The Why's of Pipeline Politics

One thing highly unlikely to change under Dmitri Medvedev is Moscow's hard-line energy policy. Indeed, one sometimes gets the impression that Russia wants the West to build pipelines that go around it.

As evidence, take a look at two disputes: Chevron's long-frustrated efforts to ship more oil through a pipeline that technically was built exclusively for its use; and Gazprom's cutoff of natural gas today to Ukraine.

The California company is nothing if not patient and persistent. It's hard to believe that its travails with Moscow have gone on for almost two decades, but it was 1989 when the California-based company first laid eyes on the Tengiz oilfield. The western Kazakhstan field, right next to the Caspian, contains 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves or more, a considerable volume in an industry that regards a 1-billion-barrel field as a supergiant. The final contract awarding Chevron 50% of the field was signed in 1993.

Since then, it's been one stumbling block after another from Russia, which has seen it in its interest to keep Tengiz bottled up. It took eight years before a long-planned dedicated pipeline from the field -- known as CPC -- finally was running. But, while CPC has been producing 320,000 barrels of oil a day, Chevron has always seen Tengiz as at minimum a 700,000-barrel-a-day field, and more reasonably capable of 1 million barrels a day of exports. As of later this year, Chevron is ready for a mid-range production increase to 540,000 barrels a day.

Only, that would require an expansion of CPC, and Russia has blocked it. As the years have gone by, Transneft, which does the negotiating for the Kremlin, has seemed always to have a new demand. When that's met, there's been another. This time, it seems to want Chevron and its partners to finance another pipeline -- a line connecting the Black and Mediterranean seas overland from Bulgaria to Greece.

This isn't public, but Transneft is currently circulating a compromise. People who have received the Transneft memo tell me that Russia is willing to allow Chevron and its partners to raise exports through a process called "de-bottlenecking," which basically means getting the kinks out. The companies could modernize existing pumping stations, but add no new ones. Exports would rise from the current 28 million tons a year to around 38 million tons; that's far less than the 67 million tons a year that the companies seek.

There's no word on whether Chevron and its partners will accept -- they have 30 days to answer -- but it seems unlikely they'll reject it. But what is the ultimate impact of Russia's intransigence? Well, what happens when water is blocked from one drain? It seeks an outlet elsewhere. So look for a greater push for a trans-Caspian oil pipeline from Central Asia to Baku.

Meanwhile, Russia's Gazprom today cut off some 35% of its natural gas supplies for Ukraine. It says its neighbor owes some $600 million for exports this year. Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko disputes the figures. Given that the accounting books are closed to the public, and are disputed by those to whom they are open, there's no way of knowing for sure.

But, while they talk, both Gazprom and Ukraine say their dispute won't again disrupt supplies to Europe (Europe receives more than 30% of its natural gas from Russia, and most of that flows through Ukraine), as they did in 2006. I wouldn't bet on that. Jitteriness in Europe is Ukraine's best leverage over Gazprom.

That's the point of a current natural gas pipeline competition between Russia and the West. Because of its repeated conflicts with Ukraine and others, Russia wants to build a completely new set of natural gas pipelines to supply Europe. But such deepened reliance on Russia makes Europe and the U.S. nervous. So they have mounted a plan to diversify the European supply by going completely around Russia.

Gazprom's latest cutoff will only redouble the European-U.S. effort.

The Western Side of the Pipeline War: On the Brink of Failure?

Readers: apologies for the week-long absence. I am back from vacation. Now, on to the latest in the pipeline war.

Another domino has fallen in Russia's relentless advance in the European natural gas pipeline war. After Monday's visit to Budapest by Russia's probable new president, Dmitri Medvedev, Hungary's prime minister is expected to sign the deal in Moscow tomorrow.

That's after an astutely run offensive in which Medvedev and his mentor, Vladimir Putin, have already recently signed on Bulgaria, Austria and Serbia, not to mention the prize in the contest -- Turkmenistan. These countries are now Russia's partners in the construction of a huge new natural gas pipeline system, Moscow's aim being to project power into Europe through dominance of the continent's gas market. Mathematically, Moscow's aim would be represented as: Economic power = Political power.

After all this, is there any reasonable case favoring a rival pipeline plan championed by Washington and the European Union? Generally, my own rule of thumb in pipeline politics is that no deal is a deal until Sumitomo's lengths of steel cylinders actually arrive on the spot, and welding begins. And they haven't.

Consider the first battle of this East-West pipeline war -- over the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian and Mediterranean seas.

On Oct. 11, 1998, The New York Times committed a stupendous blunder. As readers of The Oil and the Glory know, the newspaper's lead story that Sunday, written by my former colleague Steve Kinzer, declared White House-backed Baku-Ceyhan to be "on the brink of failure." Less than a year later, a deal for the line was a reality.

Kinzer's mistake was in focusing on the big picture and armchair analysts in Washington and London, all of which indeed did make the strategic pipeline look to be dead. What he and these pundits missed were the facts on the ground -- from Central Asia and the Caucasus, it was clear that the pipeline was going to happen. Principally, Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev -- who had his hands on 5.4 billion barrels of oil that floundering Big Oil was desperate to develop and sell -- wanted that pipeline. It helped that essential NATO member Turkey wanted the line, too, as did the 800-pound gorilla, the White House. But the main thing was the insistence of Aliyev -- the essential man on the Caspian. Big Oil had to build it, and today, it's mightily glad it did so, since it's delivering about 1 million barrels a day of oil onto the tight world market, entirely free of interference by Moscow.

Yet today Heydar Aliyev is dead, and the Caspian is surrounded by presidents with, to put it kindly, shorter geopolitical stature. Big Oil seems to be absent the big corporate personalities who in the 1990s got in the sauna with one or more of the Caspian presidents, downed some vodka shots, and emerged with rights to huge reservoirs. And the White House lacks the vision to assign a political heavyweight -- in the 1990s, it was Clinton and Al Gore themselves, in addition to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger -- to spearhead a deal.

As for the future, there's no sign of the Bush administration suddenly changing course. The word is that Condi Rice will appoint Bush family friend Donald Evans to general the western battle. But Evans lacks the star power for instant success, and the longevity -- he will be out once the next administration takes power next year -- to manage through sheer effort.

Big Oil has been slow to snag a natural gas deal in Turkmenistan that would jump-start the western-backed Nabucco pipeline. And, short of a trip to Camp David, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov isn't suddenly going to grow a spine.

Meanwhile, Putin and his protege Medevedev are running Moscow's battle plan personally.

So, at the risk of repeating the Kinzer Blunder, Nabucco does appear to be on the brink of failure.

Of course, lightning could always strike.

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Putin On Stage

Vladimir Putin conducted his valedictory annual news conference today, and it was a bravura performance – more than four and a half hours long (Reuters video). Among the questions posed involved the pipeline war. Putin, a consummate player of market economics whose pipeline strategy – Nord Stream and South Stream – has left the U.S. and the European Union flat-footed, accused Washington of politicizing pipelines. And he’s right – if the issue were purely economic, no one would care much about Russia’s economic inroads in Europe; his critics are apprehensive that, as it has acted in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, Russia will exploit market advantage for political leverage. Putin also pointed out that the west “has no resource base” – no natural gas to put into the alternative pipeline it favors. Again, Putin is correct. That is what makes the West's proposed trans-Caspian and Nabucco lines so far untenable.

Here are Putin’s direct remarks:

"As for what smells of oil or gas, we know how our American partners conduct dialogue in Europe. They come to certain countries, try to convince them not to buy our resources or to try to find different routes to deliver fuels, avoiding Russian territory. They put pressure on these countries and that's already in the political sphere. I think this is a wrong policy, a dumb one. Moreover, it's unprofessional, since behind all this politicization of the question, there are no calculations, there's no resource base."

"On the issue of Gazprom biting into the body of Europe [with its efforts to acquire assets there], why the Americans are so concerned for the European body, I don't know. Maybe because they want a piece of it, they like it, it's a nice body. … Yes, the economic power of Russian companies is growing, of course, but our main consumers, especially in Europe, should only be happy about that. … Gazprom isn't demanding any exclusives, it just requires fair cooperation.

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Rice in the Race

The Bush administration has officially announced the high-profile Caspian Envoy position we’ve been discussing on this blog for some three months. This would be Washington’s point person in the contest for petro-influence with Russia in Europe.

In reply to a question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice said she’s head-hunting for the position now:

“I do intend to appoint, and we are looking for, a special energy coordinator who could especially spend time on the Central Asian and Caspian region,” Rice said. She added, ``It is a really important part of diplomacy. In fact, I think I would go so far as to say that some of the politics of energy is warping diplomacy in certain parts of the world.”

Rice is right. Russia's Vladimir Putin is far advanced in his shrewd market strategy for dominating Europe's natural gas supply even more than Russia currently does. Putin has personally gotten most of the necessary approvals from other nations for three new natural gas pipelines stretching from Turkmenistan into the heart of Europe. Meanwhile, Washington is not yet out of the starting gate for its rival, Western-controlled pipeline system that also would begin in Turkmenistan.

But I have my doubts about Rice's seriousness given her singular focus on the Middle East as a legacy issue for the Bush administration. Even if she were actively seeking someone, it seems highly unlikely that this late in the administration she could get a commitment from anyone with enough star power to outplay the masterful Putin.

Someone such as Zbigniew Brzezinski or James Baker. And even if someone of that caliber did agree, he or she would likely be in the job just 11 months, until the next administration takes over, which doesn’t seem sufficient time to mold the Western plan into shape.

Back in November, it looked like U.S. super-diplomat Thomas Pickering was imminently to be appointed. In the end, I’m told that the lawyers couldn’t work it out given his position as an adviser to Boeing.

The most realistic question now may be whether it will be too late when the next administration gets up and running.

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Another Death in England

England is seeming less and less safe for its multitude of political exiles. The latest death is a colorful Georgian businessman named Badri Patarkatsishvili (whom I will call Badri). British authorities say they expect to finish a post-mortem on the 52-year-old Badri today after he was found dead yesterday of a possible heart attack in the county of Surrey. As is their routine in unexpected deaths, they have handed over the case to their major crimes investigation unit. (Photo by Reuters' David Mdzinarishvili)

Badri’s possible enemies list isn’t short. Just a few short weeks ago, he lost in an election for president of Georgia against Mikheil Saakashvili. He has been charged there with plotting a coup and planning a ``terrorist attack'' on a government official. He denied the charges.

But Badri was best known as the main business partner of Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky, who himself lives in England in political exile. That has put both Badri and Berezovsky on a black list in Russia. Both men have been charged with fraud there for allegedly stealing cars in the mid-1990s from AvtoVAZ, a company they controlled.

If the British deem foul play to have been involved, Badri's business dealings would also be in question. In his 2000 book on Berezovsky, American journalist Paul Klebnikov described Badri as Berezovsky's "primary emissary to the traditional underworld."

In a BBC report, Berezovsky said he had seen Badri yesterday. He said that Badri wasn’t sick but did complain about his heart. "I have lost my closest friend," Berezovsky said.

Pipeline War Watch—Russia’s Vladimir Putin has astutely assembled most of the pieces for a Gazprom triumph in its battle with the West to control Europe’s natural gas market, and win the political leverage that goes with it. By appearances, he’s got the main player on board – Turkmenistan, which has all the natural gas. And he also has the main countries along the route of his proposed South Stream pipeline – Bulgaria, Austria and even Serbia.

Now, Putin seems to be moving in to harden the market victory by tying up the second-tier buyers of Turkmen gas, the objective being to completely submerge the West’s comparatively amateurish, rival pipeline plans. The key second-tier buyers of Turkmen gas are Hungary, Slovakia and Poland.

Readers of The Oil and the Glory know that when middlemen show up, deals get murky. That’s the situation with this latest turn in the pipeline war. I’m told that two middleman companies – a Hungarian firm named Millander International, and a shadowy Ukrainian-Russian company called RosUkrEnergo – are working to seal a long-term contract selling Turkmen natural gas to Hungary. The deal would be signed by these two firms, Gazprom, Turkmenistan and Hungary. I am told that it could happen as early as this week.

Currently, no Western oil company has obtained rights to any Turkmen gas fields, so there’s no guaranteed natural gas to feed into the West’s proposed trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines.

Such Gazprom deals mean to keep it that way.

Why Russia is Winning the Pipeline War

Vladimir Putin.

That's how Russia today made another advance in one of the most important battles under way anywhere in the world at the intersection of commerce and geopolitics -- for control of the natural gas market between Central Asia and Europe. This battle will decide who dominates the European energy market, and obtains commensurate political leverage in Europe and Central Asia. Russia already supplies more than 30% of Europe's natural gas and oil.

In another example of the role of personal diplomacy in the battle, Putin was in Sofia today and signed a deal nailing down Bulgaria's role as the principal transit point for the South Stream natural gas pipeline, which is meant to cement Russia's dominance of southern Europe's gas supply.

Putin had previously used the prestige of the Kremlin to push through plans for a separate pipeline serving northern Europe, called Nord Stream. And last month, he secured the natural gas supply required to feed the two lines. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan sold a large portion of their natural gas supply for the next thirty years, and agreed to a third pipeline to take their natural gas to Europe.

One would hardly know that Russia has a competitor in this epic market battle. But it does -- the West, specifically the European Union and the U.S., which have advanced their own dual-pipeline idea. They are a proposed trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline, also starting in Turkmenistan, and hooking into a proposed Nabucco pipeline into Europe.

How is the Western effort faring? It's stalled at the starting gate. Indeed, while Putin personally jets around the world, wining, dining and flattering the presidents of other nations whose favor is required, no Western leader has invited any of them for a personal meal. The U.S. hasn't even managed to select a senior statesman to lead the effort since Thomas Pickering dropped out and decided to stay in the private sector.

If it were not for the way that post-Soviet history has been so topsy-turvy, with a winner one day ultimately losing, I'd say the battle is over. For starters, it's high time for Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov to spend some time at Camp David.

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Note on Yesterday's Post on the Pipeline War

I received a couple of warranted complaints about yesterday's description of a delay within the Bush administration in naming a top envoy to direct the U.S. side of the West's pipeline war with Russia. As background, I've complimented the choice of gray beard Thomas Pickering as Washington's chief envoy for the Caspian. Steve Mann, another talented senior diplomat, would be his deputy. But I've not understood why these men aren't already in the field making the case for a western-directed, trans-Caspian pipeline for Turkmenistan gas. Yesterday I reported that an 11th-hour struggle over personnel was partly to blame. Specifically I reported that Dan Fried, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European affairs, was trying to get one of his deputies into the envoy's slot.

Fried rightly notes that I didn't offer him a chance to respond, and I regret that. Today Fried said the following in a telephone chat: "I think it's a great idea to have a senior person doing it, and he will be most effective if there is a team representing all the bureaus, economic, mine. (Under Secretary of State for Economics and Energy) Ruben Jeffrey should also be involved. We should get that team together and get them to work." On why there is a holdup, he said, "I'd like to do this as soon as someone identified is in place. The sooner the better is best."

Fried couldn't say so, but I'm still told that Pickering is headed into the top slot. I'm also told that there's a cat fight over who will be his deputy, including a turf war between the State Department and the National Security Council.

While the bureaucrats tussle over the details, they risk Russia gaining greater advantage.

The Pipeline War: As the CondiBoys Bicker, Putin Laps The West Again

Vladimir Putin has advanced again in the principal current theater of battle between the West and Russia -- the European pipeline war. His antagonists meanwhile are bickering over who will general their troops.

As wars go, this one is easy to figure out. It's purely business driven -- over who will dominate Europe's energy market -- and the spoils are political influence in Europe, where the votes are decisive on numerous issues vital to the West, in particular the U.S.

Russia, which currently controls about a third of Europe's oil and natural gas market, is seeking to enhance its dominance further by building large, new natural gas pipelines into northern and southern Europe.

On the other side, the European Union and the U.S. are trying to lessen Russian influence by building a competing set of natural gas pipelines into Europe.

The improbable key for both sides is that little can happen unless a single state -- Turkmenistan -- goes along. It possesses the world's fourth-largest reserves of natural gas, and it's these supplies that would make either side's pipeline strategy work.

So both the West and Russia have been assiduously courting this desert Central Asian nation, and its new president, Gurbangly Berdymukhamedov.

Except that Putin has been much more assiduous, and today that bore fruit as the leaders of Turkmenistan and also Kazakhstan signed a final agreement to build the first leg of Russia's new pipeline system. It would gather up the natural gas supplies of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, ship them north to Russia to be combined with Gazprom's volumes, then exported on to Europe at a much higher price (the profit to go to Russia alone).

I still think this is not a done deal. I've seen such seemingly concrete agreements silently disappear before. The real test is whether the pipeline lengths and bulldozers arrive on the spot, and welders begin working. As a smart friend posed the situation this morning, "Will Putin/Medvedev/Gazpromistan cough up the funds for it? Stay tuned." He was referring of course to Putin's probable successor, Dmitri Medvedev, and the character of today's Russia: The Gazprom State. The Russians aren't renown for willingness themselves to finance such projects.

As if to highlight this point, Berdymukhamedov himself didn't attend the signing ceremony -- which is notable since Putin and Kazakhstan's ultra-cautious Nursultan Nazarbayev did. He seems to be keeping the door slightly ajar for the Western route.

Still, the signs are not propitious for proponents of the Western route. While Putin has personally sat down with Berdymukhamedov numerous times, even flying down to Ashkabad to see him, President Bush gave him a mere photo op at the United Nations a couple of months ago.

Meanwhile, Bush's foreign policy team is in a catfight over who is going to lead the charge. Last month I reported that diplomatic warhorse Thomas Pickering was about to be named the new Caspian energy envoy. It's an inspired choice -- one of America's top two or three statesmen, Pickering brings undisputed gravitas wherever he goes. He exudes seriousness. His deputy is to be Steven Mann, a long-time ambassador and authority on the Caspian Sea.

But I'm told that Dan Fried, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European affairs, isn't happy. He's intent on installing a senior deputy, Matt Bryza, in one of the two jobs. Bryza is deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. Fried and Bryza served together under Condoleeza Rice on the National Security Council before she became secretary of state.

Which brings me to CondiBoys. I realize I am out of it, having spent too much time in Central Asia, but until this week I had never heard this term. It apparently refers to the prevalence in key foreign policy positions of Rice's former mates at the NSC. Such proximity and loyalty to Rice, and not necessarily merit, is said to be key to promotion; loyalty to Bush is said to be helpful as well.

I happen to admire Dan Fried. I was told back in 2005 that he was singularly responsible for America's humane response to the massacre of hundreds of people in the Uzbekistan city of Andijan, apparently on the order of President Islam Karimov. Knowing that Karimov would force out the U.S. military base at the slightest hint of provocation, Fried pushed through a decision to fly out dozens of survivors who had fled to neighboring Kyrgyzstan, and eventually relocate many in the U.S. The U.S. did lose the base.

I also think that Bryza is a highly qualified Eurasian hand, probably the longest-serving Caspian expert in government. Plus he's a nice guy.

But Fried's campaign is absurd. If the CondiBoy description is true, neither Pickering nor Mann are Rice proteges. But you don't bench your first string quarterback if he's willing to play (Asian and European readers: You catch the drift). It seems to me that Fried and Bryza ought to get out of Pickering's and Mann's way so they can go to work.

They have a slog ahead. My friend Russell Zanca, an Uzbek export over at Northeastern Illinois University, just sent a comment on yesterday's posting about Putin containing the following notable remark:

"It's totally natural for the Cen Asians to go w/ Russia--all connections, work ethics, everything is well in place--um, not to mention geography. Meanwhile the U.S. organizes conferences and exhibitions in Ashgabat. As a Tashkent hat seller once told me, America's a good country, but Russia's much closer. "

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Fence-Sitting on the Caspian

Oil and the Glory readers are acquainted with irascible Valekh Aleskerov, Azerbaijan’s preening, blustery, table-pounding former chief oil negotiator. Aleskerov was in Washington this week for a conference run by my friend Zeyno Baran at the Hudson Institute.

I unfortunately wasn’t present, but heard that Aleskerov was his best, straight-talking self. I was particularly struck by a point on the second round of Pipeline Politics currently under way between Moscow, Europe and the U.S.

He noted that Azerbaijan’s courage was largely responsible for the diplomatic triumph in the game's first round, capped by last year’s completion of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline linking the Caspian and Mediterranean seas. Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev opted to ignore Russian threats and, in partnership with Georgia’s Eduard Shevardnadze, spearhead the strategy of the thousand-mile, U.S.-backed line.

But Aleskerov was speaking in the context of the second-round battle between the West and Russia over who will control the resources of the Eastern side of the Caspian. Russia wants to take Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s natural gas north for onward shipment to Europe. But Europe and the U.S. are pressing a competing proposal to ship the gas west through a new trans-Caspian pipeline linking Turkmenistan to Turkey.

The Western proposal is prudent since going along with the Russian plan would mean isolation for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which would then rely on a single buyer and shipper of this huge cash-earner.

The trans-Caspian idea is beset with indecisiveness and bungling from the Caspian all the way to Washington -- mainly in Europe and Washington -- but one of the problems is that neither Turkmenistan nor Kazakhstan have committed to the proposed line. And that’s the foremost step before anyone else can move. As Aleskerov put it: “Turkmenistan will not take risks like Azerbaijan took risks” with Baku-Ceyhan.

Yesterday, Kazakhstan unintentionally provided Aleskerov a coda.

For more than a decade, Kazakhstan’s president has played the cautious middle ground in Pipeline Politics. When Nursultan Nazarbayev is in front of Russian leaders, he says, We will ship our oil through Russia! Before Chinese leaders, it’s, China or bust! And with his Turkic brothers or the West, he’s a gushing fan of Baku-Ceyhan.

Yesterday was more of the same in the Kazakh capital of Astana. Standing with Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Nazarbayev was uncontainable. “Kazakh oil will be transported to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,” he stated unequivocably.

Well, yes, because Chevron intends to ship a few hundred thousand barrels a day that way from its Tengiz oilfield. And so do the Italian-led developers of Kashagan, the mother of all Caspian oilfields, once they get on line in a few years.

But do the Kazakhs intend to ship any of their state-owned oil through the line? More to the point, would Nazarbayev ship oil or natural gas through trans-Caspian lines were they built?

As I write these questions, their absurdity becomes almost profound. Why would Nazarbayev not do so? And if there's no reason not to, why doesn’t Nazarbayev – the strongest current leader in the eight-nation Caucasus and Central Asia region – commit definite volumes to Baku-Ceyhan and a trans-Caspian line?

The answer is wrapped into Russia's own assumptions in its Pipeline Politics strategy. As Aleskerov put it so well, Vladimir Putin assumes that Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan "will not take risks like Azerbaijan took risks.”

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Russia: Note to Presidential Candidates

This week's U.S. reversal on Iranian nuclear aims is a wake-up call on multiple fronts for those who will run American foreign policy for the next few years.

Among them is this: Vladimir Putin isn't a simple gadfly. Instead, he's one of the most important leaders the U.S. can cultivate over the next few years. Why? Because he's engaging and challenging the U.S. on issues that both countries care about, and happens to get it right -- and the U.S. wrong -- at important times.

As we learned this week, Iran is one. For years the U.S. tried to stampede him into supporting ever-escalating sanctions, leading to possible war, against Iran. But he resisted, asserting that President Bush's claims about Iran's nuclear weapons capability were overblown, and according to the new U.S. intelligence estimate it is Putin's judgment that was correct.

The new Iran intelligence highlights another needed correction: Putin in fact isn't inaccurate -- nor belligerent -- when he asserts that the U.S. presumes to know the only way on foreign policy.

U.S. policy on Russia currently amounts to this: You hurt my feelings.

It would be better to focus on issues, and the main one is energy, the foundation of Russian -- and Putin's -- power, how he's asserting Moscow's prerogatives in Europe and elsewhere.

As readers of this blog know, I think that one of the most potent instruments of power in Europe today is control of the flow of oil and natural gas. Putin has learned the lesson of the momentous U.S. foreign policy triumph last year with the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and is conducting his own, much more ambitious pipeline policy.

Putin's strategy is market-oriented -- to cement and increase Russia's current control of 30% of Europe's natural gas market. It so happens, in my opinion, that that aim is incompatible with European and U.S. interests in a more diversified natural gas supply so that no one can dictate terms.

The U.S. is attempting to counter the Russian pipeline thrust, but is late to the game. U.S. energy bureaucrats led by Steven Mann are meeting in Sofia tomorrow and Friday to talk over how the U.S. can polish its strategy, and it'll be interesting to know the outcome.

I personally think that the new intelligence assessment on Iran -- like the previous one -- sounds too smugly certain. Anyone who has read Tim Weiner's excellent Legacy of Ashes can see that the intelligence business is barely manageable at best, like herding cats as the saying goes. But the fact that the intelligence services did not have rock-hard evidence before on Iran's intentions gives little comfort to those reading this week's abrupt, contrary assertions.

And it's equally discomfiting to those who have watched American policy on Russia amount to finger-pointing.

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Notes on the Pipeline War: Amateur Hour in Washington and Europe

Note: I had an interesting interview today with David Inge of WILL Radio at the University of Illinois. Lots of history, Russia, Iran and China.

Now to pipelines. I’ve been exchanging emails with an oilman friend about a long natural gas pipeline championed by the United States and Europe to meet Vladimir Putin’s petro-thrust into Europe. This friend, who chooses to correspond privately, thinks the West’s handling of the pipeline, called Nabucco, has been amateurish at best. And I must say after going over it with him that he makes a strong case.

As background, this clumsily named, 2,000-mile-long pipeline would start in Turkey and terminate in Austria. It would transport natural gas from the Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, providing them a financial channel independent of current monopoly-buyer Russia. It would also help to diversify the natural gas supply of Europe, which relies on Russia for some 30% of its gas.

Nabucco is the West’s response to three big Russian-planned pipelines that instead would channel Central Asian gas north to Russia, for onward export to Europe through the planned Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines. The pipelines would advance a shrewd Russian market strategy to cement and build on its domination of Europe's energy supply.

Russia is far advanced in the contest, but the West thinks it can catch up. As readers of this blog know, the Bush administration is about to name Thomas Pickering, one of Washington’s most seasoned statesmen, to head the diplomatic effort in a newly created office within the State Department.

But my friend argues that, not only would Pickering not be poised to push Nabucco over the finish line, the West is currently “not even in the starting gate.”

Putting aside for the moment that the Central Asians have yet to make a necessary commitment to the line, Nabucco’s advocates have to date failed to perform a detailed economic analysis of the proposed line. And because they also have no convincing engineering study of the line, along with a detailed, country-by-country understanding of how big or small the role of each player in the complex line would be, the West ends up at risk of being manipulated by those with a vested interest in its construction.

In the 1990s, when the U.S. got behind the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline – the million-barrel-a-day line connecting Baku with the Turkish Mediterranean – it corralled support money from organizations like the Export-Import Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. No equivalent effort has accompanied the campaign for Nabucco.

So is the West serious? If so, my friend says it might move beyond a pose and create a program. He makes sense.

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News: Bush Creating New Position Of Senior Envoy For Russia, Caspian

The Bush Administration is about to appoint a retired senior diplomat to a newly created position to try to advance ambitious U.S. aims in Russia and on the Caspian Sea. Like the 11th-hour push on Israel and Palestine, it's an example of Bush's determination to stay relevant by attacking the thorny global problems he largely sidestepped until now.

Thomas Pickering, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and among the country's most respected statesmen, has been asked to return to the State Department as a special envoy with a broad portfolio in the Eurasian region, according to people with whom I've been talking.

I met Pickering in 1993, when he was ambassador to Russia, and he's an extremely smooth, well-connected, mannerly fellow. He's suited for his leading tasks -- to help smooth over some of the friction with Russia's Vladimir Putin, and work on getting Caspian natural gas to the West via a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan.

Pickering's deputy would be Steven Mann, a Central Asia specialist with among the longest titles in the State Department -- principal deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs. I've met Mann numerous times, and find him extremely knowledgeable and realistic without being cynical.

The twin appointments amount to a resurrection -- and elevation -- of the old job of Caspian Sea czar, a post that Mann previously held. It's a Clinton-era position that Colin Powell abolished as unnecessary when he became secretary of state.

One seasoned Washington hand with whom I exchanged messages said the Bush administration is re-inventing the job because it doesn't know what else to do in Moscow and on the Caspian. "They have run out of options and need someone with more gravitas to show they are serious and not irrelevant," he said. " The question is why Pickering would come back for this."

I'd say Condoleeza Rice must have seriously flattered Pickering that only he could salvage the situation. But we will wait for Pickering himself to speak after his appointment becomes official.

How to Survive in the New World of Big Oil

Italy’s Eni continues to pioneer a successful path to survival in Big Oil’s treacherous new world – get in bed, don’t compete, with the world’s state-owned oil companies.

Eni’s flexible strategy has already made it Big Oil’s most successful company in both Russia and Kazakhstan. Today, it announced a fresh partnership with Russia’s Gazprom – to build a $14 billion natural gas pipeline between Russia and Europe. The pipeline directly challenges U.S. and European Union policy.

Called South Stream, the pipeline would ship Central Asian and Russian natural gas into southern Europe. It’s part of a three-pronged Russian strategy to deepen its dominance of Europe’s natural gas market. Russia is also building a natural gas pipeline called Nord Stream, which would serve northern Europe. A third line would feed cheap Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan natural gas into Nord Stream and South Stream.

Eni hopes to parlay its cooperation with Gazprom into natural gas development deals in Russia, which has recently sharply resisted such relationships with western oil companies.

Washington and the EU are fighting to blunt the market impact of the trio of Russian lines. They are doing so by championing rival natural gas lines from Turkmenistan into Europe. But, as today’s announcement shows, Russia is more advanced in the contest.

Photo: Mini D
Rights: Creative Commons

Meanwhile, On the Field of (Pipeline) Battle

The Europeans have supplied fresh entertainment for spectators of the ongoing East-West pipeline war. It comes in the form of an announcement by BP and Norway's Statoil that they have double the reserves they initially estimated at a huge offshore Azerbaijan natural gas field. That makes the underdog Western side a more serious contender in the battle for economic influence in Europe.

The Caspian Sea occupies its accustomed key role in the events.

For almost a year, Russia and the West (Europe and the U.S.) have been circling one another. At stake has been dominance over Europe's energy supply. Russia, which already supplies more than 30% of Europe's oil and natural gas, wants to build up that formidable position. The West wants to shrink it. The two goals are incompatible, so a diplomatic and economic battle have ensued.

Russia's Vladimir Putin has taken the lead by getting Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to sign away their natural gas exports and fire sale prices, and to agree to help build a new pipeline to take the supplies north to Russia, and then on to Europe.

Europe and the U.S. have countered by suggesting that Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan instead ship their natural gas west, and on to Europe, where a pipeline called Nabucco would be built to supply the continent. But they are late to the game, and have suffered valid skepticism about their ability to harness sufficient natural gas to justify Nabucco.

The new announcement by BP and Statoil comes from across the Caspian, in Azerbaijan. The companies say they may be able in the next few years to start exporting the natural gas equivalent of an extra 150,000 barrels a day of oil from an offshore field they control.

That's because the companies discovered a new reservoir of natural gas at the giant Shah Deniz field. They did so by drilling the deepest well ever in the Caspian -- 7,300 meters below the seabed.

The companies had already expected to export a peak volume of the natural gas equivalent of 150,000 barrels a day of oil from Shah Deniz. Now they say the new reservoir seems likely to supply that much or more. So, in all, Shah Deniz will export the natural gas equivalent of more than 300,000 barrels of oil a day.

Some of the new gas will be absorbed locally. But the Russians are no doubt scowling, and the Europeans and Americans smiling, at the prospect that the remainder could go on to Europe through proposed Nabucco.

Photo by: Cadd
Photo rights: Creative Commons

Europe's struggle for energy independence from Russia

An excellent new piece in the Economist describes Europe's yet-again-divided and weak approach toward energy supplies. The first two graphs:

WESTERN failures in recent energy tussles with Russia have been persistent and spectacular. Key allies have drifted off into private deals. The big picture has been ignored. The gloomy drift accelerated this year with the signing of a three-cornered deal between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to pump the Caspian’s huge gas reserves north through Russia. Now Uzbekistan, according to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, is going to join too.

Europe’s only chance of getting gas along pipelines that Russia doesn’t control is a project called Nabucco. Its aim is to connect the gas riches of the Caspian and the Middle East to Europe via the Caucasus and Turkey. Read rest of article

From Steve: In addition to a hilarious account of State Department energy authority Matt Bryza in action, the piece points up how Russia yet again has triumphed by relying on Europe's propensity for going multiple ways at once. It also highlights the persistently short-sighted attitude of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which so far have refused to concretely back an independent export pipeline for their lucrative natural gas reserves and so are subject to Russia's whims on price. The Economist piece is by Edward Lucas