Russia: Nobel, Browder, and the Annals of the Pull to Gamble

Some nine decades ago, Emanuel Nobel, a nephew of Alfred Nobel -- founder of the prizes being awarded this week in Oslo -- fled Baku disguised as a peasant in order to escape the Bolshevik Revolution. As O&G readers know, Alfred Nobels' brothers were the biggest oil barons of all in Baku's 19th-century heyday. In the end, for the Nobels all was lost.

It wasn't a huge surprise. The story of Western investment in Russia is that of a crapshoot. Pockets laden with cash, all say they are entering with a realistic grasp of the country's perils. All say they are therefore taking precautions. Yet the outcome is always the same -- on the way out, some are wealthier than anyone could dream; others, no longer cash-laden, are wearing no shirt. The trick has been to avoid being the latter.

So the narrative continues. Hermitage kingpin Bill Browder had been on a soapbox about Russian investment even before Moscow kicked him out of the country three years ago. Now, he is out with a glossy new, 10-minute video detailing his fall as Russia's biggest foreign investor, to his current status as victim of Russia's unpredictable winds.



The release of the video coincides with a story in yesterday's Kommersant that the Russians intend to issue an international arrest warrant against him. Over at the Reuters blog, my former Business Week colleague Jason Bush notes that Kommersant claimed the very same thing last year, only for the Moscow police to repudiate the report. Still, the public brinksmanship well illustrates the stakes at play in the country.

Update: Jason Bush has just emailed me an MVD report -- Browder is indeed on Russia's international warrant list for arrest.

This is a big news week for foreign investors in Russia. On Monday, Norway's Telenor aped the throw-up-your-arms strategy of BP, and caved in to Alfa Group's Mikhail Fridman. After a prolonged court battle in which Telenor initially seemed ultra-confident that it would prevail, it has changed its mind and will embrace the original peace agreement offered by Alfa, its business partner, which will now run the show. As regards BP, the following day, Reuters' Dmitry Zhdannikov reported that the British oil company is resigned to letting Alfa run their partnership as well -- the oil company TNP-BP. Over at aptly named Seeking Alpha, Craig Pirrong calls this a "marriage made in hell," but corporate honeymoons are usually quite short in Russia.

One thing is for sure -- Moscow is certain that foreign investors will keep returning. On Sunday, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signaled that Russia would embark on yet another bout of privatization next year. Get out the champagne.

The indicators are that Putin's confidence is well-placed. In Business Week, Carol Matlack writes that western companies continue to flock to Russia despite the perils. Their rationale is similar to what drives gamblers to Vegas: the excitement (never underestimate the appetite of brio-seeking westerners to seek street cred by working in Russia; as a corollary, do not underestimate the Russians' capacity to notice) , and the long-shot prospect of big, big wealth.

Take a look at Business Week's "How to Play It" feature in the same issue as the Matlack story. I hadn't noticed this myself, but after last year's breathtaking nosedive, Russian markets are -- at least of now -- doing extremely well in 2009.

Craps anyone?


Credit: BusinessWeek

Ripple From Russia: R.I.P. BP?

The stewards of Big Oil have to be watching the latest brawl in Russia with a sense of dread. For their brother, BP, is fighting not merely to save its assets in Russia; it's fighting for its life.

BP itself is rapidly becoming vulnerable as an acquisition target. And for the handful of companies of Big Oil, that's a picture of their own possible future.

For months now, we've been treated to a spectacle of three or four Russian oligarchs making BP miserable. These fellows -- the billionaire oligarchs and BP -- are 50-50 partners in a highly lucrative oil concern that they call TNK-BP. The company accounts for a full quarter of BP's entire global production, and a fifth of its reserves.

The oligarchs want something from the Brits, and the result has been the usual Russian treatment: visits from countless inspectors, summonses to the prosecutor's office, visa trouble.

Yet the TNK-BP dustup no longer has the ring of expropriation as usual.

In the latest development, the concern's BP-appointed CEO, Robert Dudley, fled Russia in secret and is now hiding out in some undisclosed place, prepared, according to BP, to continue running TNK-BP from a distance. I asked a BP adviser why Dudley is behaving so mysteriously. Couldn't he have set up shop like a normal CEO in London? Perhaps this is part of the antagonists' PR war? "I do not know anything about the location except that he is operating as CEO for both [the Russians and BP], and London might not be the most appropriate location," he emailed me in response.

After some three decades of petro-nationalism in the Middle East and elsewhere, Big Oil is accustomed to the puffed-out chest, the boot, and picking up the pieces. It has found a modus vivendi in most cases.

Recall previous bouts of trouble in Russia: In December 2006, Shell responded to a similar onslaught at Sakhalin II -- at the time the world's largest combined oil and natural gas project -- by going to the Kremlin and crying uncle. The response was some advice -- sell half your shares at below-market rates to Gazprom. The result is that Shell, now with 27% of Sakhalin II instead of 55%, is still in business in Russia. And just six months later, BP was forced to sell out entirely from Kovytka, a supergiant natural gas field. BP sold its expulsion publicly as a fair deal, considering that in exchange it was embarking on a worldwide partnership with Gazprom. This partnership was crucial, because BP and the rest of Big Oil is finding it almost impossible to acquire new reserves to replenish what they pump each year; combinations with national energy companies like Gazprom are one way of maintaining one's bulk.

But not so fast. That BP-Gazprom partnership has yet to materialize. Indeed, BP's hopes for this partnership seem not just wishful, but hubristic. Because part of its calculus appeared to be ceding control of TNK-BP to Gazprom, which ostensibly would buy out the oligarchs while leaving BP with a sizeable remaining chunk.

TNK-BP was never a stable grouping, and seems always to have been bound for divorce court. But BP's talks with Gazprom appear to have accelerated the estrangement. The oligarchs seem to have believed that BP planned to sell them out in exchange for a global lifeline from Gazprom.

And, as Yulia Latynina, the respected Russian commentator puts it, the oligarchs responded "in the most brutal manner. They effectively said ..., 'We're the big guys around here.' [What followed] was a shoot-out. The other side shot better."

Here is where the gunfight appears to diverge from Big Oil's prior confrontations in Russia. Previously, the Kremlin has halted the hostilities once a targeted Big Oil company surrenders. But not in this case: BP has made clear that it's prepared to surrender control to one of the state-owned Russian companies, yet that's not been enough.

One is led to the conclusion that control in fact isn't good enough. It looks like Russia may want all of TNK-BP. And it also may not mind Big Oil understanding that, even if the state stands aside in a turf battle, the BPs of the world aren't tough enough to hold their own in Russia's brutal business environment. It may be a warning to all foreigners doing business there.

Richard Gordon, an experienced observer of Russian oil, sees it slightly differently. He told me last week that the Russians want BP to reduce its share considerably -- to 25% or less. At that point, Gordon said, it's up to BP to decide whether it has faith that TNK-BP would be run well enough, and, "if they don't have faith in the company, why remain a partner?"

In The Guardian today, Oppenheimer's Fadel Gheit, one of Wall Street's most seasoned oil analysts, advised BP to get out. "It's a bit like Manchester United losing Ronaldo," Gheit said. "It would take time to recover -- a blow but not fatal."

What happens next? Wall Street would pummel BP's share price were it to lose or leave TNK-BP, which would make the company a highly attractive target for acquisition. In that case, Gheit thinks that ExxonMobil is the only Big Oil company with deep enough pockets to buy BP.

But both Gordon and Gheit think that BP might act first and seek out its own merger partner because, as Gordon put it, it's better to "do a deal than be done to." Gheit told The Guardian that a logical BP partner would be Shell, "with [BP CEO] Tony Hayward running both companies."

Yet why are the Big Oil companies the only perceived merger partners? As Big Oil seeks access to China and the Middle East, wouldn't their national companies and sovereign wealth funds seek equal treatment?

Harvard Business School will no doubt chronicle the brawl as a case for how the game of energy is changing. But Big Oil is observing more closely, because this is its own future.

Photo: lawkeven
Rights: Creative Commons