Is There Political Will on the Caspian?

The presidents of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are in New York this week for the United Nations General Assembly. While together in a neutral environment, they could take the first step to resolving the pipeline morass that has bedeviled their half of the Caspian Sea for fifteen years. That would mean getting out of their luxury hotel suites, dispensing with the hallowed meetings with oilmen lining up to kiss the presidential ring, and announcing that they intend to build a joint oil and natural gas pipeline system across the Caspian to Baku.

Why should they take a rest from such accouterments and risk the predictable firestorm with Russia? Because it’s the only way they will finally obtain a measure of true political independence. Once they make that commitment, oil companies and western governments can help realize it.

Since the Soviet breakup, Russia has wielded what a former National Security Council officer named Sheila Heslin called its “iron umbilical cord” to hold the Caspian republics in check. Heslin’s term referred to the former Soviet energy pipeline system, which channels almost all the region’s oil and natural gas exports through Russia. When it is so moved, Russia just switches off the spigot.

In just one recent example of what it means to be reliant on the Russian system, Chevron and Exxon Mobil last week were effectively forced to agree to a large tariff increase for an oil pipeline that runs from Kazakhstan through Russia, even though it’s private and not ostensibly under Russian state control. The tariff increase is part of a Russian squeeze before it agrees to the companies’ plan to double the pipeline’s capacity and export more oil from Kazakhstan’s supergiant Tengiz oilfield.

In Turkmenistan’s case, it has its hopes pinned on a Chinese pledge to link the countries through a $26 billion natural gas pipeline. If it's actually built, the pipeline will be crucial to Central Asia’s economic and thus political independence. But this is the same China that has vowed for a decade to build a much cheaper oil pipeline to Kazakhstan, a pipeline that has yet to be finished. If it takes comparatively long in Turkmenistan, the line should be finished by mid-century.

In the mid-1990s, Azerbaijan and Georgia decided to reject Russia’s energy stranglehold, and spearhead the construction of an oil pipeline to Turkey, avoiding Russia entirely. With then-Azerbaijan leader Heydar Aliyev taking the lead locally, the Clinton administration backed the line on the world stage, and pushed the oil companies to build and finance it. A year ago, the first oil began moving through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and natural gas will come, too.

But Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan cut themselves off from the East-West link by refusing to concretely back a trans-Caspian spoke to the Baku hub.

The Kazakh and Turkmen presidents may think that such a pipeline will simply be built, and that then they will use it. But the countries have it reversed – they themselves must take charge of their future.

Turkmenistan Casino

Turkmenistan is getting much attention for its ostensible new attitude toward Big Oil with the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov. Much of the attention focuses on the new Turkmen leadership's deals with competing geopolitical interests -- China, Russia, the U.S. But it remains to be seen whether the country's new leadership has the vision or skill to carve out genuine sovereignty after Niyazov's delusive and false policy of "neutrality."

Here is an interesting piece a week ago from Guy Chazan at The Wall Street Journal. And here is one this week on Eurasianet.org. Here is a key quote from an unidentified Pentagon official in the latter piece: "If there is a new Great Game being played in Central Asia, the most important part is Turkmenistan."

Steve's comment: The lofty "Great Game" similes make one suspicious. Is Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov truly playing a new Great Game, or is he simply in over his head with so many suitors at his door?

We'll have to wait a year or two for an answer. One thing is clear -- the U.S. has been out-classed in terms of reviving a trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. That simply is not going to happen any time soon.

The idea of a Chinese pipeline is the most interesting, in my view. It meets the U.S. requirement of evading both Russian and Iranian turf, and provides the region some balance in terms of export.


One whopper in the Eurasianet.org piece is worth visiting: the western diplomat who asserts that, unlike its competitors, Washington is not playing a "zero-sum game." For all parties the game is zero-sum.

Gazprom: To Fear or Not to Fear

The West often expresses the apprehension that Russia will use its energy for outside political leverage. The answer of course is that it already is -- its oil and natural gas is the source after all of its newfound confidence and influence in Europe. Yet the most vulnerable and victim-prone countries are Russia's former Soviet colonies. The upshot: The Caspian states need to keep up their guard.

Take a look at The Independent of London today, which has a good, long primer on Gazprom. The piece, by Anne Penketh, makes two conclusions: Gazprom is so unwieldy and large that it may end up being a paper tiger; and that, given the combination of Gazprom's management failures and its abiding need for continued profits from Europe, it will end up having to give someone the short end of the stick -- one of its former Soviet brothers.

A key quote for those who follow the non-Russian states comes from Pavel Baev of the International Peace Research Institute: "They are the victims of choice," he tells the newspaper. "A new gas war is predetermined."

Steve's comment: The world caught on to Russia's outside power during the last eighteen months or so when Europe's oil and natural gas supply was disturbed over disputes with Ukraine and Belarus, and the Independent piece focuses on those two former Soviet states.

But the Caspian states and foreigners who work there -- Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, as a transit country, Georgia -- have witnessed Moscow's willingness to wield the energy club since just a few months after the 1991 Soviet breakup.

Russia starved Georgia of natural gas. It cut off Turkmenistan's access to foreign export markets. It has done the same in Kazakhstan, reducing the value of its giant fields (Karachaganak, one of the world's ten largest natural gas fields, is absurdly reduced to exploitation as an oil field). To its credit, Azerbaijan has responded to Gazprom's threats by going off Russian gas cold turkey, and turning to the local supply.

Transneft's actions in terms of the region's oil exports is well documented and have been discussed previously.

Russia argues that its actions are market-oriented. Maybe. But one must add realpolitik -- Gazprom has been the cudgel to bring feisty neighbors (such as Georgia) into line. And there is no sign that the custom is changing soon.