The Same Old Game in Uzbekistan

As they say, hope springs eternal. But when it comes to Uzbekistan, it's getting ridiculous.

Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, the former Soviet Union’s most malignant president, is engaged in one of his customary mid-rule alliance shifts. After a few years of bedding with Vladimir Putin, he’s showing some leg to his former intimate, Washington. He has released some political prisoners. He’s allowing Human Rights Watch to re-open its Tashkent office. He's again allowing NATO to use Termez as an entry point to Afghanistan.

All of this has triggered remarks by some human rights activists and State Department officers that Western sanctions against him are working.

But Karimov’s about-face is predictable. He has with regularity shifted between Russia and the United States since the 1991 Soviet breakup. What does not change are his main policies – iron-fist rule, torture and repression of his people, and impoverishing, Soviet-like economic policies.

It seems a quaint notion now, but in 1996, for instance, Karimov desperately wanted what was then regarded as the ultimate recognition in this part of the world – an official state visit to the White House. Washington rubbed its hands with glee, getting Karimov “in exchange” to agree among other things to currency reform, and to allow exiled opponents to return home. Within months of his Oval Office visit with President Clinton, however, it was back to the old Karimov – the currency reform was canceled, and opponents were arrested or forced back out of the country.

Now, Human Rights Watch says that Karimov’s release of political prisoners just before last week’s visit of a European delegation to Tashkent is proof that “sustained international pressure on Tashkent is effective.”

It means nothing of the sort. What it does mean is that Karimov remains a cynical – and shrewd – geopolitical player who knows precisely how to push the right buttons in both Moscow and Washington.

Photo: DGtal Plus Art & Photo
Rights: Creative Commons

Diplo-Capitalism: Bush's Clintonian Iran Strategy

One needn't be a gene physicist to see that President Bush looks a lot like -- gulp -- former President Clinton these days. He's hosting Israeli-Palestinian talks, speaking with Syria, and now we hear that he's opened a pen-pal exchange with the mother of all totalitarians, North Korea's Kim Jong Il.

As my former Wall Street Journal colleague Jay Solomon notes today, neo-con John Bolton hates this shift. "Our foreign policy is in free-fall at the moment," the former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and advocate of uni-polar diplomacy tells Solomon. Engaging dictators, Bolton says, will only "diminish our prestige and influence."

Bah humbug.

So what's next in Bush's embrace of the foreign policy he's spent seven years deriding? Adoption of Clinton's diplomatic two-step with corporate America?

As readers of this blog know, I see one of America's most triumphant foreign policies of the last decade as the successful linking of the Caspian and Mediterranean seas through the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. When this million-barrel-a-day came on line last year, it cemented a decade-long challenge to Russian suzerainty in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

And it was all a joint diplomatic-commercial effort of Clinton administration officials and Big Oil, specifically BP, Pennzoil and a few other companies. It was cutting-edge stuff -- geopolitics at the intersection of diplomacy and commerce.

Now it seems Bush is following the same tack. Today my friend Dean Rose was kind enough to pass along a transcript of Bush's news conference this week on the fresh intelligence that in fact Iran stopped seeking development of a nuclear weapon four years ago.

Bush said he's working to get companies both in the U.S. and abroad to help persuade Iran to stop enriching uranium. One presumes Bush was talking about oil companies -- what other type of company would he be describing?

Here's Bush's direct language when asked what's next in U.S. policy on Iran:

"And I believe now is the time for the world to do the hard work necessary to convince the Iranians there is a better way forward. And I say, hard work -- here's why it's hard. One, many companies are fearful of losing market share in Iran to another company. It's one thing to get governments to speak out; it's another thing to convince private sector concerns that it's in our collective interests to pressure the Iranian regime economically.

"So I spend a fair amount of time trying to convince our counterparts that they need to convince the private sector folks that it is in their interests and for the sake of peace that there be a common effort to convince the Iranians to change their ways, and that there's a better way forward."

This is not to mock Bush but simply to note the dovetailing of long-standing foreign policy practices.

Photo: ynse
Rights: Creative Commons