Guest Column: America's Ostensible Ally in Baku

Next week, Dmitry Medvedev travels to Japan for his first G-8 summit as president of Russia. But before that, he is on a three-day trip to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. If the West hasn't taken note of that, it should -- Vladimir Putin and now Medvedev have neatly cemented strong relationships with the oil- and natural gas-rich Caspian countries of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, nations that during the 1990s the U.S. sought to bring into the Western fold. These countries continue to be strategically important, both because of the tight energy supply, and because of the energy independence they can provide to Europe. In an email exchange, my friend Tom de Waal -- co-author of the classic Chechnya, and author of the trenchant Black Garden -- told me that in The Oil and the Glory I overplayed Azerbaijan's alienation from Russia. His argument was compelling, and I asked him to expand it into a guest column. The result follows.

By Tom de Waal

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrives in Baku today.

In the West, there is a widespread assumption that Azerbaijan is an ally, and in the same anti-Russian camp as Georgia. I think that is a misperception. Azerbaijan is now developing a foreign policy of “complementarity,” which used to be the aspiration of the Armenians – be on good terms with everybody and get the best out of everybody. The model here is Kazakhstan, rather than Georgia.

Actually this was always the case. I suspect the Azerbaijanis have always been good at delivering the message in Washington, “You are our main ally and friend” and then going to Moscow and repeating the same refrain. Heydar Aliyev, the first post-Soviet Azerbaijani president (and father of the current president), was careful to keep good relations with Russia; before he talked seriously to Western partners about the non-Russian Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, he got a Russian oil pipeline in place – the so-called Early Oil line from Baku to Novorossiisk. Aliyev also wanted to give the Iranians a stake in the offshore Azerbaijani oil consortium, known as AIOC, but was of course over-ruled by the Americans. Aliyev kept his good contacts in Moscow, but was held back by Boris Yeltsin’s personal antipathy to him -- although he did successfully bury the hatchet with another Gorbachev-era reformer who had been his enemy in the Politburo, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Once Vladimir Putin came to power, Aliyev made it a strategic priority to rebuild relations with Russia. Aliyev was very successfully at charming the Putin Kremlin, and his daughter, Sevil, made a useful marriage with a well-connected Moscow Azerbaijani, Mahmud Mammadquliyev. The elite-level relationship has deepened under his son, Ilham Aliyev.

Medvedev, with his background as former chairman of Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant, now speaks the same language of money and energy as the Azerbaijani elite. They must find it a relief not to have to bother with all that talk of democratization and human rights that enters conversations with Western politicians.

The Georgians enjoy the access they get in Washington but I wonder if they secretly envy the lobbying power in Russia of people like Vagit Alekperov, the Azerbaijani chairman of Lukoil, who have made sure that Azerbaijan doesn’t suffer the kind of boycotts, visa bans and border closures that the Georgians do.

The price for Azerbaijan is that it will not pursue NATO membership, which would alienate Russia, but I believe that is not a big priority for the country’s elite. The Azerbaijanis now feel secure enough because of their vast and growing oil wealth. Moreover, NATO standardization would also threaten to bring unwelcome transparency to the notoriously corrupt Azerbaijani armed forces.

This is not a love-match but a marriage of interests—as indeed is the Azerbaijani-U.S. relationship. Both Baku and Moscow are still capable of actions that hurt ordinary people:

In Azerbaijan, the authorities have needlessly banned the re-broadcasting of Russian television channels, barring Russian-speaking pensioners who cannot afford satellite television from their only form of entertainment; in Russia, the authorities have played to a xenophobic constituency by stopping Azeris from trading at markets. The newspaper commentariats in both countries continue to exchange hostile remarks, and men like former Azeri presidential adviser Vafa Guluzade continue to blame all of the country’s ills on the Russians.

But on an elite level, there are plenty of common interests. And consider also an opinion poll conducted by Azerbaijani political analyst Rasim Musabekov in Azerbaijan in February 2008.

Asked to name the three nations friendliest to Azerbaijan, 89% of Musabekov’s respondents unsurprisingly named Turkey. But Russia came in second place with a 20% vote of approval, well ahead of the United States, which was named by 5.7%, just behind Iran and on the same level as Ukraine.

This suggests that, on the street level, Russia and Russians remain popular with ordinary Azeris. They are still on the same wavelength in a way that Americans or Europeans will never be.

Labyrinth Excerpt

Business Week is running an excerpt of Labyrinth next week. Here is the link to it on the web site, where it went up last night.

Catfights and Bystanders in Russia

Russia is getting harder and harder for BP, whose executives are now getting kicked out of the country. That's not wholly surprising, since the British company is still operating by the old, pre-Putin-era rules that allowed Big Oil to own half or more of a large oil field. But there's something different about this dust-up, and that's that the Kremlin isn't stepping in to make clear the price of peace. The reason may be that the price isn't yet clear because the Dmitry Medvedev Kremlin hasn't decided who is going to control the spoils of the state.

The normal course of business when a western oil company has been shellacked in Russia is that it's been communicated a relatively clear state objective (usually that the Kremlin wants control of the field to go to Gazprom or Rosneft). BP knows this, since almost exactly a year ago it voluntarily agreed to a shellacking when it sold a 63% holding in Kovytka, a huge natural gas field, to Gazprom. (BP also was shellacked involuntarily by its current Russian partners in 1999.)
This time, BP says it's received no such alert. Indeed, the Kremlin says it's staying completely out of what it calls an internal matter between BP and its Russian partners in TNK-BP, which accounts for a full quarter of the British company's annual production.

Today, BP's Robert Dudley, who is CEO of TNK-BP, said his visa hasn't been renewed, and that he'll probably have to leave Russia by the end of July. It's the same for around 79 foreign BP employees.

The Russian partners -- oligarchs Mikhail Fridman, Viktor Vekselberg, Len Blavatnik and German Khan -- say they are simply seeking a larger say in how TNK-BP does business.

I talked to a BP adviser who asked that his name not be used. What he reckons is that we are watching a defensive maneuver.

It goes like this: All parties know that eventually the Kremlin is going to insist on TNK-BP being controlled by Gazprom or Rosneft. There also seems to be a presumption -- although I personally am not convinced of this -- that it's the Russian oligarchs who will be forced out, since they bring only money and no expertise to the oilfields. So, according to this scenario, the oligarchs are seeking to get control of some or all of BP's holding so that when, say, Gazprom comes along, they command a "control premium" in the negotiations, and can demand more money.

For the record, one of the oligarchs has told me by email that this scenario is inaccurate. "The aim is to have a bit more [of an] independent company and get liquidity options with much higher valuation than now (within the next 1-2 years)," he said. In other words, TNK-BP could be worth much more in a couple of years than now, when the Russians could think about selling out.

However, for argument's sake, sticking with the BP adviser's assertion: if Gazprom or Rosneft are to step in, where are they? And why are their executives claiming they aren't interested?

According to this BP adviser, it's because of a power struggle within the Kremlin between officials associated with Gazprom, and those associated with Rosneft. The outcome will decide "who is advantaged in the Kremlin."

I found this explanation compelling. Why else would the Kremlin stand aside and let this go on?

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Rights: Creative Commons

O and G Goes Live on Business Week

Business Week has imported O and G into its on-line magazine. Here is the link. O and G readers can continue to receive RSS feeds through the usual site, but you ought to take a look at the Biz Week offerings, both the enterprise stories and its other bloggers. There is good smart stuff.

More on the Baku Bluff

A friend has passed along a fascinating speech I'd missed early this month by Bill Schrader, who runs BP's operations in Azerbaijan. In it, Schrader says that BP and its Big Oil partners in Baku can pump almost 70% more oil from their offshore Caspian fields there than they previously thought, or an increase of 3.6 billion barrels. The total now will be close to 9 billion barrels.

At a time of scarce positive news from the world's oilfields, Schrader doesn't imply the onset of a flood of new oil to the market. But he does mean that Baku's 1 million-barrel-a-day production will last longer -- it was thought that this peak would terminate in five years; now it can be extended for another six years, through 2019. With North Sea and Alaskan oil on the decline, that's a bit of a cushion. I don't have a link to the June 4 speech itself, but here is Platt's coverage if it.

Yet, for the O and G audience, I couldn't help shaking my head. You will recall that, back in the 1990s, when recalcitrant BP was under pressure from Washington and Azerbaijan to build a non-Russian pipeline from Baku to the Mediterranean, the company replied that it would love to, but that there simply wasn't enough oil.

Why, then-BP representative Terry Adams said again and again, there are just 4 billion barrels of oil offshore, and at least 6 billion would be necessary to economically warrant the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. That naturally was before BP discovered that it needed Washington's approval to buy Arco. Then BP said: Did we say we needed 6 billion barrels? We meant 5 billion! And what do you know? We have found another billion barrels offshore! How do you like that? So let's go ahead and build that pipeline! The 1,000-mile line went live two years ago, and ships a million barrels of oil a day to the world market.

There are multiple interpretations of that timely shift. My own is that both sides exaggerated -- Washington elevated the volume of oil in order to promote the region; the oil companies under-estimated, partly to get a better transit fee deal from Georgia and Turkey.

As for the current energy environment, the Shepherd speech I think informs the current panic-stricken atmosphere. All the information isn't necessarily out there.

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In the Interrogation Room with Gazprom

Police have used the tactic for centuries -- good cop, bad cop. After a few hours of roughing up by a nasty interrogator, a suspect warms to the coffee and banter brought by a seemingly sympathetic officer. Then the suspect throws himself on the mercy of the court.

One sees at least a bit of that strategy in the tandem of Russia's Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. After years of nastiness by Putin, Europeans were feeling warm and fuzzy after Friday's European Union annual summit, where they were treated to Medvedev's good cop approach: "being nice to them," as The New York Times' Stephen Castle described it.

I raise this not because it's surprising -- a lot of us see Medvedev as Putin with a nice face; we shall watch how Europe responds.

But it's interesting in combination with a great example of journalistic initiative (also on Friday) by the Financial Times' Carola Hoyos and Ed Crooks. It was a strong email interview the pair managed to land with Gazprom's gonzo CEO Alexei Miller. The paper devoted space on page one, in which Miller says that Gazprom will eclipse Exxon and become "the most influential [company] in the energy business," and dismisses OPEC as no longer relevant. It ran a second article on page three, in addition to a full transcript on-line, in which Miller expands on what's been a self-evident strategy toward which foreign oil companies get new energy deals in Russia: those willing to help Gazprom in its quest to become "a global player on the energy market."

Miller also defended his recent prediction that world oil prices will hit $250 a barrel.

While Russian energy titans are prone to flights of bloated rhetoric, this is not empty talk. Given its vast stores of natural gas, Gazprom may already be the most important energy player in Europe, and Miller says it is striking new deals ranging from Nigeria to North America. In the U.S., Miller is interested in the talk of new natural gas pipelines in Alaska.

In terms of big geopolitics, Miller predicts outright that South Stream, Russia's weapon to defeat Washington in the natural gas pipeline war in Europe, will definitely be built. In the remote chance that the U.S.-backed Nabucco pipeline is also erected, he says, it will pose no threat to Russia's South Stream.

So O and G readers should look for more, not less, Russian assertiveness in global energy. It will simply be quieter.

Photo: Independentman

Rights: Creative Commons

Labyrinth on NPR

I was interviewed today by Krys Boyd for NPR's Think. Here is the link to listen or podcast.