Labyrinth with The American Entrepreneur

I spoke with Ron Morris -- "The American Entrepreneur." Here is the recording. (Ignore the Moody Blues at the beginning.)

Catfights and Bystanders in Russia

Russia is getting harder and harder for BP, whose executives are now getting kicked out of the country. That's not wholly surprising, since the British company is still operating by the old, pre-Putin-era rules that allowed Big Oil to own half or more of a large oil field. But there's something different about this dust-up, and that's that the Kremlin isn't stepping in to make clear the price of peace. The reason may be that the price isn't yet clear because the Dmitry Medvedev Kremlin hasn't decided who is going to control the spoils of the state.

The normal course of business when a western oil company has been shellacked in Russia is that it's been communicated a relatively clear state objective (usually that the Kremlin wants control of the field to go to Gazprom or Rosneft). BP knows this, since almost exactly a year ago it voluntarily agreed to a shellacking when it sold a 63% holding in Kovytka, a huge natural gas field, to Gazprom. (BP also was shellacked involuntarily by its current Russian partners in 1999.)
This time, BP says it's received no such alert. Indeed, the Kremlin says it's staying completely out of what it calls an internal matter between BP and its Russian partners in TNK-BP, which accounts for a full quarter of the British company's annual production.

Today, BP's Robert Dudley, who is CEO of TNK-BP, said his visa hasn't been renewed, and that he'll probably have to leave Russia by the end of July. It's the same for around 79 foreign BP employees.

The Russian partners -- oligarchs Mikhail Fridman, Viktor Vekselberg, Len Blavatnik and German Khan -- say they are simply seeking a larger say in how TNK-BP does business.

I talked to a BP adviser who asked that his name not be used. What he reckons is that we are watching a defensive maneuver.

It goes like this: All parties know that eventually the Kremlin is going to insist on TNK-BP being controlled by Gazprom or Rosneft. There also seems to be a presumption -- although I personally am not convinced of this -- that it's the Russian oligarchs who will be forced out, since they bring only money and no expertise to the oilfields. So, according to this scenario, the oligarchs are seeking to get control of some or all of BP's holding so that when, say, Gazprom comes along, they command a "control premium" in the negotiations, and can demand more money.

For the record, one of the oligarchs has told me by email that this scenario is inaccurate. "The aim is to have a bit more [of an] independent company and get liquidity options with much higher valuation than now (within the next 1-2 years)," he said. In other words, TNK-BP could be worth much more in a couple of years than now, when the Russians could think about selling out.

However, for argument's sake, sticking with the BP adviser's assertion: if Gazprom or Rosneft are to step in, where are they? And why are their executives claiming they aren't interested?

According to this BP adviser, it's because of a power struggle within the Kremlin between officials associated with Gazprom, and those associated with Rosneft. The outcome will decide "who is advantaged in the Kremlin."

I found this explanation compelling. Why else would the Kremlin stand aside and let this go on?

Photo: gaborcselle
Rights: Creative Commons

What BP Has to Fear

Why are we hearing BP chairman Peter Sutherland accuse his Russian partners of being thieves? Is the latest oil drama in Moscow truly a rough, 1990s-style grab for assets, as BP has cast its dustup with the Russian oligarchs Mikhail Fridman, Viktor Vekselberg and Len Blavatnik?

The short answer seems to be no.

On the first question, BP's public indignance appears to reflect an understanding that it faces a threat not just to its Russian assets, which comprise a third of the company's entire worldwide reserves, but to control of BP itself. And in the second case, the oligarchs have stated -- and I think it's true -- that they simply disagree with how BP has managed their joint company, called TNK-BP. As 50% owners of the company, they want a greater say in its operation, including an expansion overseas. And they want the current CEO, Robert Dudley, to be sacked.

BP could simply accede to these demands, and get on with business. That doesn't currently seem likely, one reason being that Sutherland could have difficulty climbing down after taking the altercation so personally.

Short of such a concession, one finds two potential outcomes, neither of them pleasant for BP:

In the worst case (for BP), the largest single block of its own shares -- about 10% of them -- will come to be owned by the four Russian oligarchs. That is one suggestion by the oligarchs -- that the dispute be settled by an exchange of their TNK-BP shares for BP shares. In this scenario, BP has said that it would sell control of TNK-BP to a Russian state company, probably Gazprom or Rosneft. The takeaway from this outcome is BP culture could be forced to change by such assertive new shareholders. Imagine Carl Icahn on steroids.

In the less unfavorable outcome, BP would cut its losses and sell out its half-interest in TNK-BP. The buyer again would be either Gazprom or Rosneft, and the price would be far less than the generally quoted market value of $20 billion-$25 billion. BP would argue that any sum above $7 billion -- appoximately the price it paid for its share five years ago -- would be gravy. But in fact, it would be fleeing a genuine fear of the first scenario.

By its hands-off behavior, the Kremlin seems happy to watch BP twisting. Don't look for assistance from President Dmitry Medvedev.

Photo: Joe Shlabotnik

Rights: Creative Commons

Putin's Wealth

The FT's Catherine Belton and Neil Buckley weigh in with an impressive story that attempts to penetrate the question of Vladimir Putin's personal fortune. This enterprise -- the documentation of what Putin is worth -- will require a long, ongoing and determined effort. But Belton and Buckley try to peal away a layer.

The piece involves Gunvor, the Swiss-based oil trading company that has miraculously (Hey, we're just really good businessmen) grabbed control of a third of Russia's oil exports. One public owner of Gunvor is Gennady Timchenko, a reclusive and long-time buddy of Putin's. The FT links Timchenko to Surgutneftegas, which Russian polical analyst Stanislav Belkovsky has asserted to many of us for over a year partly belongs to Putin. As the FT reports, when Bill Browder -- until a couple years ago Russia's biggest foreign cheerleader as the head of Hermitage Capital Management -- sought to find out who really owned Surgutneftegas, he suddenly could no longer get a visa.

Putin swats away suggestions regarding his personal share of Russia's economic boom. But those who have hung around the former Soviet Union for awhile know that his dismissals are not exceedingly convincing. Personal wealth is a prerequisite to rule in this rough neighborhood; one simply is not taken seriously among former Soviet power brokers unless one has one's own, enormous cash stash. But the hard evidence is almost impossible to obtain; I think the only case of such proof has involved Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev, and that emerged only after a perfect storm of bungling.

The trouble at BP: For some time, it has appeared that BP could lose control of its main asset in Russia, its share of TNK-BP. The thinking has been that Gazprom is intent on grabbing control of TNK-BP, by either forcing out BP or its Russian partners. The arrival of tax inspectors at TNK-BP's offices in recent months seemed to buttress this view, given that that's precisely what signaled trouble for Shell before it was forced to hand over control of the gigantic Sakhalin-II natural gas field to Gazprom.

But my former colleagues Guy Chazan and Greg White at The Wall Street Journal have a piece that embraces a contrarian view: that Gazprom isn't the villain; the partners themselves are in a catfight. Igor Yurgens, the adviser to President Dmitri Medvedev, told me the same thing in a phone chat a couple of weeks ago.

Robert Amsterdam does a good job of explaining the probable bigger picture -- perhaps there is infighting; but Gazprom is likely still pulling the strings behind the scenes. This Reuters piece about a phantom company suddenly suing TNK-BP is more evidence of this.

Gazprom's goal -- as expressed by Putin himself -- is to obtain energy assets overseas. In order to land a traditional oil deal in Russia today -- one that involves ownership of actual oil or natural gas reserves -- one has to give up similar assets abroad. BP is trying to work such a deal with Gazprom, and the trouble at TNK-BP seems a piece of that negotiation.

Photo: Eclectic Al

Rights: Creative Commons

Notes on the Pipeline War: Amateur Hour in Washington and Europe

Note: I had an interesting interview today with David Inge of WILL Radio at the University of Illinois. Lots of history, Russia, Iran and China.

Now to pipelines. I’ve been exchanging emails with an oilman friend about a long natural gas pipeline championed by the United States and Europe to meet Vladimir Putin’s petro-thrust into Europe. This friend, who chooses to correspond privately, thinks the West’s handling of the pipeline, called Nabucco, has been amateurish at best. And I must say after going over it with him that he makes a strong case.

As background, this clumsily named, 2,000-mile-long pipeline would start in Turkey and terminate in Austria. It would transport natural gas from the Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, providing them a financial channel independent of current monopoly-buyer Russia. It would also help to diversify the natural gas supply of Europe, which relies on Russia for some 30% of its gas.

Nabucco is the West’s response to three big Russian-planned pipelines that instead would channel Central Asian gas north to Russia, for onward export to Europe through the planned Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines. The pipelines would advance a shrewd Russian market strategy to cement and build on its domination of Europe's energy supply.

Russia is far advanced in the contest, but the West thinks it can catch up. As readers of this blog know, the Bush administration is about to name Thomas Pickering, one of Washington’s most seasoned statesmen, to head the diplomatic effort in a newly created office within the State Department.

But my friend argues that, not only would Pickering not be poised to push Nabucco over the finish line, the West is currently “not even in the starting gate.”

Putting aside for the moment that the Central Asians have yet to make a necessary commitment to the line, Nabucco’s advocates have to date failed to perform a detailed economic analysis of the proposed line. And because they also have no convincing engineering study of the line, along with a detailed, country-by-country understanding of how big or small the role of each player in the complex line would be, the West ends up at risk of being manipulated by those with a vested interest in its construction.

In the 1990s, when the U.S. got behind the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline – the million-barrel-a-day line connecting Baku with the Turkish Mediterranean – it corralled support money from organizations like the Export-Import Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. No equivalent effort has accompanied the campaign for Nabucco.

So is the West serious? If so, my friend says it might move beyond a pose and create a program. He makes sense.

Photo: PhylB
Rights: Creative Commons

Business Week Names The Oil and the Glory A Top-10 Business Book of the Year

Thanks to Business Week for the recognition. SL

Newsbits for the Weekend

James Giffen foreign bribery case - There will be no immediate selection of a trial date for former Kazakhstan oil gatekeeper Giffen. Today's federal court hearing in New York was postponed for six weeks -- until Dec. 13th. This is the second straight postponement in the already three-and-a-half-year-long case. Giffen is accused of passing along some $80 million in payments to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev from American oil companies. With the way things are going, some are starting to think that this will be another touchy item passed along from the George Bush administration to his successor. Could a trial really wait until 2009? It's hard to believe, but considering Giffen's defense -- that he was an effective asset for the CIA during his entire time in Kazakhstan -- it could indeed take many, many months to disgorge top-secret documents from the government. And, as for the prosecutors, it's not clear that they are as eager as they earlier seemed to go fast.

The Vladimir Putin show - Can the Russian president go anywhere abroad without getting into a schoolyard scrap? In Lisbon today, Putin lashed out at European concerns regarding Russia's rising dominance in Europe's energy market. Russia has established a post-Soviet record of using its enormous petro-power as a blunt instrument for political and economic gain. But Putin said that it "makes me laugh" when he hears Europeans worry about Russians buying up European energy properties. Putin will have to do something more than be combative in order to calm European nerves.

Godfather-in-Law - Rakhat Aliyev, who until recently was the powerful son-in-law of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, is writing what appears to be a tell-all memoir of life inside the first family. Its working title, he says, is Godfather in Law. Aliyev's saga is a window into the sordid post-Soviet ruling class that's emerged in Central Asia and the Caucasus, many of whose states resemble sultanates rather than elective republics. The difference is that in Kazakhstan -- primarily because of the documentation that's been disclosed in the James Giffen case -- the mess is being played out in public. Aliyev was tossed out of the Kazakh ruling family earlier this year after a series of rows with the country's business elite, and the disappearance of two executives from his Almaty bank. Among the allegations he will make in his book is that Nazarbayev himself ordered the murder of Altynbek Sarsenbayev, a former Kazakh ambassador to Russia who joined the political opposition, then was murdered in February 2006. Critics have accused Aliyev himself of the murder. Aliyev has lived in exile in Austria since Nazarbayev ordered him arrested. RFE-RL has a good interview with Aliyev.

A Few Hundred Millions Dollars Between Friends

Just two weeks ago, Chevron Chairman Dave O'Reilly scurried aboard the corporate jet to Kazakhstan after a legislator urged a shutdown of the company's supergiant Tengiz oilfield for environmental violations.

But O'Reilly emerged cheerily from a meeting with President Nazarbayev -- the Kazakh leader had called Tengiz "an excellent example of how the government and a foreign investor can work together successfully," O'Reilly crowed.

In other works, he seemed to imply, Chevron wasn't in the same boat as the Eni-led Kashagan development, a sister oilfield whose work the Kazakhs have suspended.

Maybe, depending how one defines working successfully. Yesterday, the Kazakhs quantified their own view, and the number is $609 million. That's the fine the Kazakhs have levied against Chevron for three years of alleged sulfur violations at Tengiz.

Dow Jones reports that Chevron is challenging the fine. And it is true that, five years ago, Chevron successfully resisted a similar ecological penalty by the Kazakhs, who sought $71 million but finally accepted $7 million.

Yet, nothwithstanding the warm and fuzzy shoulder massaging that went on between O'Reilly and Nazarbayev last month, look for the current dispute not to end as peaceably.

For one thing, it's a wholly different atmosphere, both in the global oil industry in general, and in Kazakhstan specifically.

Big Oil has been knocked on its heels by a sea change in who gets access to the newest oil fields around the world -- by far, it's nationally owned oil companies and state ministries, not publicly held oil majors like Exxon Mobil, BP and Chevron.

In addition, Russia is leading the way locally in tearing up 1990s-era oil contracts in order to take control of its most promising oilfields. While Kazakhstan is acting under different circumstances, the impact could be similar -- Kashagan (the largest discovery on the planet in more than three decades) is under threat of a Kazakh state assumption of joint operatorship.

In the 2002-2003 row, Chevron played brinksmanship with Kazakhstan, even temporarily shutting down the Tengiz operations to demonstrate its resolve. It will hardly try such antics today, given the possibility -- even if remote -- that Kazakhstan could simply push the envelope all the way and find ready companies or contractors, in China or India, say, prepared enthusiastically to take over Tengiz.

Fencing Out Russia

The Financial Times has an interesting piece today on a developing European Union strategy that's explicitly designed to prevent outside countries from buying up energy properties for political purposes. The story is based on a leak of internal EU working papers. The upshot: the disclosure takes the vagueness out of Western Europe's attitude toward Russian acquisition of its pipelines and refineries -- the writers of the papers are clearly worried that Europe will be treated like some former Soviet states.

Here are the two key sentences from the FT piece: An internal Commission document about the implications of unbundling, seen by FT Deutschland, the Financial Times' sister paper, says the EU could be "vulnerable to a strategy of third countries to dominate the EU markets not only in terms of supply but also by acquiring the networks". The document explicitly warns about situations "where investment is driven by other motives than economic ones". Read story

Steve's comment: Of the EU states, Poland has most openly discussed the issue of state- owned and private Russian companies buying parts of Europe's energy infrastructure. It has said in so many words that it is not going to risk its independence after the decades it took to take it back from Moscow.

The likelihood is that broader support has formed within Europe to prevent its energy assets from being swallowed up by wallet-thick petro-states like Russia and also Saudi Arabia.

Russia bristles at such attitudes, calling them hypocritical. And it is true that some of the criticism from Europe and the U.S. has been self-serving and at times hysterical.

Yet Moscow is short-sighted if it believes that no one has taken account of its behavior in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Since the 1991 Soviet breakup, oil and natural gas export pipelines that pass through Russia have been routinely blocked or bottled up to use by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. A needed expansion of the export pipeline from Kazakhstan's supergiant Tengiz oilfield has been blocked at least partly for Russian geopolitical reasons (in order to counterbalance the U.S.-backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline by forcing Chevron to help build a rival pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece to the Mediterranean). And Georgia has regularly suffered oddly timed cutoffs of its natural gas supply.

In part there are financial reasons for these acts; but the over-arching explanation is that Russia has a history of bullying whom it can, and attempting to keep its former colonies under its thumb.

The working papers no doubt will go through revisions. But there is no doubt that Europe will adopt some sort of legal mechanism to make it harder for outside countries to buy its energy assets.

How stringent that mechanism is will depend on how convincing Russia is that its treatment of its former Soviet colonies has been an aberration.

Bonus: Russian Cutoff and Lord Browne

Two news items of note:

Russian oil cutoff in Germany

Over the last month, Russian oil supplies to Germany have been curtailed in an apparent dispute with Lukoil. The cut of about 50,000 barrels a day, in figures compiled by Reuters, may be restored in the coming days because of a compromise. The supply disruption does not appear on first glance to be linked to the Russian government. But it does come after Russia came under European criticism for cutting supplies to Ukraine and Belarus over the last couple of years. Read Reuters story

Back At Work: John Browne

Officially John Browne is going to work for a seven-year-old private equity company. But while doing so he will work with the repository of the corporate world’s marquee names of the past – the powerful Carlyle Group. He is joining to run the new London office of Riverstone Holdings, which is a partnership with Carlyle in energy investments, Carlyle announced on its Web site.

The 59-year-old Browne brought BP into some of the biggest deals in the former Soviet Union – offshore Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, operatorship of the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, and the TNK-BP partnership in Russia.

For years, Browne was Britain’s most famous businessman, and was even knighted as Lord of Madingley. But he withstood unaccustomed tabloid treatment in May when he resigned from BP after a scandal involving a former lover.

While he will be Riverside’s biggest name, he is hardly so in the Carlyle crowd. Former President George H.W. Bush and former British Prime Minister John Major were advisers there. Its current roster includes Richard Darman, former director of the Office of Management and Budget under Bush Sr.; Mack McLarty, former chief of staff to Bill Clinton and president of Kissinger McLarty Associates; Karl Otto Pohl, former president of Germany’s Bundesbank; Arthur Levitt, former head of the SEC; and Norman Pearlstine, who formerly edited both Time and The Wall Street Journal. The Bloomberg story

Russia For Now Holds Its Trump Card

President Putin's reprisal today was measured. (Video) He shrewdly held out his ultimate card -- energy -- as ammunition to be used as he believes the need arises.

For his domestic audience, Putin could have done no less than the expulsion of an equal number of British diplomats, and possibly also the imposition of visa restrictions that was announced. The moratorium on terror cooperation can be taken with a grain of salt -- the two sides share concern on the important grounds, and joint efforts will continue.

As noted in a comment to the previous post, Russia and Britain to a degree are tied at the waist financially -- BP for instance desperately needs continued good relations with Moscow for its current and future production and reserve base. But Russian business relies on London's capital markets as well.

Concern about Russia's future attitude toward British business is well-founded. That remains the likeliest ground for Putin's long-term reaction to what, if one listens to his remarks, he seems to regard as an intolerable challenge to Russia's image and its law. BP's investments remain Britain's soft underbelly.

Gazprom Gains BP Gas Field as Putin Tightens Control

June 22 (Bloomberg) -- OAO Gazprom took control of BP Plc's stake in a Siberian deposit with enough natural gas to supply Asia for five years as President Vladimir Putin ends foreign ownership of Russia's biggest energy assets.

State-run Gazprom will pay as much as $900 million for the 63 percent of the Kovykta field held by BP's TNK-BP unit and half its regional pipeline unit, and agreed to set up a $3 billion global venture, executives from the three companies said in the Kremlin today.

Read rest of story

From Steve: The once full-throated multinational oil companies, knocked onto their heels in Russia, ought to be worried about Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which certainly are watching these events with interest.

4 Leaders Try to Offset Russia's Clout

BAKU, Azerbaijan (AP) – Leaders of four former Soviet republics discussed ways to counterbalance Russia's wide influence in the Caspian and Black Sea basins at a summit of their regional grouping.

The summit is the first for the organization, called GUAM, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, since its four member countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova – agreed last year to deepen ties and cooperation.
Read the rest of story

From Steve: On the other side of the Caspian, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still have no concrete link into the Baku-based oil-and-natural gas pipelines to the Mediterranean.

Instead they recently agreed to build another natural gas pipeline through Russia. To the degree that they are seeking leverage against Russian influence of their energy markets, they are doing so by building up transportation with China, and organizing barge traffic to Baku.

But one wonders if this will be sufficient for their long-term economic independence.