After the Matches, After the Drones, How to Capture An Elusive Taliban Leader

For more than a decade, both the U.S. and the Pakistans have tried a rising scale of payments -- from a few hundred dollars up to $25 million -- to capture the most violent militants using the borderlands with Afghanistan as safe harbor. On one of my reporting trips to Pakistan in 1998, American aircraft dropped green matchbooks offering $5 million for the capture of Osama bin Ladin. I keep a box of the matches as a souvenir in a drawer.

Needless to say, neither this system, nor the use of arms, has resulted in many top-rank captures. Those that have occurred – such as that of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh – were the result of other traditional intelligence.

Why would dirt-poor people living in the tribal belt give up a chance at millions of dollars for turning in an Uzbek or a Saudi with whom they have absolutely no blood link, with whom their sole link is that they happened to drop in on the village one day?

One reason is the code – the Pashtunwali, under which the tribals don’t make a habit of surrendering guests. The other reason is that the Americans went about it all wrong culturally. What they needed to do was to quietly seek intelligence, without tipping their hand publicly; then lots of Pakistanis, including tribals, might have helped find virtually any of the militants, including bin Ladin.

But after the matches, it was more or less a matter of pride to keep one’s mouth shut. But that’s all another, long story.

What’s now news is a new tactic to make it in the tribal interest to talk. The tactic is arresting other members of the tribe. In the case of Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban commander accused of murdering former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and various other continuing acts of mayhem, the Pakistanis are arresting other Mehsuds.

Given that the Mehsuds are an enormous tribe -- according to a seriously good story by The Washington Post’s Joshua Partlow and Haq Nawaz Khan, there are a few hundred thousand of them in and around the Pakistani border region of South Waziristan – there are a lot to choose from. Partlow and Khan report that hundreds of Mehsud-owned businesses may have been shut down, and 25 members of the tribe arrested.

This is getting some bad press. Over at Registan.net, Josh Foust for one is up in arms.

But this seems to me to be among the shrewdest tactics the Pakistanis have employed so far. As my old friend Jim Rupert of Bloomberg reports from the field, drone attacks may have done more to aggravate the region than make its occupants give up Behsud.

Yet those who have actually traveled in the tribal areas know that this is a tough region. It freely engages in smuggling, kidnapping, opium- and gun-running, and so on. I recall inspecting the enormous estate of Haji Ayub Afridi, one of the border region’s most legendary drug smugglers, along the Khyber Pass. Afridi would understand the language the Pakistanis are speaking with such roundups.

This is carrot and stick. The stick is arrest. The carrot is that, if you want to avoid jail and your business shutting down for awhile, the U.S. is offering up $5 million.

Watching the Pakistan Army

By appearances, the Pakistan Army has at last recognized the grave threat facing it and the secular government. There are no independent eye-witness accounts of the actual fighting in the Swat Valley and Buner. But there are reports on the Taliban digging in within the city of Mingora and elsewhere, as the PrairiePundit notes.

The BBC is often the best reporting from the region. Here is a BBC video report.

Will the Army dislodge the Taliban entirely from Northwest Frontier Province? Over at Israpundit, Salim Mansur argues that Pakistan is already "more or less a Taliban state." At Op-Ed News, Michael Collins labels concerns of a Taliban state in Pakistan "The Big Con." With respect, both of these views are seriously misled.

As discussed previously at O&G, Pakistan is nowhere near "a Taliban state." In addition, the threat is not that the Taliban captures power in a frontal assault, which appears to be the only way these pundits-from-afar can imagine such a change of government taking place. Instead, the risk is that, over time (it took two years for the Taliban to manage this during the 1990s in much-less-difficult Afghanistan), the Taliban captures more and more territory; long-ago-trained militants living in villages and towns across the Punjab start their own anti-state activities; and there is a tipping point at which important elements of the Army simply turns.

Why would middle-ranking Army officers and jawans tip this way? Because they would regard such as move as them taking power. They would be fooled, as were countless Afghans, by Taliban promises of power-sharing.

Obama: The Wrong Interlocutors

President Obama will meet tomorrow with the leaders of what are, in terms of security, the two most crucial nations on the planet. Neither of the two men -- Pakistan's Asif Zardari and Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai -- are fond of Taliban-like politics, nor militants. But they also are utterly weak figures lacking the political support to stand on their own two feet, and are disrepected by stronger forces around them. So one can be cheered at the administration's continued support of the two countries' attempts at democracy. But in the end, a reduction of the threat of a Taliban takeover of the region depends -- as it always has -- on the Pakistan Army.

In today's Washington Post, my friend Ahmed Rashid correctly notes that the Taliban threat is not isolated or overstated, as some claim; at the New American Foundation, for instance, Peter Bergen argues that concerns about this threat have risen to the level of "hyperventilation." Rashid writes compellingly that Pakistan is "on the brink of chaos," with militants cultivated by the Army's InterServices Intelligence directorate present and strong in all four of the country's provinces.

In a story borrowing from his book, The Inheritance, David Sanger at the New York Times reports that U.S. officials remain worried about the integrity of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Could some of the fissile material or even a bomb get lost? That's the fear.

Simon Cameron-Moore at Reuters has made much of the fact that the specter of one's demise can concentrate the mind; this is in the way of explanation of why Pakistan's Army is suddenly on the march in Buner and Swat. Yet, it is notable that Pakistan allowed the Taliban such a foothold that this mighty army -- believe me, the Pakistan Army is a serious force -- is compeled to fight door to door to dislodge them, as Zahid Hussain is reporting in the Times of London. Reuters' Junaid Khan reported today from the field that hundreds of civilians are fleeing, implying that more trouble is on the way.

I personally don't see how the situation gets turned around in the short or the medium term.

The Irrelevancy of Nawaz Sharif

If the New York Times has it right, the Obama administration thinks that the prime ministership and presidency of Pakistan are decisive positions in the pursuit of the Taliban. In a piece today by Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, we learn that the administration is courting former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who has zero influence over the Taliban or any other militant in Pakistan or anywhere else.

It's not that President Asif Zardari has relatively more influence than Sharif with the militants. Neither of them does. (In fact, neither of these fellows is particularly impressive in person.) The point is that anyone seeking to resolve the Taliban advances must do so through the Army and its intelligence wing, the InterServices Intelligence directorate, both of which are seriously entangled with the militants. Majed Iqbal discussed the topic of Sharif's rising favor a week ago. Aiming any attention at the political structure is wasted energy.

One matter we have not discussed here earlier is the utter failure of successive Pakistani governments going back two decades to lay the groundwork for confidence in civilian, secular rule. The main failure has been in education. The CIA says that 49% of Pakistanis over the age of 15 are literate; that's certainly a generous figure. The indicator is also a shrinking one -- in 1980, according to the United Nations, about 72% of adults could read and write. Whatever the precise figure, the government has decided to channel almost all its money into the Army, thus leaving its people reliant on madrassas, and seething in anger at their leaders.

Would a different president or prime minister aim more attention at improving the lives of ordinary Pakistanis? Perhaps. Meanwhile, this failure is the river in which the Taliban are swimming.

Would a Taliban Regime Bring a Truly Different Pakistan?

For the last several days, I've been surprised by the response of friends to the topic of the Taliban's march in Pakistan. The takeaway, according to them: A Taliban government would change little for the vast majority of Pakistanis; certainly, such a shift in power does not threaten the Pakistani state.

That is correct if public floggings, hangings and amputations -- all hallmarks of Taliban rule in Afghanistan -- are not a shift for Pakistanis; for my friends concerned with the metric of political risk, it will be interesting to watch the market's reaction to Taliban control of the country's nuclear weapons.

According to some excellent pieces published the last couple of days, a sentiment of lethargic resignation prevails in Pakistan itself. In a sobering lament in yesterday’s Washington Post, the BBC’s Mohammed Hanif described this atmosphere:

“As a Taliban insurgency gains strength in Pakistan, my country seems to be preparing to surrender. In areas where the Taliban formally hold sway, such as Swat, people have bowed to their guns. And in the heartland, in Punjab and other regions, there is a disquieting acceptance of the inevitability of the Taliban's rise to power.”

At Registan, Josh Foust takes note of the Hanif report, and now seems more concerned about the news than he expressed previously.

The latest reports are that the Pakistan Army is fighting back with helicopter gunships. The Taliban has pulled back a bit. But the fighting will go on. A cleric who has been brokering talks between the government and the Taliban has severed the negotiations, accusing the government of violating the peace accord by attacking the militants who themselves moved beyond the peace zone of Swat and seized the neighboring district of Buner.

A lot of Pakistanis are terrified because they can’t count on the military to protect them, so they must make a decision on survival. The Financial Times’ James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari dissect the Army’s problems in an excellent piece today in the paper. Pam Constable talks about the sense of foreboding in Islamabad in the Washington Post.

But, according to Hanif, a lot of his middle-class friends in the Punjab simply think that the Taliban will recognize that, while their ways suit Afghans and the Pashtuns of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier, the culture of the Punjab is different. The Talibs will live and let live. Over at the National Journal on-line, Georgetown Professor Paul Pillar argues similarly.

But this is contrary to the Taliban’s history – as anyone like me who visited Afghanistan at the time knows, the movement wholly displaced the ways and thinking of the Persian-speaking populations of Kabul, Herat and elsewhere; the traditions of the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras were displaced by the distinct culture of conservative villages outside southern Kandahar. Yet people in such situations do tend to hope for the best regardless of the reality.

I checked out the Hanif report with a couple of friends in Pakistan – one in Peshawar, one in Islamabad. Both said the piece is accurate.

The Peshawar friend is worried for his kids: “Already they have been made to learn security precautions in school in case of a bombing.” This friend went on:

“The military is taking its sweet time, not willing to go the epicenter of the problem, Waziristan. What they don’t realize or are unable to do is to take out the militant leadership [based in Waziristan] that will solve much of the problem.”

Validation of that thinking came from an interesting source today. Prince Turki al-Faisal – the former Saudi intelligence chief who ran the kingdom’s Afghanistan policy during the 1980s and financed many of that period’s most militant leaders -- appeared this morning at the New America Foundation. In terms of the U.S. approach to the Pakistani crisis, Turki urged the U.S. to go laser-like after the militant leaders, and forget about nation-building and democracy. “Kill the terrorist leaders, declare victory, and get out,” he said.

Turki said that the presence of NATO in the region, along with the use of unmanned drones to attack militants along the border, “undermines the glue that holds Pakistan together, which is the Army.” Hanif said much the same thing:

“There is not a single Pakistani who supports these attacks or the way they are being conducted. They have made being pro-American radioactive. And they have also made opposing the Taliban that much more difficult,” Hanif wrote.

The Pakistan Army has a history of distorted thinking. This was brought home most dramatically to me in 2002. Following the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Danny Pearl, a few of us went in to see Gen. Pervez Musharraf. I asked the general what he thought of the shift in the capabilities of the militants in Pakistan after 9/11.

“What shift?” Musharraf replied.

Musharraf may have been putting us on. If he was not, he did not seem to recognize that the militants, having shifted their base from Afghanistan into Pakistan, had wholly elevated their capacities by the use of technology, especially the Internet.

Later in the year, I interviewed Musharraf again. The general was angry with Zahid Hussain, the Journal’s Pakistan-based correspondent and one of the best analysts on the ground. Because of Hussain’s coverage, Musharraf wouldn’t allow Hussain to join me in the interview. What did such coverage mean? “I think he’s on India’s side,” Musharraf said.

That’s another dimension of the trouble in Pakistan – an obsession with India and the supposed predominant mortal threat it presents to Pakistan. So, while the Taliban marches from the West and from within Pakistan, the Army is busy protecting the Eastern borders. That India would try to exploit the Taliban threat by attacking Pakistan is preposterous; a Taliban government would threaten India, too.

A general quoted in the FT dismisses concerns about Pakistan’s integrity:

“Has anyone considered that the Punjab is home to six of the nine corps of the Pakistan army? The military’s headquarters are in Rawalpindi, while the air force and navy headquarters are in Islamabad. Do you seriously believe the Taliban can simply walk over this area?”

This general misses the point. The Taliban can’t attack and defeat the Pakistan Army directly. But it also won’t have to. The danger is that the Army itself will invite them in. As a diplomat tells Lamont and Bokhari in the FT piece, “The army has been Islamized over the long term. For them, jihad is the guiding principle.”

Moment for Regrouping in Pakistan

Pakistan's Army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, has seemed to suffer a scare. The normally taciturn general came out publicly today with a warning against Taliban forces who took advantage of the shaky president to march into a district of 1 million people just 65 miles from the capital of Islamabad. The Taliban have responded by initiating a retreat from Buner.

That's good news. But it's wise to stay mindful of the Taliban's history in Afghanistan. Their two-year, 1994-'96 march from Kandahar to Kabul was not smooth and without setbacks. To the contrary, in 1995, Ahmad Shah Massoud delivered a fierce punch that forced them back reeling. And the following summer, they appeared to be dead in the water. As O&G readers know, that's when Osama bin Ladin showed up with $3 million in cash, which, along with materiel and personnel support from Pakistan's military, carried the Taliban through Jalalabad and on to the Afghan capital.

For excellent perspective, read my friend Ahmed Rashid on the BBC website.

The Taliban are a patient bunch. They have support in the Pakistan military, particularly the InterServices Intelligence directorate. Over at Registan, Josh Foust has an interesting post in which he cautions not to get alarmed. Perhaps Josh means that we shouldn't run around with our arms in the air shouting. But the seriousness of the developments I think is profound. The current events in Pakistan are more blowback from a series of monumental blunders by Pakistan's politically expedient military and political leaders going back to the 1970s. This is an important, important moment, as Kayani's uncharacteristic response demonstrates.

Where is the Pakistani Army?

The most telling detail in the Taliban's trademark step-by-step march on Islamabad is the invisibility of the vaunted Pakistan Army. It tells us about all we need to know about the staying power of the Asif Zardari government: It may not be long.

In dual reports today, my friend Zahid Hussain -- one of the sharpest observers in Pakistan -- finds that the Army has elected to meet the shift of the Taliban to within 65 miles of the capital with a token, ragtag force of 300 fighters from the Frontier Corps. (Here is Hussain's report in The Times of London; here is his report in The Wall Street Journal.)

For those familiar with how coups happen and capital cities fall -- I've seen over the last couple of decades in Baku, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Kabul and Manila -- the opposing force doesn't have to actually enter or even come near to the capital. Bargaining among power brokers begins long before that.

It's anyone's guess as to where the tipping point is over Islamabad. In today's New York Times, Jane Perlez quotes an unnamed law enforcement official as identifying that pivotal place as the nearby provincial city of Mardan -- second only to Peshawar in size in the Northwest Frontier. "They take over Buner, then they roll into Mardan, and that's the end of the game," the official said.

But the Army, and in particular its intelligence arm, the InterServices Intelligence directorate, has been in cahoots with the Taliban, al Qaeda and the region's other militants for almost three decades. For the last two decades, the ISI has asserted that it has no further operational links with the militants, only to be proven to be prevaricating (see O&G, chapter 16, about the ill-fated Unocal pipeline through Afghanistan).

So which is it -- is the Pakistan Army supporting the current civilian government; or is it backing a Taliban takeover of the country?

In 21 years of living in, traveling to and watching Pakistan, and observing all the various missile strikes, coups, and so forth, this is the first time I have felt a serious threat to the country.

If events continue along the current trajectory, look for serious instability -- a serious and far-reaching reaction.

A Front-Row Seat to Momentous Events. The Oil and Glory Interview: Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha

Albania has had a prime view of some of the most dramatic events in Europe of the last decade and more. Most recently, they have included the West's showdown with Russia over Kosovo's independence, which led directly to Moscow's effective absorption of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition, while Russia has opposed further expansion of NATO, Albania along with Croatia became the alliance's newest members three weeks ago.

When I was last in Albania – during NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbian troops in Kosovo – I had a great time, but the country was overrun with criminal gangs. There were Mercedeses everywhere – all of them absent license plates since Albania served as the way-station for stolen vehicles traversing Europe. It also was a smuggling route for people of all sorts seeking to migrate illegally to Europe; I watched a couple of boatloads of these migrants traveling fast late one evening on to Italy. Today, with the country a NATO member and seeking to join the EU, those old days seem largely gone.

Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha has traversed this entire period. A 65-year-old trained cardiologist, he was Albanian president for five years during the 1990s, before losing the post in a huge investment scandal. After ten years in the opposition, he returned to power in 2005. I called Berisha in his Tirana office. The edited interview:

O&G – The International Monetary Fund calls Albania “highly vulnerable.” Yet it is one of the few economies in the world expected not to shrink this year. How is the country withstanding the financial crisis? How are remittances from Albanians abroad holding up?

Berisha – I have high esteem for the IMF. But it should not [encourage] a panic. It’s not helpful, in my view. I told them, ‘Look, you’re a very, very crucial institution. I’m glad that the G20 provided you with a new role.’ But many governments are hesitant to work with them because their scheme at a time of social unrest could create more problems than it solves. I don’t consider the [Albanian] economy as highly vulnerable. It’s a real economy. Remittances are not coming [to the same degree] because of the loss of jobs in Greece and Italy. But we are encouraging tourism.

Q – Is NATO membership a right? Russia, while opposing Kosovo independence, for instance, has vigorously opposed NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, and made that a benchmark for good relations with the West.

A – For my country, NATO membership was the most important achievement since independence day. Albania suffered more than any country from security problems. It suffered from isolation and self-isolation. It was an orphan nation. Now it’s part of an alliance. We have all the potential to build freedom. It means high credibility for Albania in the world. It is high credibility for investors. Albania will never walk alone.

Q – Is NATO membership a right?

A – For a free nation, yes. NATO proved to be a shield of nations. NATO has faced no difficulty adapting to the new situation. It has brought freedom everywhere.

Q – Is it valid for Russia to make good relations with it contingent on opposing NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine?

A – I know no country that is afraid of Russia. I know only countries that are willing to work with Russia. Based on some imperial heritage, if you go into their history, expansion is in their psychology. What effect would Georgia or Ukraine have on Russia? What effect would NATO expansion have on Russia? [The assertion of a NATO threat to Russia] is nonsense. It will take time, but with realism [Georgian and Ukrainian membership] will happen.

Q – The decisive factor in deciding who should be a member of NATO is whether it would send troops to defend that country, Article V of the NATO charter. Would NATO defend Ukraine or Georgia if need be?

A – Is Russia intending to attack Ukraine or Georgia? If Russia intends to partake an aggression, NATO must firmly stand, because that would mean the new Russification of Europe.

Q – What is your view of the August war between Russia and Georgia?

A – Who attacked first is unclear. But a [Russian] scenario was there to invade Georgia. The Russians moved not only into Ossetia. They moved into Abkhazia, and toward Tbilisi. Russia probably wanted to occupy Georgia. The stand of the international community worked.

Q – How will Albania respond to President Obama’s call for more NATO troops in Afghanistan?

A – Albania is sending a new company, doubling our current number of troops. We also sent 20 nurses and doctors.

Q – Is Afghanistan a threat for NATO countries?

A – Afghanistan and Pakistan must both be helped. It is difficult terrain. Politics at home aren’t easy. But I think the strategy will be effective. The U.S. sent a man over there who is highly skilled in negotiations.

Q – [Richard] Holbrooke?

A – Yes. Holbrooke. It’s very important to promote peace there.

Q – Unlike elsewhere in Europe, President Bush seemed highly popular when he visited Albania in 2007. Can you explain why?

A – First, he was the first U.S. president to visit my country. Second, we suffered more than any country from dictatorship. So we definitely support toppling dictators, including Saddam Hussain and [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar. Third, he came with great messages here – support for Kosovo independence, and NATO membership for us.

Afghanistan: Central Asia Takes Center Stage Again

With the Taliban having made Pakistan an insecure supply route for war materiel headed into Afghanistan, NATO and the U.S. are looking again to Central Asia for help.

Thom Shanker of The New York Times has filed a piece this morning detailing talks with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan about serving as alternate supply routes. The talks also include Russia, which exerts considerable influence in the former Soviet region.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were primary staging grounds for the 2001 dislodging of the Taliban from Kabul. Since then, the U.S. has created some distance from those regimes, in Uzbekistan's case because of its horrendous human rights record.

Look for Washington to argue that engagement is the best way to get some moderation in Uzbekistan. That will be no more true now than it was the dozen other times over the past decade and a half that the U.S. has employed that logic.

However, if the U.S. is intent on a surge of some 30,000 troops in Afghanistan, which appears to be its plan, fresh agreements may be the only way to supply them. Today, for instance, Pakistan itself closed off the Khyber Pass as it carried out a new offensive against militants based in the border area.

Lawlessness: Dealing With the Past -- and Present

Cliff Levy at The New York Times has a long, well-written account of a local historican in the Siberian city of Tomsk. The historian -- Boris Trenin -- was rooting around in the earth in an area called Kashtak, and found two skulls with bullet holes. Others found human bones there. Trenin sought to investigate whether this meant that Kashtak was a site for a Stalin-era mass grave, but he cannot get access to state archives.

Trenin has encountered the tension between Russians who seek to air the past in order to make clear the values of the present, and those, such as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who think that such efforts can be abused by those wishing to beat up on the country. Levy quotes Putin at a meeting last year:

We do have bleak chapters in our history; just look at events starting from 1937. And we should not forget these moments in our past. But other countries have also known their bleak and terrible moments. In any event, we have never used nuclear weapons against civilians, and we have never dumped chemicals on thousands of kilometers of land or dropped more bombs on a tiny country than were dropped during the entire Second World War, as was the case in Vietnam.

What's missing from Levy's piece is a contextual, broadening paragraph on the same phenomenon elsewhere: It's common around the world for countries and peoples to have problems dealing with the nightmares of their past -- and present. This is not a Soviet story, but a global one.

In the must-read cover story of this month's Harper's magazine, New York lawyer Scott Horton continues his long, penetrating examination of America's own hestitation at self-examination (subscription required as of now. If anyone has seen the entire text on line, please let me know).

Horton, whom I met when I lived in Tashkent and have known for some 13 years, is no zealot. He is wholly fact-driven, with a penetrating intelligence and an impatience with those who use ideology to explain away abuse of power. In Horton's view, while prior periods of U.S. history have seen official criminality such as Richard Nixon's, "no prior administration has been so systematically or so brazenly lawless."

He argues that the Bush years must undergo legal examination. I asked him why. In an email exchange, he replied:

Americans have something of an aversion to the past. "Get over it" is the refrain. But as Orwell says, we are the prisoners of our past--both as individuals and collectively as a society. And Chekhov had the same idea in that amazing passage of act ii of the Cherry Orchard, "Ведь так ясно, чтобы начать жить в настоящем, надо сначала искупить наше прошлое, покончить с ним, а искупить его можно только страданием, только необычайным, непрерывным трудом." (For it’s so clear that in order to begin to live in the present we must first redeem the past, and that can only be done by suffering, by strenuous, uninterrupted labor.) So it may be painful, but if we want to move forward, we have to labor in that garden of the past, form attitudes, draw consequences. But it's about the future, ultimately.

For a recorded interview with Horton, here is Glenn Greenwald talking with him at Salon.

The Old and the Not-So

Over the last several years, I've been focused on murder, and before that oil, so it's been easy to forget that at one time my main obsession was the concentration in Peshawar, where I was then based as a correspondent for Newsweek, of a bunch of clearly discontented Arabs.

In 1991, that turned into a long piece that I wrote with another correspondent, Melinda Liu, on what were then known as the "Afghan Arabs," the Somalis, Jordanians, Egyptians and so on who, having earned their spurs in the anti-Soviet conflict of the 1980s in Afghanistan, were now filtering out to Bosnia, the Middle East and elsewhere to fight other wars.

Among the people we profiled was a fellow down in southeast Afghanistan named Abu Abdullah, who for years and years had led a ragtag band of Arabs who, though they never could quite get their act together, were among a determined bunch that aimed to capture the city of Khost. Finally, the Pakistanis, perhaps in sympathy with the long-suffering Abdullah and others, fired artillery shells into Khost, spooking soldiers from the Moscow-backed Afghan government, and Abdullah and his gang poured in to the city.

Forlorn Abdullah later became known to the world by his real name -- Osama bin Ladin. And we wrote about the organization he had just set up, al Qaeda, which at that time was simply meant as a counter-organization to a rival group run by the locally worshipped leader of foreign Muslims, a Jordanian named Abdullah Azzam.

In any case, my memory of all this was triggered today when I ran across a video interview of a former colleague of mine from the period, Steve Coll, discussing his new book, The Bin Ladens.

In the video he describes how, in 1993, a car bomb went off in the garage of the World Trade Center, and he and I proceeded to try to find the roots of what happened.

We split up the Afghan Arab world as we knew it. I went off to Sudan, and Steve to Jordan and elsewhere. In Khartoum, I found the house to which bin Ladin shifted after leaving Pakistan and Afghanistan in disgust. The scene was straight out of Peshawar -- the mini-trucks, the men dressed in shalwar kameez, the over-sized houses, and of course the dust. I left several notes for Bin Ladin.

I never met him. At one point, a Sudanese intelligence man pulled up in a car behind us and called aside my assistant. Stop trying to see Osama, he warned my assistant; it's dangerous for him. People want to kill him.

In late summer, we produced a long story for the Post on the network of these militants that had sprung up, starting in Afghanistan.

Peshawar today looks a lot like it did in those days -- a base for foreign Muslims in a war against a foreign invader. Only the perceived invader has changed.

Photo: tnk_gn

Rights: Creative Commons

Guest Column: Khanna Explains The Second World

Today we have the pleasure of helping to launch a terrific new book. It's The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, by Parag Khanna, director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation. I asked Parag to write for the blog today not only because of the quality of his book, but because his travels took him through our turf, and he came away with a different take from my own in some cases, in particular about Gazprom. Without further ado, here is Parag's posting:

Thanks very much to Steve (with whom I share a terrific editor at Random House) for allowing me to post an introductory note on this esteemed blog about my book, which has been released today.

The book covers my travels through about 40 countries to look at their changing and increasingly multi-directional leanings, and focuses on societies that are increasingly divided socially, politically, and economically between haves and have-nots, winners and losers, first- and third-worlders -- hence the "second world." It's a happy coincidence that the countries of interest to O&G readers used to be called the "second world" until the term fell out of use. I spent quite some time in Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the like for my research.

I want to jump into two ongoing debates: Gazprom/Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization/Afghanistan.

Very often Gazprom diplomacy and Russian diplomacy are taken as synonymous, and recently the two have appeared as well-coordinated as Chinese synchronized divers. But we should not forget last year's tiffs with Belarus, and the current bickering in Ukraine, both of which serve as examples of corporate logic undermining diplomatic logic.

Gazprom's demand that Belarus -- Russia's only major ally in the former Soviet Union (alongside perhaps Armenia and Tajikistan) -- pay market prices didn't win it friends other than those who saw bankruptcy and incorporation into a State Union with Russia as desirable. It also woke up EU members to the need to diversify fast.

And in Ukraine, the creation of RusUkrEnergo to continue Gazprom's bullying for constant pay-outs on amounting arrears has only alienated wider segments of Ukraine's leadership. One can only imagine that the population is as well, meaning that future election outcomes may not be as close a split between Russian and Western -leaning sides as has been the case to date. Gazprom logic would care little for such an outcome. But an increasingly Russia-skeptical Ukraine could abandon caution and welcome overtures from NATO more than it has to date -- making Putin's worst fear a reality. Diplomacy is about making friends, while corporations exist to make money. Unless Russia balances the two, oil and glory may not be forever connected.

Furthermore, the argument that Russia has Europe permanently over a barrel on gas supply assumes a long-term Russian stability while ignoring that it is Europe that can invest in diversification over the long term, drawing more oil/gas from North Africa, for example, thus gradually increasing its leverage over Russia.

The other issue is the recent talk of NATO reaching out to China (perhaps via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, known as SCO, though Russia for obvious historical reasons wants no part in any Afghan operations) to potentially run a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, or run one jointly with other nations, even the U.S. Apparently the offer was made, and China was enthusiastic, but their letter to the State Department is said to have gone unanswered for lack of coordination with NATO or a decision on how exactly to respond. So the U.S. may have dropped the ball. (Any updates/insights on this would be appreciated.)

Across the 'Stans, it's only a matter of time before NATO and SCO mingle ever more closely, and friction possibly occur. Rumors from on the ground (yet again) that the Kyrgyz might demand a shutting of America's Manas base have such maneuvering at their root. So concrete outreach between the two "alliances" beyond mundane briefings in Brussels would be where geopolitics and diplomacy intersect today. That could be quite exciting to watch unfold as NATO stands on the brink of failure in Afghanistan while Chinese and Iranian infrastructure projects -- such as in Tajikistan and Afghanistan -- move forward across the region, eventually allowing the two to connect safely overland.

Will it be the new Great Game or new Silk Road? I predict both: America continues to support political liberalization in the region, meaning some opening to greater cross-border flows, while also hoping to maintain lily-pad like bases across the region. From China's view, it too requires open borders to facilitate its exports while importing energy, and through the SCO sees itself ever more as a contributor to regional stability. Throw in Russia and Europe and you have a recipe for all the intrigue and mystery that characterized both the Silk Road and Great Game eras.

Tipping Point in Pakistan? Musharraf's Military Support Cracks

If you're a Pakistani strongman, it's not wonderful but it is survivable to lose the support of the judges and lawyers. But it's quite another to be challenged by your fellow former generals.

That's President Pervez Musharraf's current predicament, and if he doesn't do something about it, we are observing his political demise. With the steady Talibanization of the nation's northwest, the military brass will put its ultimate loyalty first -- to Pakistan's survival -- and force Musharraf out.

Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood of The New York Times weigh in with a piece today on a startlingly public demand for Musharraf's resignation by several hundred retired senior military officers. As a measure of the discontent, the retired generals among yesterday's protesters included Jamshed Gulzar Kiani, the former commander of the key Army corps in Rawalpindi.

Their outburst -- their third in two weeks -- is an important turn of events because of how the Pakistan military operates. This ultimate bedrock of Pakistani power is discreet and united. Serving and retired officers are an organic whole, sort of a society, listening to and advising each other. They regard themselves as Pakistan's fundament. When the officers decide the country's integrity is threatened, you get a government overturned.

That the retirees have gone public means that that military society has become disfunctional; Musharraf has stopped listening to the retirees. If he's stopped listening to the retirees, it's probably the same to one degree or another with serving officers.

So far, Pakistan's serving generals have been content to stay behind the scenes and allow Musharraf to rule unimpeded. But if the contagion spreads, and Musharraf can't keep his base on side, he is finished.

Photo: pingnews.com
Rights: Creative Commons

Lord Zalmay

It seemed that the British had the most nerve of any nation on Earth when it came to Afghan politics. Even after the debacle of losing their entire Kabul garrison of 16,000 men, woman and children in 1842 when they attempted to keep their man, Shah Shuja, on the Afghan throne, they returned for yet more bloody noses.

I know that this must be a joke, but just in case it isn’t, we Americans seem prepared to upstage British chutzpah. According to John Barry and Michael Hirsh at Newsweek, Zalmay Khalilzad, the former American ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and the current U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is seriously considering running for Afghan president.

Hamid Karzai is already regarded in many quarters as a stooge of the Americans. I happen to like Hamid as a person, but as with Shah Shuja he’s able to stay on the throne only because of the support of foreign troops.

Now the Afghan-born Khalilzad – a former Rand analyst known in the 1980s for his stubborn intellectual support for the bloodthirsty mujahedin leader Gulbedin Hekmatyar – at least according to this report seems to think he’ll step in and show the Afghans how a country should really be run.

If true, Khalilzad has forgotten the first rule of a westerner going abroad as a reporter or a journalist, which is to avoid the delusions of Lord Jim.

Think 1842. Think overthrow. Think Taliban restoration.

Terror at the Serena: An Eye-Witness Account

I’ve received an email from a diplomat friend passing along a riveting, eye-witness account of Monday’s terrorist attack on Kabul’s ultra-popular luxury Serena Hotel, where Afghans, diplomats, journalists, NGO employees, and military tend to gather. Seven people were killed. This blog tries to keep it short, but because of its uniqueness I publish the letter in its entirety. I had omitted the writer's name but, as noted on Barney Rubin's blog, Naser Shahelemi is fine about going public.

It was 5:30 PM and I was wrapping up my day in the office. My cousin, my office manager and me decided to head off to the Serena Hotel for a classy 5-star dinner, a rare commodity in Kabul. My two drivers were out driving the employees home and so my cousin decided to drive and we left without a driver which may have saved their lives.

We arrived at Serena Hotel, on the outside gate. The same friendly faces, all 4-6 guards posted outside, one a good friendly face, Aghai Sultan, always gives me a friendly wave and waves my car in after checking the vehicle.

Everything smooth, and everything is normal. We walk to the restaurant section and they have not yet set up the final buffet. The friendly hostess tells me we need 15 minutes. I look at my cousin and I say come on let’s take a walk until things are set up. I head back walk into the lobby see a few friendly faces. I sat down in the lobby a few minutes, and my cousin said hey let’s wait here until until it's time. Then I remembered the nice teahouse on the left side of the Serena called the Chai Khana. So we went for a quick cup of tea in the Chai Khana.

We sat down, tea in hand and then it began. All of sudden BOOM! A suicide bomber dressed as police had walked into the security x-ray booth with a vest of explosives attached on his chest and blew himself up, killing half of the guards in the booth. The windows began shaking. I quickly think hey that was a bomb but the Serena glass is thick so we don’t know if it's close or far. Usually a bomb like that I would estimate was 5 blocks away then all of a sudden BOOM again and then rapid gunfire. The guards killed 1 attacker and but two more got inside the main lobby of the Serena.

Everyone gets up, and starts getting back into a slip door that connects to a 2nd lounge. I quickly move looking around thinking very quick anything could happen. I don’t hear anything. I walk back to the original spot I was in looking for some signal of what was happening. I look through the glass outside and see a Corolla turn and wrap to the front of the Serena door, and then the driver jumps outs and throws himself on the ground. The Corolla hits the wall of the front glass doors. Then I just hear hundreds of bullets shooting. I hit the ground because the bullets at this point sound extremely close to me. I start crawling through the Chai Khana on my knees and I get back to the 2nd lounge in the slip door.

The Serena worker is quickly telling me to move and get to the basement as soon as possible. Grenades are being thrown and the lobby is covered in a thick smoke that no one can see. I hear more explosions. 1 Serena employee is being carried past me covered in blood by two other Serena employees. His hand is covered in blood. His face is covered in blood. I am hearing gunshots in the lobby, the terrorists have infiltrated the lobby and are now shooting anyone.

I turn on the afterburners and start cutting up the hall following a trail of blood leading to the basement. Everyone is running as fast as possible. I lost my cousin in this mess. I get down two flights of steps in the secure basement of the Serena where I see him. We greet each other, and I check to see he isn’t injured. I asked him are you ok? He is fine. We quickly move to the deeper portion of the basement. Among us is the Norwegian foreign minister, and his security contingent. Also there is the UN Human Rights activist Sima Samar, also a former Women’s Minister of the Karzai Administration. We get in the cafeteria and more Afghan politicians are among us, with Europeans and foreigners. Karzai’s oldest brother is also trapped with us and he is pacing frantically as we are unaware of what is going on in the lobby. We can hear shots and we can hear booms, but the remaining security personnel is posted at the doors and is ready to shoot at will.

More people come to the basement, as the terrorists have infiltrated the gym and spa area. They have shot dead the spa manager, Zina, a very pleasant Filipino girl who was just doing her job working in Afghanistan to support herself and her family abroad. The terrorists move into the gym and shoot an American dead in the face on the treadmill. The president of the Olympics, Mr. Anwar Khan Jekdalek, was in the locker room getting dressed when a terrorist came face to face with him. Mr. Jekdalek asked him in Persian, "Khaireyaat kho ast? (Is everything ok?)," and then he turned his gun and took a shot at the president of the Olympics. Mr. Jekdalek made an Olympic dive and fled, and quickly found refuge in some space in the locker room where the terrorist couldn't find him. He escaped to the basement through another pass.

The doorman was carried down to the basement by Serena staff. He had passed out from all of the events he saw, and they were opening up his vest to get him air and began sprinkling water on his face. Then all of sudden a bunch of Serena employees started running down the hall in the basement like they were being chased. This in turn caused two Russian girls to start screaming, and made everyone start to hide including President Karzai's oldest brother. What could you do, what would you do if you knew people were coming to shoot you? Turns out the terrorists had not infiltrated the basement, and the Russian girls had to be calmed down, and were given cigarettes to relax.

Hours pass, and we are all sitting and reminiscing about what the hell just happened in front of our eyes, who and what we saw. Then all of a sudden two U.S. Marines come down to the basement armed to the teeth, asking everyone if they are all right. We were kind of relieved to see the Marines. The Marines then called out for all US Citizens and they took me, and about 10 other people out including my cousin whom I told the Marines was with me. They said fine, but let’s move. We started moving with the Marines out the basement, guns drawn coming upstairs through the same hall I ran down. There was a pool a blood where I was standing before when everything began and now there was blood everywhere in the lobby, broken glass, black walls from the bomb blasts. Hundreds of Afghan Secret Service and NDS guards were standing around. The US Marines got us out and put us in armored vehicles and took us to the embassy where they treated us, took reports and gave us medical checkups.

They later released us, and my driver and guards came and picked us up in another car and we went home. Next day I came to get the Land Cruiser I left parked at the entrance of the door when the bomb went off.

The Amniyat (Afghan CIA) asked us some questions then let us go. I looked at my car, I couldn't believe what I saw. Blood, guts, black marks from the bomb blast everywhere. The Land Cruiser from behind was filled with bullet holes. The 2^nd suicide bomber had detonated himself 5 meters away from the car once he got inside and his finger ended up in the back of my Land Cruiser, and his thumb was on my dashboard. I peered inside the back of the Land Cruiser through the broken glass and saw the finger. I am not at all accustomed to seeing those types of gruesome items up-close. It was pretty damn disgusting. The lack of respect for their lives was proven in this heinous crime.

This whole thing has me really spooked. Now the Taliban are vowing more attacks on Kabul restaurants where foreigners and expatriates are gathering. I am unsure what to make of all these tragic events. However the situation in Kabul is obviously deteriorating.

Update on Tribal Justice in Waziristan

The Associated Press has a quick addendum to the piece below on the wisdom of possibly beefed-up U.S. incursions into Pakistan's tribal areas.

From the AP story, datelined Islamabad:

Suspected Islamic militants fatally shot eight tribal leaders involved in efforts to broker a cease-fire between security forces and insurgents in Pakistan's volatile northwest, authorities said Monday. The men were killed in separate attacks late Sunday and early Monday in South Waziristan, a mountainous region close to Afghanistan where al-Qaida and Taliban militants are known to operate, a security official and the military said in a statement.

Josh Foust commented on the previous piece that the U.S. seems to wish to import its strategy from Iraq's Anbar province to Pakistan. The only part that seems prudent to import is waiting until the locals themselves work out their approach.

Ode to Harry Flashman

Westerners gathered in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s understood they were in Great Game territory. They understood it deep in fact, mainly because of the writing of a handful of superb Britons -- Peter Hopkirk, Fitzroy Maclean, and of course George MacDonald Fraser.

Fraser died yesterday, which brought me back to the influence he had on a generation of foreign correspondents based in Peshawar, Kabul and Islamabad.

In The Great Game, Hopkirk was unmatched in his grasp of the big picture, and Maclean's Eastern Approaches was a riveting, first-person account of sneaking into the Caucasus and Central Asia when it truly was perilous to do so.

But it was Fraser's Flashman that provided comic relief while delivering the authentic history. It's a belly-laugh-out-loud frolick through Afghanistan, starring the cad Harry Flashman. When new correspondents arrived in Peshawar, the first thing they were often advised to do was stop by Abdara Road and pick up a copy.

That helped to create a Flashman cult following. In all, Fraser turned out a dozen Flashman novels, taking his character into exploits ranging from the charge of the light brigade to the U.S. civil war.

Farewell George MacDonald Fraser, and thanks for the inspiration.

Echoes of Zia in Bhutto Assassination; A Reasonable Election Delay

The bungling of the post-mortem in the Benazir Bhutto assassination is eerily reminiscent of the aftermath 19 years ago to the death of the general who hanged her father, Zia ul-Haq. In the Zia case too, police and investigators corrupted the scene of death, a field where a C-130 carrying him and most of his top generals crashed, killing all of them. Likewise, there were widespread cries of coverup, including by the United States, which blocked a FBI investigation and carried away key forensic evidence.

I looked into the Zia investigation thoroughly during the 1990s, and was never satisfied with how it was handled. A joint U.S.-Pakistani military panel found cause for suspecting murder -- one theory was that a nerve gas was implanted in the cockpit that disabled the pilots -- and recommended that a fresh panel comprised of pathologists be formed to look into that angle. But the investigation was halted right there. I concluded that the various powers -- the new Army general Mirza Aslam Beg, the intelligence agencies, and especially the United States -- decided that, if it was murder, they were better off not to know by whom. For instance, one suspect was Moscow, which at the time was in the middle of withdrawing from Afghanistan; if Mikhail Gorbachev were accused of murder, the pullout could be scotched. Another suspect was India, and a new war could be threatened on the Subcontinent.

All of this makes me unsurprised that the Bhutto murder scene was compromised. As with the Zia case, it could be a simple matter of incompetence. Otherwise, the issues appear different -- there ought to be no reason why officialdom wouldn't want to identify the culprits. Unless of course they themselves suspect the possibility of perhaps low-level inside connivance.

CNN has thoughtfully posted the Bhutto post-mortem, which I pass along here. It also posted a story that includes new film of the moments of the killing.

Parliamentary elections: The word is that President Pervez Musharraf will postpone parliamentary elections. On one hand, holding the elections on time next week would have been a strong show of calm leadership on Musharraf's part. On the other, rioters appear to have destroyed all the electoral paperwork in a dozen or so Election Commission offices, and it needs to be reconstructed so Pakistanis can vote in those districts. As my former Wall Street Journal colleagues reported over the weekend, Musharraf's opponents are urging Pakistanis to take out their grief on him; they are likely to see something pernicious in a delay. But it seems to me that a few weeks to get the records in order is reasonable. The date for a new election will probably be the end of February or the beginning of March.

For Kate Webb

A friend kindly forwarded a piece from today's New York Times Magazine -- an article from its annual remembrances of those who passed on during the year. The story was on Kate Webb, a war reporter whom both of us first met in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. This unforgettable New Zealander, with her long, brunette hair, her voice raspy from the years of cigarettes and whiskey, was one of the two or three best and most fearless reporters I encountered in eighteen years abroad.

It almost didn't matter how many consecutive nights you sat down with Kate for a beer. She had another hair-raising memory to recount, the type of story that -- if it alone had happened to anyone else, why he or she would have dined off of it for the rest of their lives. Not Kate. She was just passing the time with friends.

Like her first experience with journalists in Indonesia in the mid-1960s. Suharto had gone on his murderous rampage in Java, in which his forces were said to have killed about a million people. Kate, at the time about 22 years old, happened to be visiting the island, and hid out in a hut or something as the killing went on, all the time fearful that she would be next. When she got back to Jakarta and told correspondent acquaintances what she had witnessed, no one believed her. It was six months later before conclusive evidence came out, and Kate's legend began.

Or the time in 1971 when, now Saigon bureau chief for United Press International, she was captured by North Vietnamese soldiers. She emerged three weeks later, delirious and malarial, to the gaping jaws of her friends -- Kate had been reported dead; the Times was among those who published an obituary.

Or the time that an Afghan warlord pulled Kate away from the telex machine in the Kabul Hotel by her hair. Kate escaped. But the bald spot on her skull showed what she had to leave behind to manage it.

Kate was often to be found at that telex machine, filing her stories to Paris. Once, she had typed in the code to the Paris operator, and received a message back from her editors indicating a live connection, but other correspondents were at other telex machines in other capitals, waiting in line ahead of her to send their stories. She was told to stand by. Just then, a rocket landed just outside the hotel, shattering the plate-glass window and sending shards across the lobby behind her, details that Kate now urgently relayed to the Paris operator in an effort to get him to hurry up so she could get to safety. "C'est la guerre" -- Such is war -- came back the reply.

And so it was, Kate would say.

Kate died in May at the age of 64. She had retired in 2001, feeling she was too old to be in her default position at the front lines. She was a mentor and generous friend. Rest in peace, Kate.

Photo: Ohio Today

Pakistan: It's About Power, Not Terrorism

For six years, the West has turned to Pakistan's General Musharraf to maintain stability in the world's laboratory of extremist Islamic terror. Events in Pakistan have rippled west and northwest to Afghanistan and Central Asia, to Europe all the way to Great Britain, and throughout the Middle East.

Now, Musharraf appears to be on the political ropes, with one of his main adversaries about to arrive at Islamabad Airport, and the other right behind him.

So should the West worry? The answer is yes and no -- for those worried about Pakistan itself, politics is about to revert to its venal and stormy norm; but nothing is likely to change in the national security sphere.

In a piece just filed on line, my friend Zahid Hussain of The Times of London says that Musharraf will try to defuse the arrival tomorrow (Monday) of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan by putting him right back on a military plane to Saudi Arabia. Here is the first paragraph of Zahid's piece: Pakistani authorities are expected to deport Nawaz Sharif, the exiled former Prime Minister, back to Saudi Arabia as soon as he returns to Pakistan tomorrow in a bid to topple President Pervez Musharraf. Read story

Steve's comment: There is very little chance that Musharraf will salvage his position; he will have to step out of politics, opening the way for a political rematch between the country's pair of two-time prime ministers -- Sharif and Benazir Bhutto.

So much for the experiment with political reform that Musharraf claimed to be initiating with his 1999 coup against Sharif after the then-prime minister effectively almost murdered him and a planeload of passengers by refusing an airliner carrying them landing rights in the country.

The current degree of absurdity is illustrated by the industrialist Sharif's almost unchallenged depiction of himself as a fighter for democratic ideals. Few seem to recall Sharif's political beginnings as a 1980s creation of the ISI, the country's intelligence agency. Having lost favor with the Army since that impolite treatment of Musharraf in 1999, he is now painting himself as a man of the people.

Politics aside, Pakistan's bulwark of stability -- the Army -- will certainly salvage itself, with or without Musharraf (I think without). Washington and the rest of the West will continue to have their partner, to the degree Pakistan has been one, in fighting the al Qaeda radicals using Waziristan as a base.

The General's Bungled Opportunity in Pakistan

Pakistan seems headed for even worse trouble than seemed possible last week. Now both of its discredited former prime ministers seem poised to return from exile. The upshot: This perpetually strategic country is again unable to break its cycle of corruption and politics-of-entitlement.


Here is the first paragraph of The AP story: The party of exiled former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ruled out reconciliation with Pakistan's embattled military leader after a court said he can return home before upcoming elections. Read rest of story

Steve's comment: Sharif and his constant rival, Benazir Bhutto, both seem to see blood in the water, and a chance to grab back the power they lost when Gen. Musharraf seized control in 1999. Both are enjoying portraying the democrat.

Of course, neither is anything of the kind. Both represent crooked politics, crooked business, bribes and madness for power. That their respective parties have failed to grow up and find someone new after eight years in the wilderness demonstrates their own bankruptness.

Musharraf is ultimately at fault. Eight years after promising his country a new way, he failed to cultivate any civilian politician to replace him in the event of just the situation he now faces. Because of that, he, too, resembles the same old generals of Pakistan's past, who seized power and could imagine no one else sitting in their seat.

Without fail, Pakistan with regularity has found itself at the vortex of world events since its birth in 1947. It seems genetically strategic. So its politics cannot be ignored. As to what those politics will ultimately be this time, all bets are off.

One thing seems sure. Musharraf appears to be hanging on to power by a slender reed. Zahid Hussain of the Times of London has this typically incisive analysis of Musharraf's predicament.

Naked Bankruptcy in Pakistan

The lead story in The New York Times today is that the Bush administration is pushing Pakistan's Gen. Musharraf to share power with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. A mistake six years in the making, the White House has failed to finesse Musharraf into cultivating concrete political alternatives to himself with whom he could live. The upshot: yet again, Pakistan is faced with a stark choice for leadership: A corrupt feudal, a corrupt businessman, the religious opposition, or a General.

The first paragraph of the NYT piece: The Bush administration, struggling to find a way to keep Gen. Pervez Musharraf in power amid a deepening political crisis in Pakistan, is quietly prodding him to share authority with a longtime rival as a way of broadening his base, according to American and Pakistani officials. Read rest of story

The synthesis of the proposed deal between Musharraf and Bhutto was reported three weeks ago by Zahid Hussain, my friend and the author of the first-rate Frontline Pakistan. According to Zahid, "under the agreement, the military leader would be granted another five-year term as president, while Ms Bhutto, twice prime minister of Pakistan, would be allowed to return in September to contest parliamentary elections, exonerated of corruption charges made against her. However, the talks appeared to have stalled over General Musharraf’s insistence that he should be allowed to retain his dual role as army chief and president." Read story

Steve's comment: Bhutto is famously a Harvard- and Oxford-trained political scientist and orator. Based on that background, in addition to the huge political following she inherited from her father, the West has had huge hopes for what she could bring the country. Yet in her two terms as prime minister during the late 1980s and the 1990s, she proved one thing -- an elite education is not guaranteed to take the arrogance out of a feudal.

In short, Bhutto has dictatorship and corruption in her DNA -- she is a beautiful speaker, and a terrible national leader. That Musharraf is trying to make a deal with her reflects his own political desperation, and his willingness to compromise his principles.

The leader whom Musharraf ousted -- industrialist Nawaz Sharif -- is a deceptively talented power accumulator who as prime minister proved himself to be a corrupt would-be dictator.

The sad thing is that Pakistan is absolutely replete with ultra-talented and brilliant economists, political scientists, lawyers and so on. That Washington is getting behind the power-sharing idea reflects utter bankruptcy. The United States should not be in the business of encouraging the perpetuation of the rule of Pakistan's landowning class.