Russian History and the Passing of the Utility of Pipeline Politics

The Harvard historian Richard Pipes has triggered an interesting debate on the Internet with a long piece that leads the Weekend section of The Wall Street Journal. The piece lays out familiar Russian history -- how and why Moscow is so vexed by independent-minded neighbors; why its people go along with political repression; and its dogged pursuit of a status as "a force to be reckoned with, a country to be respected and feared." Pipes goes on to suggest policy prescriptions, including a recognition that Russians are likely to react badly to a feeling of encirclement, and a renewed attempt to persuade Moscow to adopt western political and economic values.

The piece is important not because it's perfectly presented -- I'm puzzled for example by the continued notion that somehow Russians are going to become like the West -- but because we get someone of Pipes' stature laying out once again the historical record. I myself hear dismay from Russia watchers get up in arms over the suggestion that some recent events there -- the impunity of murderers, and the public acquiescence to it all -- follow an arc going back several centuries. To them, I suggest a fresh read of Pipes. Below, I'm posting a video from a speech I just delivered at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco, arguing that time has perhaps passed by the utility of current U.S. oil policy on Russia, specifically that of pipeline politics.



At the American Conservative, Daniel Larison argues inaccurately that Pipes is merely advocating a continuation of two-decade-long U.S. policy. For instance, Larison takes Pipes to task for failing to insist on a break in NATO expansion, when the piece in fact suggests the opposite.

At the Squirrel's Nest, we get an attempt at the long view from Terry McGarty, a Massachusetts startup investor and one of Pipes' former Cambridge colleagues. McGarty quotes a well-known criticism of NATO expansion by George Kennan, one of the best diplomats the U.S. ever turned out. Kennan asserted that, among other things, NATO expansion would restore the atmosphere of the Cold War, and impale Duma ratification of Start II. Today, no one can project backward with certainty how events would have unfolded absent NATO expansion, but, in the context of Russian history, as Pipes well lays out in his piece, even in the most optimistic of circumstances there would have been at minimum the danger of Moscow creeping back into the vacuum of its former Eastern European satellites. And in a more pessimistic turn of events, eastern and central Europe could have been in similar circumstances to Ukraine and Georgia today, confronting an angry, assertive Russia at their border. Finally, Kennan wholly misjudges the Russian position on nuclear arms. Russian politics could change down the road, but since Mikhail Gorbachev the country has favored almost any nuclear arms control deal; none of the serious nuclear arms accords discussed in the post-Soviet era was ever imperiled as far as Moscow's signature was concerned. Kennan had that backwards -- they were upended in the U.S., by the Bush administration.

Cyber-Attack Strategy: Part of Russian Attack on Georgian Pipelines, Report Finds

John Bumgarner, a former cyber-security expert for the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, is attracting much attention for his report concluding that Russia's military offensive in Georgia last year was coordinated with a pre-arranged civilian cyber-attack on the country. What appears to have gone unreported is Bumgarner's conclusion that the region's oil apparatus was a strategic target of the overall conventional-and-cyber offensive.

The 100-page report, conducted for the U.S. Cyber-Consequences Unit, where Bumgarner is director of research, was distributed to U.S. officials and security experts. Bumgarner and I chatted by phone, and he emailed me the nine-page executive summary (thanks to Josh Foust for agreeing to post it at Registan.net. Incidentally, Foust has a good piece on the media war between Russia and Georgia at CJR).

Bumgarner says the report is the result of an examination of hundreds of public Internet forums, sharing of data with sources at home and abroad, and his own reporting on the attack from almost the instant it began. Others have reported that much of the findings were already known; but Bumgarner's findings appear to be the difference between barstool talk and authentic data. Nor is the report the kid-stuff such as carried out last week against 45 million Twitter users along with Facebook members, apparently by a Georgian blogger calling himself Syxymu (the blogger's attempt to Latinize the name of the Abkhazian capital, Sukhumi.).

Its chief takeaway is that the Russian cyberattack -- which disabled 54 Georgian websites in banking, communications and media with the apparent aim of reducing Georgia's capability of responding to the Russian offensive -- was prepared well in advance. Bumgarner writes:

Many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the corresponding military operations that there had to be close cooperation between people in the Russian military and the civilian cyber attackers. When the cyber attacks began, they did not involve any reconnaissance or mapping stage, but jumped directly to the sort of packets that were best suited to jamming the websites under attack. This indicates that the necessary reconnaissance and the writing of attack scripts had to have been done in advance. Many of the actions the attackers carried out, such as registering new domain names and putting up new Web sites, were accomplished so quickly that all of the steps had to be prepared earlier.

The Russian Embassy in Washington denies any official Russian or military role in the cyber attacks. And in fact Bumgarner writes that he found no sign of official Russian participation, and concluded that no military personnel, with their distinctive fingerprints, could have carried out the attack. But he adds that there had to be complicity. "The organizers of the cyber attacks had advance notice of Russian military intentions, and they were tipped off about the timing of the Russian military operations while these operations were being carried out," Bumgarner writes.

Yet, the cyber attackers did not go in for the kill, Bumgarner told me -- they didn't attempt to cripple sites that could have caused chaos or injury, such as those linked to power stations or oil-delivery facilities, but merely those that could trigger comparative "inconvenience." "There was a political decision not to attack those critical infrastructures directly. They made the point that they could launch these attacks. They showed they have the capability to do more," Bumgarner said.

This mirrors Russian action against Georgia's paramount strategic installation -- the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, by far the biggest reason why the U.S. and the West as a whole are interested in Georgia. We've discussed here how Russia bombed all around the pipeline without actually hitting it -- a clear message that it could do so if it wished, but would refrain for the moment.

Indeed the cyber attack fit into an overall Russian strategy centered on Georgia's oil infrastructure, Bumgarner concludes. It succeeded, in Bumgarner's view. "Unstable ground conditions, augmented by cyber attacks, soon made all of the Georgian pipelines seem unreliable," he writes.

Certainly that was the impact for the first weeks and months -- Russia demonstrated that the pipeline was vulnerable, not to mention dispelling the illusion that Georgia enjoyed special Western protection.

To a large degree, that remains the fact on the ground -- Georgia and the other former Soviet states of the Caucasus and Central Asia are far more deferential toward Russian wishes. Yet the oil and gas continues to flow.

As for the larger picture, most recently Russia has gotten push-back. This week, Georgia announced that it has officially withdrawn from the Commonwealth of Independent States, the grouping formed as a substitute for the Soviet Union at the same time as its 1991 collapse. (In the 1990s, Georgia's refusal to join the CIS infuriated Russia; in 1993, as Russian-backed Abkhaz troops closed in on Sukhumi, then-Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, standing alongside his troops, reportedly shouted, Okay, we will join the CIS! Suing for peace with Moscow, Shevardnadze did so soon after.)

And last week, it was reported that the Obama administration has decided to ignore strenuous Russian opinion and revive its training program for Georgian troops. Matthew Yglesias appears to be shocked that Washington would help Georgia through a ruse -- the U.S. claims the Georgian troops are being trained only for action in Afghanistan. Yglesias says this transparently false form of foreign policy -- obviously Georgia will use the training to rebuild its defense capability against Russia -- is "very, very, very silly."

As reasoning, Yglesias trots out the usual -- that the U.S. would blanch if China trained Mexican troops and formed a military alliance with America's southern neighbor. Therefore, Russia's furious opposition to the U.S. assistance -- and to Georgia's interest in joining NATO -- is understandable. The main weakness of this specious-but-much-used argument is that the U.S. and Mexico aren't military antagonists. More to the point, as benjamin81 comments over at The Plank, "A better analogy would be China or Russia training troops in Guatemala or Cuba. We wouldn't like it, but we probably wouldn't lose too much sleep over it either."

This summer, Russia and Georgia have resumed their usual bellicose relationship. Does this portend more war? After the drubbing he has taken since his adventurism last summer, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is unlikely soon to fall for Russian bait. But Georgia will remain a flashpoint, with or without U.S. involvement.

O&G Vacation

Steve is on vacation Aug. 1-17. Please return for more then.

Bill Browder, Russia, and More in the Annals of Personal and Corporate Safety

We've discussed the failure to identify and prosecute those who ordered and paid for the murders of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, Forbes' Paul Klebnikov and others. But what about that of Valery Kazakov, a Russian man slain on the way to testify against the former mayor of the town of Pushkino?

It's the subtext of a piece by Megan Stack of the L.A. Times, whose reporting suggests a couple of principal reasons why such cases don't get solved. One of course is official corruption. But another is that, even when cases have moved through the system in reasonably good order, Russians are hesitant to testify for reasons of personal safety. There's effective impunity not just for killers, but for those who murder witnesses intending to testify against the low-ranking triggermen who typically take the hit for everyone up the food chain.

That's one stubborn reality about Russia. Of a different order are the foreign firms and companies -- lawyers, bankers, investors -- who get fleeced, their local employees jailed, then indignantly scream for justice as though not pre-warned.

Over the last several days, this victim's slot has been filled by American Bill Browder, the once high-flying defender of investment in Russia as head of a $4 billion Russian fund called Hermitage Capital Management. In 2005, Russia effectively expelled the 45-year-old Browder, whose grandfather Earl headed the U.S. Communist Party in the 1930s and early 1940s, and since then he has had to run his fund from a distance in London.

As my colleagues at Business Week and others are writing, Browder now has hired former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft to run an unusual case stemming from a subsequent assault on Hermitage in which a couple of subsidiaries were seized. It's a tax fraud and money-laundering case against a group of officials who he says conspired to defraud the Russian government of $230 million.

(Yawn)

We've seen this movie before. For instance, BP keeps returning for more despite its own experience with the rough-and-tumble Russian system.

To his credit, Browder's stratagem at least in part is meant to free one of his Moscow lawyers, Sergei Magnitsky, who was jailed after filing a court statement alleging official corruption in the seizure of the subsidiaries.

Yet BP and Browder stuck around because of the money -- in BP's case, despite it all Russia remains one of its main profit centers. As for outsiders, there's the entertainment value of gaping at the road wreck.

Obama Administration Adding Oil (and Caspian) Balance to Energy Team

One persistent knock against the Obama administration's energy team is that it is one-dimensional -- everyone has a clean-tech background, the mirror image of the oil industry bent of the Bush White House. At the top, climate and energy czar Carol Browner is a former administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Energy Secretary Steven Chu ran, among other things, an alternative energy development program while director at Lawrence Berkeley National Labs. The criticism has been that, even if you want to accelerate non-fossil fuel research and controls on greenhouse gases, you still need a balance in terms of expertise since, according to most forecasts, it's going to be a long time before oil and natural gas vanish from our fuel mix. No policy can be serious unless it takes shrewd account of everything.

All the while, however, word was that the administration intended, but simply hadn't gotten around yet, to name senior global energy officials both in the National Security Council (the president's foreign policy think tank) and the State Department. Now, it looks like Frank Verrastro, one of the Caspian era's steadiest hands, will be taking the NSC job. David Goldwyn, who doesn't have the same oil industry experience but does possess a long biography in senior government energy jobs, will take the State Department position.

Verrastro, currently director of energy and national security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, seems likely to be named senior NSC director for energy and the environment.

I first met Verrastro a decade ago when he was Pennzoil's Washington representative and a key player in the negotiation of the pivotal offshore Baku contract between the world's largest oil companies and Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev. He was also in the center of the mix on making the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline happen.

One main truth I found while researching The Oil and the Glory was that at most a handful of the players -- diplomats, oilmen, local officials, and so on -- truly understood the complex events taking place on the Caspian. Meaning not just being able to recite events, but instinctively grasping them so as to accurately and trenchantly forecast what came next.

Verrastro gets the global oil and natural gas game, and at the same time is conversant on clean energy. I'd say he'll be an effective player.

I don't know Goldwyn at all. He was an assistant secretary for energy during the Clinton administration, and is said to be a former protege of New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson. Since Dick Morningstar, Eurasian energy czar under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, already has the former Soviet Union, Turkey and parts of Europe, it looks like Goldwyn will handle the rest of the world. Morningstar is another former Caspian hand from the 1990s.

While we are on the subject of names, Jon Elkind, a former NSC director for Central Asia whom I first met on a plane in Turkmenistan back in 1995, is the new principal deputy assistant secretary of energy for policy and international affairs. Elkind is a no-nonsense kind of guy. The Caspian will be getting smart attention all around.