Guest Column: America's Ostensible Ally in Baku

Next week, Dmitry Medvedev travels to Japan for his first G-8 summit as president of Russia. But before that, he is on a three-day trip to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. If the West hasn't taken note of that, it should -- Vladimir Putin and now Medvedev have neatly cemented strong relationships with the oil- and natural gas-rich Caspian countries of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, nations that during the 1990s the U.S. sought to bring into the Western fold. These countries continue to be strategically important, both because of the tight energy supply, and because of the energy independence they can provide to Europe. In an email exchange, my friend Tom de Waal -- co-author of the classic Chechnya, and author of the trenchant Black Garden -- told me that in The Oil and the Glory I overplayed Azerbaijan's alienation from Russia. His argument was compelling, and I asked him to expand it into a guest column. The result follows.

By Tom de Waal

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrives in Baku today.

In the West, there is a widespread assumption that Azerbaijan is an ally, and in the same anti-Russian camp as Georgia. I think that is a misperception. Azerbaijan is now developing a foreign policy of “complementarity,” which used to be the aspiration of the Armenians – be on good terms with everybody and get the best out of everybody. The model here is Kazakhstan, rather than Georgia.

Actually this was always the case. I suspect the Azerbaijanis have always been good at delivering the message in Washington, “You are our main ally and friend” and then going to Moscow and repeating the same refrain. Heydar Aliyev, the first post-Soviet Azerbaijani president (and father of the current president), was careful to keep good relations with Russia; before he talked seriously to Western partners about the non-Russian Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, he got a Russian oil pipeline in place – the so-called Early Oil line from Baku to Novorossiisk. Aliyev also wanted to give the Iranians a stake in the offshore Azerbaijani oil consortium, known as AIOC, but was of course over-ruled by the Americans. Aliyev kept his good contacts in Moscow, but was held back by Boris Yeltsin’s personal antipathy to him -- although he did successfully bury the hatchet with another Gorbachev-era reformer who had been his enemy in the Politburo, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Once Vladimir Putin came to power, Aliyev made it a strategic priority to rebuild relations with Russia. Aliyev was very successfully at charming the Putin Kremlin, and his daughter, Sevil, made a useful marriage with a well-connected Moscow Azerbaijani, Mahmud Mammadquliyev. The elite-level relationship has deepened under his son, Ilham Aliyev.

Medvedev, with his background as former chairman of Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant, now speaks the same language of money and energy as the Azerbaijani elite. They must find it a relief not to have to bother with all that talk of democratization and human rights that enters conversations with Western politicians.

The Georgians enjoy the access they get in Washington but I wonder if they secretly envy the lobbying power in Russia of people like Vagit Alekperov, the Azerbaijani chairman of Lukoil, who have made sure that Azerbaijan doesn’t suffer the kind of boycotts, visa bans and border closures that the Georgians do.

The price for Azerbaijan is that it will not pursue NATO membership, which would alienate Russia, but I believe that is not a big priority for the country’s elite. The Azerbaijanis now feel secure enough because of their vast and growing oil wealth. Moreover, NATO standardization would also threaten to bring unwelcome transparency to the notoriously corrupt Azerbaijani armed forces.

This is not a love-match but a marriage of interests—as indeed is the Azerbaijani-U.S. relationship. Both Baku and Moscow are still capable of actions that hurt ordinary people:

In Azerbaijan, the authorities have needlessly banned the re-broadcasting of Russian television channels, barring Russian-speaking pensioners who cannot afford satellite television from their only form of entertainment; in Russia, the authorities have played to a xenophobic constituency by stopping Azeris from trading at markets. The newspaper commentariats in both countries continue to exchange hostile remarks, and men like former Azeri presidential adviser Vafa Guluzade continue to blame all of the country’s ills on the Russians.

But on an elite level, there are plenty of common interests. And consider also an opinion poll conducted by Azerbaijani political analyst Rasim Musabekov in Azerbaijan in February 2008.

Asked to name the three nations friendliest to Azerbaijan, 89% of Musabekov’s respondents unsurprisingly named Turkey. But Russia came in second place with a 20% vote of approval, well ahead of the United States, which was named by 5.7%, just behind Iran and on the same level as Ukraine.

This suggests that, on the street level, Russia and Russians remain popular with ordinary Azeris. They are still on the same wavelength in a way that Americans or Europeans will never be.

What's the Book About?

Shawn Miller of Critical Compendium had a slew of questions about The Oil and the Glory. Here is his interview.

Becoming Like the Soviets - Part II

While researching The Oil and the Glory, an amusing story I heard again and again from the oilmen and diplomats who found themselves on the Caspian Sea was the ubiquity of eavesdropping. As they sought their lucrative deals or carried out statesmanship, they would find KGB microphones hidden behind portraits in their hotel rooms, and dug into the walls of their offices. Somehow the Azeris were able to surveil them even in five-star hotels all the way in London.

The Westerners described a resultant atmosphere that was paranoid, poisonous and wholly over the top.

Once, two Britons in Baku – BP’s Terry Adams and Ambassador Thomas Young – had something confidential to discuss, too confidential to risk being overheard indoors, and went for a rainy walk along the shoreline. Their privacy seemed assured — few cars or people were braving the nasty weather. Just then, a small Soviet-made Lada stopped fifty yards ahead of them, and a sheepdog with a big collar jumped out. The dog trailed after the men, making them suspicious. “When the dog’s tail would go up, Tom would say, ‘Careful, it must be transmitting,’” Adams told me. As bizarre as it sounded, the story took on a life of its own, and it helped convince many other oilmen that most if not all conversations were being recorded.

The foreigners began to treat it as a game. They would tailor their conversations with the express purpose of manipulating government negotiators. Some of the locals themselves tried to confound the bugging by dropping crumpled-up notes on the floor to caution foreign guests to watch their mouths.

Meanwhile the foreigners resorted to code names in hopes of confusing those listening in. One member of Azerbaijan’s loyal opposition was dubbed “Loyal Avis” by the Pennzoil team. Another who wore alligator shoes became “the Big Bopper,” and a third who owned a house near the president’s was known as “the Landlord.” A fourth who was in the local KGB was “the Lamp.”

As we see in today’s New York Times, the Bush administration set off on an eavesdropping campaign within two weeks of taking office, in February 2001. We can debate the merits of becoming like the Soviets, which I've blogged about previously.

But I can tell you after years of researching the KGB experience that in this respect it doesn’t work, at least not for long – shrewd listenees find a way to disguise their conversations, and conduct their genuine ones out of earshot.

Photo: tanakawho
Rights: Creative Commons

Business Week Names The Oil and the Glory A Top-10 Business Book of the Year

Thanks to Business Week for the recognition. SL

Meanwhile, On the Field of (Pipeline) Battle

The Europeans have supplied fresh entertainment for spectators of the ongoing East-West pipeline war. It comes in the form of an announcement by BP and Norway's Statoil that they have double the reserves they initially estimated at a huge offshore Azerbaijan natural gas field. That makes the underdog Western side a more serious contender in the battle for economic influence in Europe.

The Caspian Sea occupies its accustomed key role in the events.

For almost a year, Russia and the West (Europe and the U.S.) have been circling one another. At stake has been dominance over Europe's energy supply. Russia, which already supplies more than 30% of Europe's oil and natural gas, wants to build up that formidable position. The West wants to shrink it. The two goals are incompatible, so a diplomatic and economic battle have ensued.

Russia's Vladimir Putin has taken the lead by getting Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to sign away their natural gas exports and fire sale prices, and to agree to help build a new pipeline to take the supplies north to Russia, and then on to Europe.

Europe and the U.S. have countered by suggesting that Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan instead ship their natural gas west, and on to Europe, where a pipeline called Nabucco would be built to supply the continent. But they are late to the game, and have suffered valid skepticism about their ability to harness sufficient natural gas to justify Nabucco.

The new announcement by BP and Statoil comes from across the Caspian, in Azerbaijan. The companies say they may be able in the next few years to start exporting the natural gas equivalent of an extra 150,000 barrels a day of oil from an offshore field they control.

That's because the companies discovered a new reservoir of natural gas at the giant Shah Deniz field. They did so by drilling the deepest well ever in the Caspian -- 7,300 meters below the seabed.

The companies had already expected to export a peak volume of the natural gas equivalent of 150,000 barrels a day of oil from Shah Deniz. Now they say the new reservoir seems likely to supply that much or more. So, in all, Shah Deniz will export the natural gas equivalent of more than 300,000 barrels of oil a day.

Some of the new gas will be absorbed locally. But the Russians are no doubt scowling, and the Europeans and Americans smiling, at the prospect that the remainder could go on to Europe through proposed Nabucco.

Photo by: Cadd
Photo rights: Creative Commons

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Putin's Show: An Opening on the Caspian

Yesterday's Caspian Sea summit in Tehran was decidedly the Vladimir Putin show, but the ostensible common front oddly enough seems to have revealed an opening for a spoiler. The West ought to climb through.

The main news of course was the states' rejection of being used as a staging ground to attack Iran. That's a very real issue, as the word has been on the street for almost a year that U.S. offensive plans against Iran included possible land attacks from both Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. If true, it would be downright unneighborly not to go along with Putin's proposed declaration against such an attack; Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev specifically couldn't disrupt the bonhomie and say, "Sorry, fellas, but we have to punch Mahmoud's lights out."

Yet, given Russia's similar peacenik act in Serbia in 1999, Putin's reach for the moral high ground this time wasn't all that surprising.

The more interesting topic I think regarded the issue of controlling activities on the Caspian. In the guise of environmentalism, Russia has long urged that all five Caspian states be vested with a veto against any work on the sea by any of its neighbors.

The actual reason for Moscow's supposed concern for sturgeon and seals is control of the region's oil and natural gas -- as long as no pipeline is built across the sea, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are effectively bottled up, and subject to a Russian stranglehold on energy exports.

Tehran was no different. Putin told the other presidents, "Projects that may inflict serious environmental damage to the region cannot be implemented without prior discussion by all five Caspian nations." Read AP account.

Yet, according to the AP account, his fellow former Soviet leaders were noticeably non-commital on the topic. Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev, for example, said only that "pipeline routes need to be coordinated with nations whose territory they cross." That logic would not preclude building a cross-sea line, say, from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, as long as both agreed.

Russia, of course, expresses no such ecological concern when it regards Nord-Stream, its natural gas pipeline project across the Baltic Sea.

This is a hunch, but it could be that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are a bit fed up with, and not a little suspicious over, Putin's turns of glad-handing and subtle pressure to consign their energy future -- and independence -- to Russia.

As it stands, the eastern Caspian states are effectively in Russia's pocket because of the absence of trans-Caspian pipelines west to export their oil and especially natural gas free of Moscow's interference.

It's long been in their interest to commit to construction of that route. And it's in the West's interest -- particularly Europe's -- to make it happen once that commitment is made.

A Caspian Deal: Tea Anyone?

There has been fanfare leading into Tuesday's meeting of the leaders of the Caspian nations, and their discussion again of the vexing question of whether they are neighbors of a sea or a lake. Let's hope the tea and meals are tasty in Tehran, because there will be no breakthrough.

The main reason: None of the main antagonists are going to capitulate.

Lots of people rightly find humor in the sea-or-lake issue, which ostensibly determines how a body of water is treated in terms of the littoral nations' rights. Apart from its amusement value, however, it's pointless to debate on the merits of the various sides, because each produces its chosen group of long-ago treaties, laws and precedents to make points that are instantly dismissed by the other interested parties.

Instead, it's easiest to look at interests:

Iran and Russia generally fall into the same camp, but for different reasons (Iran wants title to more sea than it would deserve by a purely quantitative count of its coastline; Russia would like to control all activities on the sea, but will settle for halting any cross-sea pipeline that would further weaken its stranglehold on oil and natural gas exports from the region).

It's principally the idea of that trans-Caspian pipeline that will scuttle any deal. Azerbaijan in my opinion will never agree to a prohibition on a pipeline in the sea, and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan won't either if they are smart. Yet Russia won't agree to any pact that doesn't preclude a pipeline.

So the meeting is hopeless in terms of a certain settlement -- Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia will continue to develop their oilfields at will. Washington will persist in trying to get Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to build a cross-sea pipeline. And Russia will push the states not to build one.

On the other hand, the weather will be lovely (84 degrees fahrenheit; 29 celsius).

Greenspan and the Caspian

As part of the publicity for his memoir, just out today, Former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan has given a slew of interviews. In a chat with Bob Woodward of The Washington Post, he accents the knife's edge on which the world economy rests because of tight oil supplies, and inadvertently provides an argument for why the Caspian Sea is strategically important.

In the Post interview, according to Woodward, Greenspan said that the disruption of even 3 to 4 million barrels a day of oil could translate into crude prices as high as $120 a barrel; the loss of anything more would mean "chaos" to the global economy, Greenspan said. Read story

That is precisely the volume of oil exports expected from the Caspian -- from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan combined -- after about a decade. The main fields involved will be Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak in Kazakhstan, and offshore Baku in Azerbaijan.

As it appears now, much of this oil will pass through the East-West oil corridor championed by Washington, with its hub in Baku. It is why the U.S. has put so much diplomatic weight behind relationships with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Oil prices are largely decided on the margin -- those last 3 to 5 million barrels of total daily world demand. In the next decade, the flow of Caspian oil will produce the equivalent of that margin.

The Pirate of Prague's Newly Restored Grin

Incredible as it seems, Viktor Kozeny could indeed ride again.

Accused of bribing Azerbaijan leaders, the Harvard-educated, lavish-living Kozeny has sat for almost two years in a Bahamas jail fighting extradition to the U.S. But now a U.S. prosecutor says the government may have to drop most charges against him. The reason -- the statute of limitations.

If it does, and Kozeny is freed or lightly sentenced, it will put a bow around the charmed life that he has led the last 17 or so years, in which he masterminded two of the most controversial investment schemes of the Gorbachev and post-Soviet era.

This story actually broke last month, but appears to have been largely overlooked. Tip to Paul Sampson for pointing it out to me. Here is the first paragraph of an AP story: NEW YORK — The government is seeking to resurrect its case against three men accused of offering hundreds of millions of dollars to top officials in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan to get favorable treatment in oil deals. Read story

Steve's comment: The 43-year-old Kozeny is famous for investment schemes in which lots of people lose most of their money.

He first attracted attention in the early 1990s when he swooped into his native Prague and persuaded hundreds of thousands of Czechs to invest their state-issued privatization vouchers with him, and become fabulously wealthy. Almost all lost most or all of their money, but Kozeny left the country worth tens of millions of dollars and never returned. For that Fortune magazine dubbed him "The Pirate of Prague."

Kozeny bought lavish homes in London, the Bahamas and elsewhere with the money.

Next, he turned up on the Caspian Sea. He decided that there were even greater earnings to be had, particularly in Baku. In 1997, he threw a now-famous party in Aspen, Colorado, where he persuaded some of America's most savvy investors and their friends that they could own, then flip, the state oil company of Azerbaijan, or Socar.

Those who tossed in a bundle totalling more than $200 million included Wall Street hedge fund doyen Lee Cooperman, former Senate Majority leader George Mitchell and Frederic Bourke of the Dooney & Bourke luxury handbag company.

The problem, as (almost) anyone who has set foot in Azerbaijan knows, is that there is no way the Azerbaijan government would part with its cash cow.

In October 2005, U.S. prosecutors charged Kozeny and two of the investors with bribery and money laundering. Specifically, the government said that the defendants provided financial incentives to a "senior Azeri official" (the late President Heydar Aliyev) in order to privatize Socar.

In June of this year, a U.S. district judge said the statute of limitations had passed on charges against Kozeny's two co-defendants, and dismissed most of them. And in an appeal last month, prosecutors said that, if the decision holds, most charges will also have to be dropped against Kozeny.

The appeal hasn't been decided yet. But those who follow the Azerbaijan case always wondered -- why, given Kozeny's history, did so many smart people entrust so many millions with him? To a person, his investors replied that they felt they had done their due diligence.

That rang hollow. The truth was that Kozeny dangled the prospect of an enormous windfall before Aspen's and Wall Street's moneyed crowd -- in addition to great fun and adventure -- and they simply grabbed for it.

Ten years later, there is the prospect of Kozeny going onto his next adventure.

Gazprom: To Fear or Not to Fear

The West often expresses the apprehension that Russia will use its energy for outside political leverage. The answer of course is that it already is -- its oil and natural gas is the source after all of its newfound confidence and influence in Europe. Yet the most vulnerable and victim-prone countries are Russia's former Soviet colonies. The upshot: The Caspian states need to keep up their guard.

Take a look at The Independent of London today, which has a good, long primer on Gazprom. The piece, by Anne Penketh, makes two conclusions: Gazprom is so unwieldy and large that it may end up being a paper tiger; and that, given the combination of Gazprom's management failures and its abiding need for continued profits from Europe, it will end up having to give someone the short end of the stick -- one of its former Soviet brothers.

A key quote for those who follow the non-Russian states comes from Pavel Baev of the International Peace Research Institute: "They are the victims of choice," he tells the newspaper. "A new gas war is predetermined."

Steve's comment: The world caught on to Russia's outside power during the last eighteen months or so when Europe's oil and natural gas supply was disturbed over disputes with Ukraine and Belarus, and the Independent piece focuses on those two former Soviet states.

But the Caspian states and foreigners who work there -- Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, as a transit country, Georgia -- have witnessed Moscow's willingness to wield the energy club since just a few months after the 1991 Soviet breakup.

Russia starved Georgia of natural gas. It cut off Turkmenistan's access to foreign export markets. It has done the same in Kazakhstan, reducing the value of its giant fields (Karachaganak, one of the world's ten largest natural gas fields, is absurdly reduced to exploitation as an oil field). To its credit, Azerbaijan has responded to Gazprom's threats by going off Russian gas cold turkey, and turning to the local supply.

Transneft's actions in terms of the region's oil exports is well documented and have been discussed previously.

Russia argues that its actions are market-oriented. Maybe. But one must add realpolitik -- Gazprom has been the cudgel to bring feisty neighbors (such as Georgia) into line. And there is no sign that the custom is changing soon.

Counting the Geopolitical Winnings on the Caspian

John C.K. Daly has an interesting article on the latest geopolitical fallout in pipeline politics on the Caspian.

ANNAPOLIS, Md. (UPI) -- The death of Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov last Dec. 21 set off an unseemly but discreet scramble among a number of nations eager for access to the world's fourth-largest reserves of natural gas. Seven months later, the clear winner for the race to control Turkmenistan's energy is Russia, with China as also-ran, while the United States and other Western nations essentially lost. What happened? The answer might be the Realtors' creed, "location, location, location." Read rest of article

Steve's comment: From the mid-1990s, Washington played a brilliant game on the west side of the Caspian, and a massively inept one on the east. The difference was that in Azerbaijan and Georgia, it had strong, far-sighted partners in Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze. In the east, however, Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev and Turkmenistan's Niyazov never joined the geopolitical combat posed by their Azeri and Georgian neighbors, and maneuvered Washington into an embarrassingly absurd diplomatic exercise.

U.S. officials paraded into Astana and Ashkabad to persuade the Kazakhs and Turkmen to do what was manifestly to their advantage -- build an energy pipeline link independent of Russia, and the Kazakhs and Turkmen delivered platitudes on how, yes, they would cooperate before promptly forgetting they had done so.

The recent Kazakh and Turkmen decision to sign a long-term contract for most of their natural gas to Gazprom -- and to build yet another pipeline north to Russia -- appears to be a nail in the coffin for the eastern half of the grand U.S.-backed East-West Energy Corridor to Turkey.

The biggest question is why have Nazarbayev and Turkmenistan's Berdimukhamedov signed such a deal. One answer is that it is the easiest short-term option -- avoid the sparks of geopolitical conflict, and simply sell to one's traditional northern trading partner. They may believe that they retain the opportunity in the future to balance out the increased leverage they have granted to Russia. It is difficult to see how, given the agreement, such a trans-Caspian pipeline could be built any time in the foreseeable future.

Here is an interesting piece on how, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, Italy may not have entirely bet the store on continued good will from Gazprom. Instead, Italy appears to be hedging its bets.

Expect More Oil Contract Demands on the Caspian

The notice given by Kazakhstan that it may seek a penalty from the developers of the much-delayed super-giant Kashagan oilfield is another sign of push-back by the former Soviet petro-states. The upshot - the likelihood is that there will be renegotiations of contractual terms on both sides of the Caspian in the coming several years. Among the main targets will be BP.

In fact, ENI-operated Kashagan deserves such treatment from Kazakhstan. Its 1997 contract, negotiated by James Giffen, includes a specific penalty clause that is triggered if first oil is not produced according to a specific timetable. That year for first oil was 2005, meaning the companies are already two years late with the probability that the first shipments won't come before 2011 or even 2012.

The indication is that Kazakhstan will leverage the missed deadline -- plus the current hostile oil environment to the north in Russia -- into a higher profit share.

This is just the beginning. After the oil is flowing from Kashagan, Kazakhstan is likely to push for more concessions. Kazakhstan's Tengiz oilfield, in which Chevron and Exxon Mobil hold 75 percent of the shares, is also likely to be under such pressure from the government.

Across the sea in Azerbaijan, the BP-operated offshore fields are also likely to face demands for contractual concessions in the coming years. Neither the leaders of Azerbaijan nor Kazakhstan are blind to the squeeze put on the multinational oil companies in Russia, and to one degree or another will follow suit.

Gazprom Gains BP Gas Field as Putin Tightens Control

June 22 (Bloomberg) -- OAO Gazprom took control of BP Plc's stake in a Siberian deposit with enough natural gas to supply Asia for five years as President Vladimir Putin ends foreign ownership of Russia's biggest energy assets.

State-run Gazprom will pay as much as $900 million for the 63 percent of the Kovykta field held by BP's TNK-BP unit and half its regional pipeline unit, and agreed to set up a $3 billion global venture, executives from the three companies said in the Kremlin today.

Read rest of story

From Steve: The once full-throated multinational oil companies, knocked onto their heels in Russia, ought to be worried about Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which certainly are watching these events with interest.

4 Leaders Try to Offset Russia's Clout

BAKU, Azerbaijan (AP) – Leaders of four former Soviet republics discussed ways to counterbalance Russia's wide influence in the Caspian and Black Sea basins at a summit of their regional grouping.

The summit is the first for the organization, called GUAM, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, since its four member countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova – agreed last year to deepen ties and cooperation.
Read the rest of story

From Steve: On the other side of the Caspian, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still have no concrete link into the Baku-based oil-and-natural gas pipelines to the Mediterranean.

Instead they recently agreed to build another natural gas pipeline through Russia. To the degree that they are seeking leverage against Russian influence of their energy markets, they are doing so by building up transportation with China, and organizing barge traffic to Baku.

But one wonders if this will be sufficient for their long-term economic independence.