The Oil and Glory Interview: Charles Clover on the Siloviki's Possibly Lesser Role

The conventional wisdom is that the foundation of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's power is the siloviki, the current and former intelligence and military officers who have been drawn into powerful political and commercial positions over the last decade. That's why I was surprised by a long piece last week by Charles Clover, the Financial Times' Moscow bureau chief and one of the clearest reporters on Russia. In it, Clover -- my former roommate in Almaty and Tashkent during the 1990s -- reports finding a diminishment in the siloviki's influence. Clover agreed to flesh out his conclusions for O&G. Here is the interview:

O&G: Charles, your latest long piece is decidedly contrarian. You report that Russia's siloviki – who others routinely describe as the ascendant power – actually hit their apex in 2007, and appear to be on the wane. Is that your takeaway? And if so, why do you think that's the case?

Clover: I should probably say in the spirit of full disclosure that I set out to write about how the siloviki are getting stronger – but when I started asking people who keep track of these things, some quoted, some anonymous, most said that actually things have reversed a bit. Now, whether this is a temporary or a permanent trend is of course an open question – I don’t know the answer, and I hope I put enough caveats to that effect in the piece! But I do think the siloviki may have gotten too powerful for their own good, and other groups are trying to cut them down to size. Putin, in appointing [President Dmitry] Medvedev as president, seems to have intended perhaps to rein in the siloviki a bit – his attitude is unclear. It’s useful to remember that in the 1990s, everyone thought the oligarchs were the ascendant power in the land – of course they are still very powerful, but they did not take over the state.

Q: Even so, you do not seem convinced that the siloviki's retrenchment necessarily equates to a greater responsiveness to the public at large, what you call "civil society." Why is that the case?

A: Russia's liberals are not a whole lot more liberal than the siloviki, and I think any 'thaw' will not be a very ambitious one. Nonetheless, there is a sense that things might have gone too far in the direction of autocracy, and Russians by and large want to live in a more normal country.

Q: President Medvedev has made what, compared with the government's previous attitude, are some bold decisions in the Sergei Magnitsky case. Do you yourself regard these as surprising or bold decisions? Do they signal anything larger? What's the context?

A: I think all we can do is wait and see where things go. Yes the developments are surprising, and seem to indicate a shift in the mentality at the Kremlin. There also does seem to be a struggle within law enforcement agencies over this case in particular – though it’s a bit inside baseball to write about this yet. The context is useful to keep in mind though – Russia for the first time in years needs to borrow abroad and is trying to attract foreign investment, so it needs to be seen to be doing something about this case involving a huge portfolio investor, Hermitage Capital. I'm not sure if all they are doing is trying to be seen to do something, or actually doing something though.

Q: Ultimately is this shift significant in terms of how Russians live, and how foreign governments interact with Russia? For instance, are we likely to see a soft-and-cuddly Gazprom? Or friendship break out with Georgia?

A: As I said, I don’t see Russia's "liberals" as much more liberal than the conservatives, though that is a whole different article to write. And I don’t think the siloviki are going to be entirely pushed out of course, just reduced a bit. I doubt Gazprom will start giving out free gas and I don’t expect to see [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili getting invited to the Kremlin any time soon.

Q: You describe Putin's circle of "Orthodox Chekists," referring to their regular audiences with a conservative Russian Orthodox monk named Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov. What's the takeaway from this relationship?

A: Kind of like the Bush White House and the religious right – It’s hard to tell how much of this is PR and spin, and how much is genuine ideological sympathy. Archimandrite Tikhon leads a very conservative wing of the Orthodox church, and I think the church generally supports conservative political figures on ideological grounds.

Q: You also say that Igor Sechin – who has seemed fairly influential in a lot of matters including politics and oil – as assuming less influence in his role as a deputy prime minister. Is title so important? Has Sechin's influence truly waned? After all, he still runs Rosneft.

A: I totally agree with your premise – I don't think title is so important. What is important, however, is access to Putin, which Sechin in his previous incarnation had every day – he controlled access to the president and that was his main "resource,” as a former senior Kremlin official put it in a conversation with me. Today, he doesn't have such access, as his position requires a lot of travel, and he has other responsibilities. He remains immensely powerful, but in a more limited sphere – energy. He is not the universal figure he was in the Kremlin.

Q: What does this phenomenon signal about Putinism, the long projected arc of Putin's influence into the next couple of decades?

A: I think I talked about this in the piece (I hope that part didn’t get cut). I think Putin certainly continues to play the hegemonic role in Russian politics. But equally he is a skilled politician who knows that he cannot allow any one faction in government to get too big, as this would threaten his own ability to play the most powerful role. I think if the siloviki see a decline, it is likely Putin's own decision.