Book Review: In 1989, Economics, Not Dissidents, Ruled the Day

By Sasha Meyer

A region ruled by dictators who came to power with promises of a great and prosperous future. A cultivated nationalism characterizes governance. Dissidents are small in number, disparate and isolated from society. And political opposition, where it exists, is reluctant to claim political power.

That sounds like a profile of Central Asia today. But in fact, it's Eastern Europe in 1989, as described in Uncivil Society, a new book co-authored by Princeton professors Stephen Kotkin and Jan T. Gross. Both are the authors of previous, excellent works set in the former Soviet space in 2001 – Kotkin’s Armageddon Averted and Gross’s Neighbors (the latter a finalist for the National Book Award) – and they again soar in this slim format.

Again, the strength of Kotkin’s and Gross’ narrative is that it stakes interesting new ground, but does so on the basis of facts and figures, and not philosophy or theory. The authors’ premise is that the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe were accidents, triggered by small, random events. Contrary to conventional wisdom, they argue, dissidents were marginal in the march of events – indeed, the idea that there was any significant opposition to communism “falls into the realm of fiction.” Instead, energized by the poor economic performance of the communist governments, each country’s population spontaneously self-mobilized. As for “the opposition,” such individuals were reluctant to take power, and were pushed into it by the people, the authors conclude. As much as anyone, the Communist regimes themselves were responsible for what happened: They ignored the public mood and belatedly replaced an odious leader with a newer face (Germany); they negotiated an exit (Poland); they bolstered the opposition in order to have a negotiating partner (Hungary); or they were the victim of an internal coup (Romania).

These events are a good illustration of Mohandas Gandhi’s belief that the obstacle to freedom is not coercion by the ruling order (always a tiny minority), but cooperation on the part of the ruled (always a vast majority). In 1989, widespread and deepening economic dissatisfaction removed this obstacle.

Uncivil Society offers up a rich picture of what happened and why: Dissidents were heroic and the governments not so. But it was when the economic fiasco became undeniably obvious to the man on the street that the regimes came down.

But what does all of this mean for other regions, in particular Central Asia? For dissident bloggers, opposition websites and broadcasters like Radio Liberty that wish to see greater political openness, getting out the word of a governments' dismal economic record erodes its public legitimacy.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev inadvertently captured the situation in Central Asia in his much-reported Nov. 12 speech on Russia’s economy. As the Economist put it:”His diagnosis is relentless: a primitive, commodity-based economy that cannot create prosperity; the lack of reforms; and all-pervasive corruption.”

This dreadful performance is particularly evident when compared with the achievements of others. Starkly, former comrades Hanoi and Beijing have produced growing and sustainable prosperity through manufacturing-led exports. Meanwhile, while the Central Asian leaders insist that freer politics will produce deadly instability, Ukraine and Georgia have demonstrated the self-interested hollowness of the claim – in both, competitive if chaotic politics accompany robust economic growth. Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili, though branded by some as reckless, irrational, and megalomaniacal, has proven that a bloated Soviet-style bureaucracy and endemic corruption – two ills that afflict Central Asia – can be sharply curtailed within just a couple of years. Elsewhere, Turkey and Indonesia illustrate that being Turkic or Muslim and having an accountable government are not mutually exclusive.

Micro-economics resonate. Unlike political issues such as civil liberties and democracy – abstractions to many, and confused with the chaos of the post-perestroika years – economics are understood from Peoria to Khojand. As Kotkin and Gross suggest, authorities learn to shrug off negative press on civil liberties. But economic malperformance and malfeasance aren’t as easily ignored. For example, it's difficult to explain why the Kyrgyz government won’t get out of the way of Aidai Asangulova, a young designer who employs eleven women, and whose hand-made scarves are a huge success at the Takashimaya department store in New York. Her customers want more. Yet Ms. Asangulova is unable to expand because the local financial police keep auditing her in order to squeeze out “a share.”

Andrey Illarionov is showing the way. On his blog, this former adviser to Vladimir Putin draws on facts and statistics, eschewing emotions or a sense of desperation, in harsh and brutal analyses of Russia’s economic performance. The result is an effective and popular critique of Kremlin policy.

The Internet, of course, makes his job easier. As Vladimir Bukovsky, a Soviet-era dissident, has said: ”I think, had we had the Internet in the 1960s, the Soviet power would have collapsed in the 1970!”