• Steve LeVine covers foreign affairs for Business Week. He previously was correspondent for Central Asia and the Caucasus for The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times for 11 years. His first book, The Oil and the Glory, a history of the former Soviet Union through the lens of oil, was published in October 2007. Putin’s Labyrinth, his new book, profiles Russia through the lives and deaths of six Russians. The updated paperback was released in April 2009.



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    A Blog on Russia, Energy, the Caspian and
    Beyond

    Saturday, May 2, 2009

    The Irrelevancy of Nawaz Sharif

    If the New York Times has it right, the Obama administration thinks that the prime ministership and presidency of Pakistan are decisive positions in the pursuit of the Taliban. In a piece today by Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, we learn that the administration is courting former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who has zero influence over the Taliban or any other militant in Pakistan or anywhere else.

    It's not that President Asif Zardari has relatively more influence than Sharif with the militants. Neither of them does. (In fact, neither of these fellows is particularly impressive in person.) The point is that anyone seeking to resolve the Taliban advances must do so through the Army and its intelligence wing, the InterServices Intelligence directorate, both of which are seriously entangled with the militants. Majed Iqbal discussed the topic of Sharif's rising favor a week ago. Aiming any attention at the political structure is wasted energy.

    One matter we have not discussed here earlier is the utter failure of successive Pakistani governments going back two decades to lay the groundwork for confidence in civilian, secular rule. The main failure has been in education. The CIA says that 49% of Pakistanis over the age of 15 are literate; that's certainly a generous figure. The indicator is also a shrinking one -- in 1980, according to the United Nations, about 72% of adults could read and write. Whatever the precise figure, the government has decided to channel almost all its money into the Army, thus leaving its people reliant on madrassas, and seething in anger at their leaders.

    Would a different president or prime minister aim more attention at improving the lives of ordinary Pakistanis? Perhaps. Meanwhile, this failure is the river in which the Taliban are swimming.

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    2 Comments:

    Blogger ANJAN SENGUPTA said...

    Steve,

    The US is going through the motions. Effectively trying to tell the world it is trying its bet on "democratic" leaders while at the back channels it is betting on Kiyani to deliver. If you read what Gen Patraeus has said recently:

    1. The Pakistani army, led by Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is "superior" to the civilian government, led by President Ali Zardari, and could conceivably survive even if Zardari's government falls to the Taliban.

    2. Even were Zardari's government to fall, it was still conceivable that Kayani's army could maintain control over the nuclear arsenal.

    While the US manages that - all this about discussing with Nawaz is as "show and tell" but not "deliver".

    Your contention that Nawaz has zero control over Taliban is not wholly correct. He may not have direct control but there is a strong indirect connect. The Jamaat Islami veil hangs over both these entities.

    The only positive thing is that Nawaz Sharif is intellectually challenged.

    May 4, 2009 1:14 AM  
    Blogger Steve said...

    Hi Anjan, I think you are right about Nawaz. One major thing I did not take into consideration is his political support in Punjab. He could have influence in terms of villages going over to the Taliban.

    I also agree with your second point -- Kiyani's government can if it wishes maintain control over the nuclear arsenal.

    That said, I have the impression that people are failing to note the example of Afghanistan in how they look at the Taliban threat to Pakistan. I do not see a scenario in which the Taliban captures civilian power without the agreement of the Pakistan Army; and to accomplish that will not require a conventional "conquest" of the Army. Enormous sections of the Army are already sympathetic to the Taliban. The danger is that, at some tipping point, these parts of the Army -- perhaps or probably minus some or all the top generals -- simply hands over the cities to the militants.

    Thanks, Steve

    May 4, 2009 7:52 AM  

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