any questions on a piece he's got on uranium smuggling in next month's Atlantic magazine, called "A Smuggler's Story." The story isn't posted yet, but Atlantic has put up an interview with Sheets on its web site. The theme is the back story to a scoop that Sheets broke in The New York Times a few months back about a hair-raising scheme to sell weapons-grade uranium from former Soviet Georgia. This is a story of the highest order.

I've known Sheets for some fifteen years, since both of us were Tbilisi-based correspondents covering the Georgian-Abkhazian civil war, he for Reuters, and I for Newsweek and The Washington Post. At a time and place when there simply was no infrastructure -- everything in the Caucasus seemed to have fallen apart -- Sheets demonstrated a superlative ability to make his bureau work. He went on to become NPR's Moscow correspondent, and is now working on what appears likely to be a classic, book-length account of his couple of decades in the former Soviet Union.

Here is how The Atlantic leads into the interview with Sheets:

Uranium on the Loose

When the Soviet Union finally collapsed in December 1991, the United States could claim victory in the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama could declare the end of history, and some 280 million people could look forward to a liberated future. But in fact the Soviet Union left its 15 successor states to navigate their own way to democracy and a market economy. And with some 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons—along with perhaps 1,200 tons of bomb-grade uranium—scattered under uncertain ownership and questionable supervision, the securing of the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear materials became a matter of pressing concern.

Over the past decade and half, with extensive help from the United States, Russia has tried to lock down this atomic detritus, at great expense. But the task is a massive one, and as of 2008, the two nations face nuclear concerns that scarcely registered during the upheaval of the 1990s. Seven years after 9/11, Russia has become something of a terrorists’ nirvana—with 12,500 miles of borders, a military so corrupt its members have sold weapons to their battlefield enemies, and vast networks of poorly safeguarded nuclear facilities.

Russia is likely the only place in the world where a man like Oleg Khintsagov, an ordinary, destitute, and dimwitted hustler, can pick up weapons-grade uranium and try to hawk it from his pockets. Khintsagov, along with two other smugglers of similar means and aptitude—Garik Dadayan and Tamaz Dimitradze—are the subject of “A Smuggler’s Story,” Lawrence Scott Sheets’ piece in the April issue of The Atlantic. To a man, the couriers Sheets describes are poorly prepared for their missions, yet they have their hands on potentially catastrophic atomic ingredients. The story Sheets tells is of a society in collapse in the face of separatist anxieties, ethnic animosities, and ambiguous borders—and of impoverished people seeking to feed their families in a radioactive land.

Read interview

Putin: Still in Pursuit of Respect

How far will Vladimir Putin push his rejection of Kosovo independence? My own feeling is not very. And even if he does go through with his implicit threat -- to recognize breakaway regions of his favorite punching bag, Western ally Georgia -- Russia and perhaps Belarus will probably be the only nations to do so.

President Bush has announced U.S. recognition of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence yesterday. The largest European countries are likely to follow. Why? Because of Serbia's murderous rampage through Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Putin asserts that territorial integrity is supreme and that, in order to create a separate nation, the country from which it is separating must approve. As an example, he cites the two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which pulled away during the early 1990s when nationalism was sweeping through the former Soviet Union.

There are only academic and polemical links between these Georgian regions and Kosovo.

I covered the Abkhaz fighting from both sides. While there was brutality, the scale nowhere approached Serbia's pathological violence against its neighbors. And in the end, in 1993, it was the Abkhaz -- backed by Moscow -- who applied ethnic cleansing after vowing not to. They simply put the Georgians in their midst on foot out of the seaside region, and occupied their homes.

One thing I learned from my time in the former Soviet Union is that pride is king when it comes to nationalities. No one wants to feel he or she are under anyone's thumb. In the case of the Abkhaz and the Ossets, the Georgians stirred the pot with their own nationalism. Then the Russians came in with military backing, which continues to this day.

What are Putin's and Russia's genuine beef? That their view isn't accepted in the West. Ultimately, that isn't very compelling. Putin will no doubt continue to protest. And, regarding Georgia as the West's soft underbelly because of the energy pipelines running through the republic and the West's backing for President Mikheil Saakashvili, he'll keep punching there.

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Guest Column: Wine and National Security

By Sasha Meyer

Wine is important. The drink can be a major source of revenue. For example, in Moldova winemaking accounts for 15% of the economy. It can even become a national security issue. Georgia, where wine is the third-largest export, has suffered a major blow since Vladimir Putin banned its wine imports.

Since then, Tbilisi has been trying to diversify its wine exports. Georgia has shown creativity, for instance by offering Jennifer Lopez half a million dollars to promote its wine (an offer the Hispanic celebrity declined). Overall, Georgia has been incrementally successful, getting its wines into some shops in Europe and North America. But a breakthrough has been elusive thus far.

Peculiarities of the wine market and emerging uses for grapes may offer Tbilisi a new opportunity. A study published in Wine Economics Journal found that getting on the radar of wine critics is a key. (The importance of gurus is corroborated by other sources, for instance in Robert M. Parker Jr.’s influence on patterns of wine consumption and the creation of new segments in the market.)

The study also concludes that continued critical coverage is useful, even if unfavorable at times. In other words, sending a bottle of Kindzmarauli for a review to Eric Azimov, Dorothy J. Gaiter and John Brecher and others could, in the long run, achieve as much as a pop star's expensive endorsement.

There’s also a new, emerging market for grapes. Resveratrol is a new health craze in the West. It’s extracted from grape seeds, skin and juice. Research shows that resveratrol can help delay many age-related diseases. Today, jars of resveratrol are in health stores in Europe, North America and online, where it retails for $20 each.

The market appears set only to grow: An American company is testing a resveratrol-based pill to fight diabetes. In Georgia, the loss of its biggest market combined with a bumper crop is forcing many to cut their vineyards, raising fears that the winemaking tradition could be lost. But resveratrol production could absorb some of the excess grape supply, make profitable use of residual byproducts of winemaking, and bring much-needed hard currency into Tbilisi's coffers.

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A Precedent for Real Elections

Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili appears to have won his big gamble today. An exit poll shows him winning re-election as president and averting a runoff with 53% of the vote, according to Bloomberg's Seb Alison.

Saakashvili stepped down as president when opposition protesters poured into the streets, demanding his resignation. He had been roundly criticized by the West for sending forces into the street to thump heads.

But if the results are confirmed in the actual count, it will validate a strategy that we've seen in no other country in the twelve members of the Commonwealth of Independent States save Ukraine.

That is -- a president who has stepped down and put himself to the voters in a more or less contested election.

I won't hold my breath waiting for others to follow, but Saakashvili has made a gratifying precedent.

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The Caspian is Blissful, Too

I have a beef with Eric Weiner, my former classmate at Stanford University. Weiner has a new book out this week, called "The Geography of Bliss: One Grump's Search for the Happiest Places in the World."

Let me say right away that the title is spot on -- Weiner is definitively grumpy. But that's not my complaint.

Look at a sampling of the "exotic" countries that he chooses to focus on: Just one -- Bhutan. Meanwhile he shows an astonishing bias toward the boring northern Europeans. We get Switzerland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Britain.

If I may inform Weiner -- Georgia is a pretty darned happy place. You can hardly beat Kyrgyzstan for merry. And how about the Kazakhs -- now that's a gay bunch.

Weiner, whose book is deservingly doing extremely well right out of the gate, blogs here.

Hummer Humor and Russia in Serbia

Leanan over at The Oil Drum, who never sleeps, has some interesting posts. One is on a Russian Hummer owner with a sense of humor. A second provides insight into Russia's support for Serbia's position opposing Kosovo independence.

Hummer Humor: Reuters reports that a Russian owner of a $49,500 Hummer is inviting anti-consumerists to vent their anger on his vehicle, specifically by pelting it with rotten eggs and tomatoes. This unidentified Good Samaritan is said to live in the Russian city of St. Petersburg. The back story is that a local activist group calling itself "Peter Antiglobalist" has been in a naturally difficult search for a Hummer owner willing to undergo food abuse. The good-natured fellow who responded plans to sell the food-decorated vehicle, and donate the proceeds to an orphanage, according to the report. I have to say that this is a difficult story to believe. However, as post-Christmas Day entertainment, I shall list it in the category of, "If it isn't true, it ought to be."

Russia in Serbia: For some eight years, Russia has supported Serbia's position that Kosovo is an integral part of it, and opposed independence for the majority ethnic-Albanian region. Moscow says its position is rooted in the principle of territorial integrity: If Kosovo can unilaterally pull away absent Belgrade's agreement, Russia argues, then what about the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for instance? Mightn't they see Kosovo as a green light to declare independence too? I've argued that Russia is throwing up an empty rhetorical threat. Abkhazia and South Ossetia perfectly serve Russia's purposes as they are, as an instrument for needling neighboring Georgia, which Russia loves to hate.

Now the other shoe drops. UPI reports today that Russia wants to take control of Serbia's state oil company, called NIS. Russia is offering $1.5 billion in cash and other incentives, plus access to its planned South Stream natural gas pipeline. There's nothing wrong about mixing politics and economics -- that's how the world works. But it does make Russia's position clearer.

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What it Takes in the Former Soviet Union: Assassination, Theft, Corruption

I've seen multiple references in recent weeks to Richard Ben Cramer's classic account of the 1988 presidential campaign, What It Takes. Inveterate footnote-and-index readers such as myself miss having neither, yet it is a wonderful read, all 1,051 pages of it, narrating in colorful detail what campaign shenanigans were required to win that year. Cramer's descriptions of George H.W. Bush are particularly unforgettable.

Cramer comes to mind because of the latest news out of the former Soviet Union: Another apparent assassination plot, this time between presidential campaigns in Georgia; another stolen election by Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan; and a report that the good times attributed to Russian President Vladimir Putin may in fact not be as advertised.

Georgia: In a story published yesterday by The Sunday Times in the U.K., David Leppard, Anna Mikhailova and Mark Franchetti report on a possible assassination plot against Boris Berezovsky's former business partner, Badri Patarkatsishvili. The news peg is a 14-minute audio tape that's surfaced in which a Georgian Interior Ministry official apparently attempts to hire a Chechen killer to off Patarkatsishvili. The killer, according to the paper, is Uvais Akhmadov, "a member of a notorious gang of Chechen brothers who specialised in kidnapping and murder," as the writers put it. There's a snap presidential campaign under way at the moment, and Patarkatsishvili is challenging former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Only, Patarkatsishvili is doing so from London, where he says he fears for his life if he goes home. The thing is, we need not sympathize with Patarkatsishvili as a sort of Goldilocks -- he is a tough businessman with a long career of dealing with some of the former Soviet Union's most unsavory sorts. The important point here is what the report might imply about Saakashvili, Georgia's Columbia University-trained former leader. What has his campaign got up to in order to win election Jan. 5th?

Uzbekistan: My former Baku roommate David Stern at The New York Times reports that Karimov won yesterday's election with a reported 88.1% of the vote. Some people are calling it fraudulent since Karimov shouldn't be running -- he was constitutionally forbidden to seek a new term -- and he allowed no real opponents. In addition, there are the usual forebodings that Uzbekistan is headed for instability either during Karimov's continued rule or after he dies (the only way these fellows leave). I personally have sympathy for the stolen election crowd, but have my doubts on the instability part. Equally undemocratic Turkmenistan, for instance, just went through a transition after a presidential death without a hiccup. There's an argument that Uzbekistan isn't Turkmenistan, meaning that it already has produced a home-grown rebellion based in the Fergana Valley. I personally adhere to the muddle-along theory, meaning that even the apparently least likely states tend to muddle along.

Russia: My former Washington Post colleague Fred Hiatt weighs in today with a tart salvo at Time magazine's selection of Putin as its Person of the Year. Against Putin's unwillingness to face serious electoral competition, Hiatt writes: "Why would a leader of such steely confidence, heroic achievement and massive popularity be so afraid of political competition? Perhaps he will explain at Time's awards banquet." Hahaha, Fred. But Hiatt's central argument is serious, based on paraphrases from a must-read report in the new Foreign Affairs by my former colleagues at Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. This report challenges the prevailing wisdom that, under Putin, crime has fallen, economic activity has improved and corruption lessened. McFaul and Stoner-Weiss detail at length how in fact the opposite is true in all three cases and that, specifically, Russia's economic growth is near the bottom of the 15 former Soviet states. "Whatever the apparent gains of Russia under Putin, they gains would have been greater if democracy had survived," they write.

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How to Tarnish A Hard-Won Reputation

It's not a household name in the United States, but in the former Soviet Union the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a source both of irritation and solace. The distinction depends on whether you are one of the region's autocrats or one of its independent thinkers.

Whichever the case, the OSCE -- financed in large part by the U.S. -- has played a hard-fought, 16-year role as Europe's official conscience.

Until now. The OSCE has bafflingly jeopardized its reputation as Europe's premier human rights watchdog in order to satisfy an understandable if misguided campaign by Kazakhstan for the prized chair of the organization.

Last Friday, the OSCE for publicly unknown reasons succumbed to Kazakhstan's full-court press on the issue, and announced that the Central Asian republic will take over the one-year chair a little over two years from now, in 2010.

Kazakhstan is hardly the region's worst human-rights violator. But neither is its record worthy of holding up as an example, which is what the chair represents. This is a country that has never held a fair election; although President Nursultan Nazarbayev has led the country since 1989, there's no way to know for sure that he actually ever won a contested election.

Nazarbayev has never permitted a genuine opponent to run against him, and like his neighbor to the north, Vladimir Putin, he has routinely beefed up the election results to show swelled support. He recently signed a law allowing him to serve as president for life. And there's no evidence that, short of his own death, Nazarbayev will ever agree to give up the post; to the contrary, the probability is that he'll stay on the job for years to come.

If the OSCE states wished an example from the former Soviet Union, why not choose Ukraine? For all its flaws, it has been holding truly competitive presidential elections for some 13 years. Or better yet, how about Georgia? There, Mikheil Saakashvili has actually stepped down from the presidency in order to run in a snap election next month.

Kazakhstan ran its OSCE campaign through its own offices and the paid help of lobbying groups like APCO in Washington. It's not clear to me what precisely turned the tide, but the OSCE decision is appalling, in my opinion. It will be hard-pressed to recover its reputation.

Georgia's Saakashvili resigns; Turkmenistan vs. Gazprom

What dictators don't do: Can you imagine Vladimir Putin resigning? Or allowing Russian elections to go forward absent his heavy hand? How about Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev or Azerbaijan's Aliyev? Uzbekistan's Karimov? The notion is preposterous. These leaders would no more risk such a rash throw of the dice than they would live off their official salary.

Yet that's precisely what Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili has done. Yesterday, he resigned as president in order to take part in the January 8th snap elections he's called to challenge his opponents to electoral battle. Whatever his critics say, Saakashvili's act distinguishes him from the run-of-the-mill former Soviet autocrats.

Making Russia pay: Even if the West loses the pipeline battle for influence in Europe, it might find solace in helping to get Turkmenistan a working wage for its chief export. Russia has been buying Turkmenistan's natural gas for $100-$130 a thousand cubic meters, much less than the world price exceeding $260 a thousand cubic meters. And it's a pittance compared with the $350 a thousand cubic meters that Russia's Gazprom intends to charge its European customers starting next year.

Now, Turkmenistan is demanding more. It's asked Gazprom for a 30% increase, to around $170 a thousand cubic meters, according to a report by the Financial Times' Catherine Belton.

The report quotes Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller as blaming Turkmenistan's sudden request on the U.S. and Europe, which have been urging the republic to defy Russia and export a large portion of its natural gas directly to Europe. The West is championing the construction of the so-called trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline as a rival to a trio of Russian-planned pipelines to Europe. It's through that trans-Caspian line that the European supply would pass.

This courtship of rivals puts Turkmenistan at the center of the East-West battle for market -- and by extension political -- influence in Europe.

Whatever Turkmenistan decides, at the very least it will receive more of the pie.

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Trouble in Tbilisi

I've been exchanging messages with a friend in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital that until recently was the scene of bloody protests. He predicts political crisis almost regardless of what President Mikheil Saakashvili does.

Remember that Georgia is the crucial crossing point of the East-West Caspian oil route.

Why is there nothing for Saakashvili to do? I quote my American friend:

"Poverty.
GDP per capital here is $3,900.
Russia's is $12,100.
Azerbaijan's is $7,500.
Armenia's is $5,500.
Enough said."

Saakashvili has done much in terms of curbing corruption and attracting foreign investment. But, in my friend's view, Russia's economic embargo has made it impossible to truly dent the country's post-Soviet poverty. "They've sunk to just above Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan maybe, Moldova," he said.

So Saakashvili's opposition is bound to be in the streets regardless of the results of the snap January presidential elections.

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Rivalry of Dictators

No world leader, genuinely elected or not, is wholly free of self-proclaimed omniscience, but it's an especially interesting time to observe the autocrats afflicted with this delusion.

They are playing a strong hand, and it's not at all clear that their ostensibly democratic opponents have right on their side.

In Pakistan, it's now two decades since the first time Benazir Bhutto treated us to the spectacle of her massive popularity -- supporters lining the streets in Lahore, Karachi and elsewhere as she decries military dictators.

Only now we have the benefit of her decade of active politics (1989-1999). Bhutto is no democrat. As prime minister and out-of-power opposition leader, she compiled a record of intolerance of dissent, failure to attack the tax-free land-owning feudalism that's Pakistan's core problem, and pocket-lining corruption.

What's really going on in Pakistan is a contest between two dictators. In my view, Pervez Musharraf is more likable if only because he at least doesn't pretend interest in sharing power. He's a man who, though he came to power in a coup, is under fire by people claiming surprise by his declaration of emergency rule on the eve of a possible Supreme Court decision invalidating his right to remain president another five years.

In Georgia, which actually is a comparative democracy, Mikheil Saakashvili has out-smarted street-bound opponents by declaring a snap presidential election in January. These suspicious demonstrations, financed by Boris Berezovsky's former business partner, Badri Patarkatsishvili, now must turn to straight-forward campaigning.

While I was in California on my book tour the last two days, academic experts told me that Saakashvili's reaction to the demonstrations -- sending out police with batons and tear gas -- has ruined Georgia's chances to join NATO and the European Union.

But I think that case is premature. Saakashvili has chipped away at the opprobrium by inviting as many election monitors as anyone wishes to send.

If Saakashvili were more mature and less imperious, he would have avoided this crisis entirely by courting opponents.

But -- like autocratic brethren from Russia to Azerbaijan, from Kazakhstan to Pakistan, and Armenia to Uzbekistan -- Saakashvili isn't an intellectually modest man.

On the plus side, all these countries actually do have a deep bench of politicians, technocrats and businessmen entirely qualified to step into the executive chair. If the autocrats were truly wise, they would court and cultivate them.

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Domino Bluff in the Caucasus

There is important wisdom in a passage of Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s new Journals, contained in a New York Times review posted today. It involves a post-mortem of the Cuban Missile Crisis by President Kennedy, as recounted by JFK's in-house intellectual.

The Times says: Schlesinger writes that Kennedy resisted seeing the missile crisis as part of a holy war with the Soviets. “Too many people will think now that all we have to do in dealing with the Russians is to kick them in the balls,” he says, after the Soviets back down. “I think there is a law of equity in these disputes. When one party is clearly wrong, it will eventually give way.” Read review

This is sharp counsel in the West's current standoff with Russia in former Yugoslavia. Eight years after halting Serbia's murderous assaults on its Balkan neighbors at Kosovo, the West supports finally recognizing the ethnic Albanian region's status as an independent nation.

The date set for that recognition is Dec. 10.

President Putin vehemently opposes Kosovo independence unless it's in agreement with its former aggressor, Serbia. He argues that, short of such an accord, uncontrollable warfare will re-ignite to the east in the former Soviet Union, specifically in the breakaway Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Balderdash. Putin's angst has nothing to do with a highly principled nightmare of dominoes falling and everything to dowith who calls the shots in Russia's claimed sphere of influence.

Putin's own intellectual cadre assert that Abkhazia and South Ossetia rose up in response to Georgian genocide. It is true that indefensible Georgian nationalism at the time is to blame for triggering the separatist revolts of the early 1990s. But what followed was inflamed and assisted by then-Russian siloviki only too happy to give the upstart Georgians a black eye.

Those events are not equatable with Serbia's ethnic cleansing.

Instead, Putin and his brain trust are making an empty threat. Putin no more than the Georgians wishes to re-ignite instability in the Caucasus.

Dominoes will not fall of their own accord in response to Kosovo any more than they did when the other parts of the former Yugoslavia became independent. Neither will Putin manufacture a cause-and-effect.

While Putin chooses to see issues like Kosovo as a humiliating physical blow, they are rather simpler matters. Most of the former Yugoslav provinces long ago chose not to be joined to Serbia any longer. Kosovo is merely the latest.

Georgia and Russia: The Bigger Battle to Come

The Economist is in a snit that the OSCE white-washed over Georgia's missile row with Russia. A studiously neutralist RFE/RL interview with the author of the offending OSCE report ends up making the Vienna-based mini-U.N. organization look egregiously non-judgemental.

The pieces are must-reading. Edward Lucas, the author of the Economist piece, is legitimately outraged. But the OSCE -- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- was right to punt. The incessant friction between Russia and Georgia over border incursions is a diversion from the main issue, which is getting Georgia ready for full NATO membership.

The two neighbors are not going to become friends any time soon. The Kremlin's loyal spokesmen say that the Georgians' main foreign policy is irritating their northern neighbor. The Georgians in turn ascribe most of their ills to malign conspiracies from Moscow.

These competing claims informed their most recent series of disputes, in which Georgia accused Russian military jets of illegally penetrating Georgian airspace, and firing a missile that allegedly missed its intended target, a radar installation. In the most recent flare-up, Georgia said it had possibly shot down an invading Russian jet.

The record in general supports Georgia's assertions. Since the 1991 Soviet breakup, Georgia has been the victim of repeated aggressive acts from the north -- the dismemberment of the country through military support of Abkhazia; the severing of natural gas and electricity supplies; and the cutoff of trade and air service between the countries.

Yet Russia and Georgia themselves have seemed to try to cool the flareup. Neither has raised the issue of the apparent crash of the errant jet recently, for instance. That is wise from Georgia's standpoint when it has much work to do to achieve its ultimate foreign policy aim, which is tying itself formally to the West through NATO and EU membership.

The West has a long-standing interest in making Georgia's NATO membership happen; the EU portion will happen far down the road if at all.

Here is where it makes sense not to get too involved in these predictable sibling squabbles. Russia will accuse NATO of encirclement. The West will have to forcefully argue that it has a legitimate interest in Georgia's independence and stability. That will be a battle writ large.

Gazprom: To Fear or Not to Fear

The West often expresses the apprehension that Russia will use its energy for outside political leverage. The answer of course is that it already is -- its oil and natural gas is the source after all of its newfound confidence and influence in Europe. Yet the most vulnerable and victim-prone countries are Russia's former Soviet colonies. The upshot: The Caspian states need to keep up their guard.

Take a look at The Independent of London today, which has a good, long primer on Gazprom. The piece, by Anne Penketh, makes two conclusions: Gazprom is so unwieldy and large that it may end up being a paper tiger; and that, given the combination of Gazprom's management failures and its abiding need for continued profits from Europe, it will end up having to give someone the short end of the stick -- one of its former Soviet brothers.

A key quote for those who follow the non-Russian states comes from Pavel Baev of the International Peace Research Institute: "They are the victims of choice," he tells the newspaper. "A new gas war is predetermined."

Steve's comment: The world caught on to Russia's outside power during the last eighteen months or so when Europe's oil and natural gas supply was disturbed over disputes with Ukraine and Belarus, and the Independent piece focuses on those two former Soviet states.

But the Caspian states and foreigners who work there -- Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, as a transit country, Georgia -- have witnessed Moscow's willingness to wield the energy club since just a few months after the 1991 Soviet breakup.

Russia starved Georgia of natural gas. It cut off Turkmenistan's access to foreign export markets. It has done the same in Kazakhstan, reducing the value of its giant fields (Karachaganak, one of the world's ten largest natural gas fields, is absurdly reduced to exploitation as an oil field). To its credit, Azerbaijan has responded to Gazprom's threats by going off Russian gas cold turkey, and turning to the local supply.

Transneft's actions in terms of the region's oil exports is well documented and have been discussed previously.

Russia argues that its actions are market-oriented. Maybe. But one must add realpolitik -- Gazprom has been the cudgel to bring feisty neighbors (such as Georgia) into line. And there is no sign that the custom is changing soon.

What Plane?

There has been silence from both Tbilisi and Moscow in the days since Georgia claimed it shot down a Russian military aircraft. The upshot: The two disputatious neighbors have taken the sensible route away from confrontation, which is -- pretend nothing happened.

Steve's comment: Last weekend, it looked like tension could rise considerably between Georgia and Russia after Georgia claimed it had shot at the jet on Aug. 23. Georgia said it saw the plane go down and then a fire erupt in an isolated part of the forest, possibly in Georgia proper, and possibly in the breakaway Black Sea region of Abkhazia.

There was concern because it is one thing to claim that Russia has violated one's airspace -- which Georgia has done with some regularity -- and quite another to shoot down that violator.

There were the usual Russian denials and Georgian vows to prove what they said. Since then, however, both sides have held fire.

The only one talking a bit has been Abkhazia, which says it, too, saw something in the sky and a fire. The verdict? Space debris, say the Abkhaz.

Good enough.

Did Georgia Shoot Down A Russian Plane?

Georgia says there is a fire in a thick, isolated section of forest in the north of the country. That's relevant because the country's interior minister also said a few hours ago that the Georgian military fired on an aircraft that it believed to be Russian. A search may start tomorrow to determine the source of the fire. So far Russia says it is missing no planes. The upshot: If it is a Russian military aircraft, there will probably be a significant escalation of tensions in the already much-strained relationship between the two neighbors.

Here is the top of the Reuter's story: Georgian forces fired at a plane they believed was Russian after it violated the Caucasus republic's airspace on Wednesday, a senior interior ministry official said. The incident marks an intensification of a row between the two countries in which Georgia has accused Russian planes of violating its border and of dropping a missile near Tbilisi. Russia called the Georgian statement a provocation. It has not reported any plane missing, and when asked specifically about the Georgian statement an official denied Russian aircraft had violated Georgian airspace. Rest of story.

Steve's comment: Russia and Georgia have had a tense relationship since the Soviet breakup. Under Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia was dismembered when Russia backed separatists in the Black Sea region of Abkhazia, which used Moscow's sophisticated military to successfully break away.

More recently, Georgia has accused Moscow of a few violations of Georgian air space, including the firing of a missile. Western inspectors traveled to Georgia and backed up its claim about the missile.

Russia has been enraged by the charge, and the western position toward it. But if Georgia actually shot down one of Russia's planes, that could change the complexion of the tension. Russia's Putin stands almost entirely on a nationalistic platform of toughness bordering on belligerence toward the outside world. If it is indeed what the Georgians suggest, that will color his response.

Georgia: A Mirror of Russia

Yet again Georgia is the target of a mysterious military strike, and yet again Russia is accused of responsibility. The upshot: Georgia continues to be a dramatic example for the West of what Russia's critics mean when they say it is dangerous to be vulnerable to Moscow.

Here is the beginning of a Chris Chivers piece in The New York Times:
MOSCOW, Aug. 8 — The Republic of Georgia presented what it called a mounting body of evidence today that a Russian warplane had entered deep into its airspace and fired an air-to-ground missile. It said it was seeking a special session of the United Nations Security Council to address the incident. Read rest of story

Steve's comment: Europe has wondered aloud for the last several years whether it is risky to become more and more reliant on Russia for its oil and natural gas. The latest news from Georgia is not necessarily, or even likely to be, the future of Europe.

But Russia's denials strain credibility. The trail of such incidents, and denials from Moscow, go back at least 15 years, when Russia backed Abkhazia in its bloody separation from Georgia proper. Russia was, and continues to be, responsible for Abkhazia's uprising. That makes the missile attack a compelling illustration of how Russia behaves with troubling regularity with a country that may be the most vulnerable of all.

Here is a good podcast summary from the Guardian.