China, Russia and the Eastern Shift of Energy

The 800-pound gorilla in former Soviet energy is China. Since the late-mid 1990s, Beijing has steadily racked up oil and natural gas deals that draw more and more of Russia's and Central Asia's supplies to China. Cash-rich in a region struggling with the financial crisis, Beijing earlier this year agreed to a $25 billion loan to Moscow in exchange for a 20-year supply of oil. And later this year, a still hard-to-fathom 4,375-mile pipeline will supposedly begin pumping natural gas from Turkmenistan into China.

Now, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is on his way to Beijing, and a host of fresh energy deals are in the works. Chief among them is continued work on an important natural gas alliance between the countries that -- if completed -- would end up shipping a large portion of Russia's gas to China. It would come from the Kovykta gas field. The two countries have been working on the pact for three years but have yet to reach pricing agreement. But when they do, pressure will increase on Europe to figure out how it will satisfy its growing appetite natural gas. (Will the gas go off in Europe in the beginning of January in the annual flareup of tensions between Ukraine and Russia? The short answer is yes)

Listen this morning as my friend Jim Falk, president of the World Affairs Council in Dallas, interviews James Miles, the Economist's Beijing correspondent, who provides among the best coverage of the country out there. Sign up for it here, then listen in on this link to the live audio feed starting at 11 a.m. EST.

China's Challenge to the U.S.

The financial crisis has accelerated China's challenge to the U.S. There is Beijing's more assertive acquisition of oil and metals properties around the world, particularly in Russia, Brazil and Kazakhstan. But it's also been making noise about bringing down the dollar as the premier global currency held by central banks.

When the Chinese first raised the idea loudly in March, they were almost unanimously derided -- the dollar was king, and despite the financial crisis abetted by loose U.S. regulation, it would remain king. Two months later, few are still laughing.

As I write in today's Business Week on-line, China has taken numerous steps making it clear that it is deadly serious. "You are witnessing the Chinese starting to make the renminbi an international currency," Dennis Wilder, a China expert at the Brookings Institution, told me.

Some remain unconvinced. Steven Schrage, who runs the international business program at the Center for Security and International Studies in Washington, called China's moves "a lot of saber-rattling."

At Forex News, Andrei Moraru notes that the Chinese continue to tightly control their currency.

There may be some factor of saber-rattling. And Beijing does keep a tight rein on the renminbi. But over a longer time frame, meaning 10 or 15 years, the broad consensus seems to be that it makes sense for the renminbi to take its place among international, fully convertible currencies. As that happens, and China's economy continues to grow, its currency will also be held by more and more central banks (it is already held by a handful because of so-called currency swaps by Beijing). Bonds will be issued in the Chinese currency.

At Shadow Warrior, San says that China is simply "moving to protect their own future in bypassing the US currency." San argues that India needs to think about doing the same. Now, that looks a bit unlikely even in China's time frame.

The Game-Changing Financial Crisis

We already know how the financial crisis has changed the landscape around us. After a drumbeat of reckoning that has brought low the titans of Wall Street and Citibank, today we hear that the venerable American International Group is breaking itself up. The crisis also provided the opening for President Obama to seek all his main campaign pledges at once -- universal health care, education reform, carbon-emissions trading, a green economy, and a reordering of the tax code.

Investors, businessmen and diplomats who poured in to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe two decades ago are familiar with how upheaval creates opportunity. Today, I have a piece in Business Week on how today's crisis has shaken up the economic equation abroad, creating potential openings where little chance of progress previously existed.

Three examples are China and climate change; Iran and Russia. On all three, the U.S. the West, and the countries themselves can or already are capitalizing on the changed atmosphere to their own advantage. In the case of the latter two, the financial crisis could alter the natural gas chessboard in Europe.

As in the case of the investment banks, the financial crisis also holds much potential peril for economies abroad. I wrote a piece over the weekend on how development banks are trying to stave off potential dangers of the crisis in Eastern Europe. The New York Times' Steve Erlanger, my former colleague in Moscow, has a good piece explaining the fears of a fresh East-West divide in Europe.

China Changes Calculus for Petro-Rulers

Much has been written on how low oil prices will help to reverse the fortunes of resource-strapped Big Oil – if not precisely jolly over their new penury, closed-armed petro-powers, it's said, will now allow western oil companies at least to make a case why they should be permitted to conduct exploration and production. Atop the list of this ostensible new state of affairs have been Venezuela, Libya, and Russia.

But so far, the opposite appears to be happening -- resource-rich countries are not opening up to new deals with western oil companies. One reason is that the analyses appear to have played down two factors – the depth of discomfort among the petro-powers with Big Oil; and the deep-pocketed willingness of China to step in.

The implications of China's entry as cash savior include not only trouble for non- state oil companies; it also could exaggerate an expected resumption of relatively high oil prices once the global economy recovers.

In the last week, we have seen China lending Russia's Transneft and Rosneft $25 billion in exchange for a guaranteed oil supply of 300,000 barrels a day for 20 years. The price of the oil wasn't disclosed. Look next for Gazprom to borrow from the Chinese to finance its ongoing operations.

Even more conspicuous was last Thursday's announcement that China is lending Brazil up to $10 billion to help develop its oil company Petrobras's deepwater oilfields. The deal is in exchange for up to 160,000 barrels a day of oil. Again, the price of the oil wasn’t disclosed.

The Brazilian case is perhaps more important because it appears on the cusp of the country becoming a huge petro-power on the backs of an estimated 12 billion barrels of offshore oil; Brazil itself says it may possess an additional 100 billion barrels of oil.

Because the oil has been found in extremely deep water, analysts have forecast that Petrobras will need Big Oil’s cash and capabilities in order to develop it. Indeed already Exxon Mobil, Amerada Hess and BG are among companies working offshore in Brazil. But if China remains open-walleted, there will probably be less need for more cooperation with multi-nationals.

Interestingly, both Russia and Brazil were willing to be on the hook to China for guaranteed reserves while at least for now remaining closed to new cooperation with Big Oil.

The ramifications for future oil prices stems from the nature of the deals. The price of oil is set to a large degree on the availability of supply during moments of man-made or natural crises, such as war or hurricanes. To the degree that the available supply is already tied up in long-term contracts, there’s less wiggle room during these crises, and thus more of a chance of a price spike.

Already, oil companies are significantly reducing new exploration projects, and shutting in uneconomic oilfields in the U.S. and elsewhere. This means that, once the economy and oil demand recover, there will be less supplies of oil and natural gas. China's new oil deals will exacerbate the supply tightness. And any geopolitical or weather-caused crisis will more likely drive oil and ultimately gasoline prices higher.

What $100 Oil Means

Yesterday's runup in oil prices was a mere blip -- two publicity-seeking traders appear simply to have sought barroom talk as the guys who made history's first buy over $100, then quickly sold at a small loss. But, coming the first business day of the new year, it's dramatized the new energy world in which we live.

I recommend an excellent piece today by my former colleagues at The Wall Street Journal -- Neil King, Chip Cummins and Russell Gold -- that sums up the themes we've been discussing on this blog, and takes them further.

In the hundred-dollar carbon fuel world, Big Oil is no longer in charge. Exxon, Shell and Chevron have been overtaken by Gazprom, Aramco and Qatar Petroleum. If you're an investor, the best long-term bets are some of these majority state-owned energy companies, and the technology-rich oil services companies being hired to work for them.

One takeaway point from the Journal piece is that Exxon -- the most successful of any of the Big Oil giants -- has only the 13th-largest oil reserves among the world's oil companies. The twelve biggest are all state-owned. This is a hugely important factoid -- Wall Street bases its valuations of oil companies on the reserves they own. So, logically speaking, they are headed for lower valuations. "Western oil companies now control only about one in ten barrels of the world's proven reserves," the piece says.

Another point is the enormous shift of wealth to these petro-states from consuming nations such as the U.S. At current prices, the Middle Eastern and Central Asian producers will earn around $750 billion this year.

For motorists, all of this means that, short of a recession, gasoline prices aren't likely to go down this year, but only up. If there's a hard hurricane season, they're likely to go extremely high.

The causes are an enormous increase in demand from China and India, along with only slowly rising production from the petro-states. There's actually a lot of oil sloshing around the world, but much of it is the wrong kind. It's heavy and sulfur-laden crude, which most refineries can't process. New refineries that can are on the way, but it'll be three or four years before they come on line.

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Blow to Bush: Russia Says No New Sanctions on Iran

Russia today joined China in a public rejection of the Bush administration's effort to increase sanctions on Iran. In Moscow, Russian and Iranian officials announced that they moved closer to finalizing Russian construction of a $1 billion nuclear power plant near the southern Iranian city of Bushehr.

The agreement in itself is unimpressive -- another of those interim pacts in which the parties agree to do something later, in this case to finalize a timetable for completing the plant, which is at the heart of Western concerns about Iran's uranium enrichment program.

But it puts meat on Vladimir Putin's resistance to further Iranian sanctions after a U.S. intelligence estimate last week said Iran had stopped trying to develop nuclear arms four years ago. The Bush administration has continued to push for stepped-up sanctions, saying the new intelligence doesn't mean that Iran is less dangerous.

The Russian position makes it even harder for Bush to get agreement since China on Sunday made its feelings on the matter known when Sinopec, the Chinese oil company, signed a $2 billion oil contract with Iran.

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Rights: Creative Commons

China Replies: No New Sanctions Against Iran

China has replied to President Bush’s request for a tougher global stand against Iran. Sinopec, the Chinese company, today signed a $2 billion contract to develop a supergiant Iranian oilfield called Yadavaran.

The field is impressive, with an estimated 3 billion barrels of recoverable reserves. But the lousy terms show that Iran is still in the driver’s seat. Still insisting on fixed profit rather than the industry-standard big-risk-big-possible-reward formula, Iran gave Sinopec just a 14.98% rate of return.

In addition, production will be extremely slow. The contract calls for just 185,000 barrels a day. By comparison, the BP-led developers of next-door Azerbaijan's offshore – which contains just under twice Yadavaran's reserves – plan to ship 1.5 million barrels a day when it’s at maximum production in the next decade.

But the message is clear. The U.S. has lost the punch of its main claim against Iran – that it’s trying to build a nuclear bomb; a fresh intelligence estimate says that Tehran stopped doing so four years ago. So that has made it difficult for Bush to step up the isolation of Iran in what he asserts is the best way to get it to halt its enrichment of uranium.

China’s action shows that Iran will find ways around the western embargo.

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Don Quixote and Exxon's Contrarian Gamble

Does Exxon Mobil know something that the rest of Big Oil doesn't? Or is Exxon on a noble but ultimately quaint and quixotic quest for the old days?

Around the world, Big Oil has been knocked back on its heels by the assertiveness of state-owned oil companies that are both developing their own fields, and competing vigorously in auctions for the rights to oil and gas reserves elsewhere. The upshot is that major oil companies look to be on the verge of a long, unpleasant (for them) decline, with the result that some of them -- such as Italy's Eni -- are scrambling to adapt by forming alliances with the state-owned companies.

Exxon is not only refusing to play along with this scenario, but is in battle around the world in a claim that the prior rules hold.

In Kazakhstan, it was announced this week that Exxon is the lone holdout on an agreement to resume work on supergiant Kashagan, the largest new oilfield on the planet; the rest of the field's big partners -- Europe's Total, Shell and Eni -- have agreed to shave off a bit of their collective shares in the field so that Kazakhstan can become a full partner.

In Russia, too, Exxon is at odds with Moscow's insistence that the company sell natural gas from its giant Sakhalin-I development within Russia instead of at a higher price to China. Meanwhile, the rest of Big Oil has thrown in the towel and done compromise deals with Moscow.

And, as my friend Paul Sampson at Energy Intelligence notes in a story this week, the company is in conflict with Venezuela after abandoning participation in the Orinoco heavy oil project when Hugo Chavez demanded a larger piece of the pie. Exxon and Venezuela are in arbitration over how the company will be compensated. Meanwhile, Total, Chevron, BP and Norway's Statoil went along with Chavez's terms.

In a speech last month in Rome, Exxon Chairman Rex Tillerson said, "Some exporting and importing countries are losing sight of their interdependence. They are responding to the energy challenge by pursuing policies of resource nationalism."

Tillerson is betting that the current phase is a blip. Oil prices ultimately will moderate, his thinking goes, and state-owned companies in Venezuela, Russia, China and elsewhere will be back on Big Oil's doorstep.

Meanwhile, Exxon's strategy is to morph into more of a natural gas company. My former colleague Russell Gold at The Wall Street Journal reported during the summer that more than a third of Exxon's total proven reserves are in the Middle East and Asia; five years ago, Gold said, Exxon reported just a sixth of its reserves from that region. Exxon's biggest play on the planet is Qatar, which accounts for much of its growth.

It seems un-Exxonish to bet one's future on a single country or region. But it's not contrary to company culture to resist change. This is a company that until recently was the biggest corporate funder of the narrow club of greenhouse gas "scientist" deniers. Exxon reduced that funding when it became too public and too embarrassing.

It would be foolish to pass judgment on Exxon's strategy. But it does seem to be betting the house against the tide.

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Is There Political Will on the Caspian?

The presidents of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are in New York this week for the United Nations General Assembly. While together in a neutral environment, they could take the first step to resolving the pipeline morass that has bedeviled their half of the Caspian Sea for fifteen years. That would mean getting out of their luxury hotel suites, dispensing with the hallowed meetings with oilmen lining up to kiss the presidential ring, and announcing that they intend to build a joint oil and natural gas pipeline system across the Caspian to Baku.

Why should they take a rest from such accouterments and risk the predictable firestorm with Russia? Because it’s the only way they will finally obtain a measure of true political independence. Once they make that commitment, oil companies and western governments can help realize it.

Since the Soviet breakup, Russia has wielded what a former National Security Council officer named Sheila Heslin called its “iron umbilical cord” to hold the Caspian republics in check. Heslin’s term referred to the former Soviet energy pipeline system, which channels almost all the region’s oil and natural gas exports through Russia. When it is so moved, Russia just switches off the spigot.

In just one recent example of what it means to be reliant on the Russian system, Chevron and Exxon Mobil last week were effectively forced to agree to a large tariff increase for an oil pipeline that runs from Kazakhstan through Russia, even though it’s private and not ostensibly under Russian state control. The tariff increase is part of a Russian squeeze before it agrees to the companies’ plan to double the pipeline’s capacity and export more oil from Kazakhstan’s supergiant Tengiz oilfield.

In Turkmenistan’s case, it has its hopes pinned on a Chinese pledge to link the countries through a $26 billion natural gas pipeline. If it's actually built, the pipeline will be crucial to Central Asia’s economic and thus political independence. But this is the same China that has vowed for a decade to build a much cheaper oil pipeline to Kazakhstan, a pipeline that has yet to be finished. If it takes comparatively long in Turkmenistan, the line should be finished by mid-century.

In the mid-1990s, Azerbaijan and Georgia decided to reject Russia’s energy stranglehold, and spearhead the construction of an oil pipeline to Turkey, avoiding Russia entirely. With then-Azerbaijan leader Heydar Aliyev taking the lead locally, the Clinton administration backed the line on the world stage, and pushed the oil companies to build and finance it. A year ago, the first oil began moving through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and natural gas will come, too.

But Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan cut themselves off from the East-West link by refusing to concretely back a trans-Caspian spoke to the Baku hub.

The Kazakh and Turkmen presidents may think that such a pipeline will simply be built, and that then they will use it. But the countries have it reversed – they themselves must take charge of their future.

Turkmenistan Casino

Turkmenistan is getting much attention for its ostensible new attitude toward Big Oil with the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov. Much of the attention focuses on the new Turkmen leadership's deals with competing geopolitical interests -- China, Russia, the U.S. But it remains to be seen whether the country's new leadership has the vision or skill to carve out genuine sovereignty after Niyazov's delusive and false policy of "neutrality."

Here is an interesting piece a week ago from Guy Chazan at The Wall Street Journal. And here is one this week on Eurasianet.org. Here is a key quote from an unidentified Pentagon official in the latter piece: "If there is a new Great Game being played in Central Asia, the most important part is Turkmenistan."

Steve's comment: The lofty "Great Game" similes make one suspicious. Is Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov truly playing a new Great Game, or is he simply in over his head with so many suitors at his door?

We'll have to wait a year or two for an answer. One thing is clear -- the U.S. has been out-classed in terms of reviving a trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. That simply is not going to happen any time soon.

The idea of a Chinese pipeline is the most interesting, in my view. It meets the U.S. requirement of evading both Russian and Iranian turf, and provides the region some balance in terms of export.


One whopper in the Eurasianet.org piece is worth visiting: the western diplomat who asserts that, unlike its competitors, Washington is not playing a "zero-sum game." For all parties the game is zero-sum.

Russia in the Air

The Central Asia republics joined their two paternalistic neighbors -- Russia and China -- in a military show yesterday. The climax was President Putin's announcement that Russia had resumed long-range flights by its nuclear bombers, and a U.S. announcement that NATO aircraft had scrambled the aircraft. The upshot: The message was not warlike, but it was belligerent. Russia is attempting to demonstrate that its global ambitions are not limited to refineries and pipelines.

The first paragraph of the L.A. Times account: Russian President Vladimir V. Putin on Friday announced reinstatement of the Soviet-era practice of having nuclear bombers routinely make long-distance flights that bring them within striking distance of the United States and its allies. "Today just after midnight, 14 strategic missile aircraft, with support and fuel planes, took off from seven airfields across Russia," Putin said in televised remarks. "Combat duty began in which a total of 20 planes are taking part. From today, combat duty of this kind will be carried out on a regular basis." Read story

Steve's comment: Russia's bomber flight is reminiscent of a similar show that the U.S. put on almost precisely 10 years ago. On Sept. 15, 1997, the U.S. 82d Airborne flew from the U.S. all the way to Kyrgyzstan for a Central Asia military exercise. It was the longest such airborne mission in history, capped by a parachute landing.

It was intended to demonstrate not that the U.S. intended to invade, but that it had the reach and will to get to the region. No one anticipated that, four years later, that would be illustrated in fact with the establishment of a semi-permanent military presence there.

The Russian flight was farce in the sense that Moscow lacks the capability to mount a massive long-range military assault. But in military language, image can be crucial. Russia is saying that it intends over the coming years to take its previously formidible military out of mothballs, and turn it into something of use. That use is surely regional, but given the neighborhood it is something that bears watching.

Here is the first paragraph of a Reuters account of the Shanghai military exercises: CHEBARKUL, Russia - Russia and China staged their biggest joint exercises on Friday but denied this show of military prowess could lead to the formation of a counterweight to NATO. Read story