The Spy Plane Over Abkhazia

Was Russia justified in shooting down an unmanned Georgian spycraft flying over the separatist Georgian region of Abkhazia last month? Probably not. If it were, Moscow would be crowing about its action, not denying it, as it has been doing.

Yesterday, the results of a United Nations investigation into the April 20 downing were released. The report concludes that Moscow did shoot down the Georgian plane, which was doing reconnaissance over the Black Sea strip of land that broke away in a war 15 years ago. The news of the report, rejected by Russia as biased, was in most of the major papers, such as this article. The U.N. said that Georgia should not have been stoking tensions with such a flight, and that it violated the terms of a peace agreement between the sides. But it also said that Russia had no business shooting down the drone, and raised doubts about Russia's legitimacy as a neutral peacekeeper, the role it serves in the region.

As I saw time and again when I visited both sides of the conflict during the 1990s, the feelings of the Georgians and Abkhazians are one understood by ethnically rivalrous people the world over -- the Armenians and Azeris, the Kurds and Turks, the Serbs and Kosovars, the Palestinians and Israelis. There is very little rationality in their deeds and words. And, in the case of the Abkhaz and Georgians, it likely will take many, many years before they can figure out how to live together normally. Perhaps they will never figure it out.

Which is why the Russians should not be stirring the pot. Back when the drone went down, Georgia and Moscow-backed Abkhazia seemed at the brink of a return to war.

So why did Russia do it? Georgia in general serves as one of Russia's main punching bags. Russia has blockaded Georgia economically, and Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders frequently lash out at leader Mikheil Saakashvili. Most recently, Georgia has been the vehicle for Putin to demonstrate his ire over Western recognition of Kosovo independence. Putin responded to Kosovo by granting effective political recognition to Abkhazia and Georgia's other breakaway region, South Ossetia.

Dmitry Medvedev doesn't seem like a bully. On the other hand, neither did Putin in his very first days.

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Book Note

Random House has advanced the publication of Putin's Labyrinth by three months. It is coming out in just a few weeks -- on June 24th.

The New World of Tumult

Here's the news today: Russian security officers have again raided BP's offices in Moscow. Nigeria has ordered Exxon and Shell to pay up $1.9 billion of their oil revenues. Exxon's Rex Tillerson is under mounting pressure to give up one of his titles, that of company chairman. And oil futures brushed up against $140 a barrel.

Welcome to the new world of energy tumult.

Taken separately, these events don't necessarily seem new -- the petro-powers have been flexing their muscles for some time; Exxon has put down previous attempts to appoint an independent chairman; and the surge in oil prices has seemed inexorable.

Yet the last two items merit attention.

The pressure on Exxon -- renown for going its own way regardless of attempts to influence it -- can no longer be put down to fringe dissidents. The more serious situation began with a push by the Rockefellers for an independent chairman and more attention to research on renewable fuels. And now, a growing number of investors are supporting the Rockefellers publicly ahead of next week's annual shareholder meeting in Dallas. Here is a piece about British investors posted by my colleagues at Business Week.

But today's $9.50 rise in oil futures, to $139.50 a barrel, resembles a panic. It looks like a tipping point in market sentiment about so-called peak oil -- traders seem convinced that indeed the tightness in world supply is a chronic problem, and not something to be overcome by added exploration and drilling.

Among the men of Big Oil, one of the most reasonable assessments is delivered by Christophe de Margerie, the chairman of France's Total. De Margerie says that the world has plenty of oil, but not the financial and technical means to deliver much more than it currently does to the market.

So the tightness in world supplies -- the fundamental reason behind this year's incredible runup in prices, and by extension the emboldened behavior of petro-powers like Russia and Nigeria -- is not going to lift any time soon, short of some economic debacle, or a dramatic public shift to the bicycle.

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Putin's Wealth

The FT's Catherine Belton and Neil Buckley weigh in with an impressive story that attempts to penetrate the question of Vladimir Putin's personal fortune. This enterprise -- the documentation of what Putin is worth -- will require a long, ongoing and determined effort. But Belton and Buckley try to peal away a layer.

The piece involves Gunvor, the Swiss-based oil trading company that has miraculously (Hey, we're just really good businessmen) grabbed control of a third of Russia's oil exports. One public owner of Gunvor is Gennady Timchenko, a reclusive and long-time buddy of Putin's. The FT links Timchenko to Surgutneftegas, which Russian polical analyst Stanislav Belkovsky has asserted to many of us for over a year partly belongs to Putin. As the FT reports, when Bill Browder -- until a couple years ago Russia's biggest foreign cheerleader as the head of Hermitage Capital Management -- sought to find out who really owned Surgutneftegas, he suddenly could no longer get a visa.

Putin swats away suggestions regarding his personal share of Russia's economic boom. But those who have hung around the former Soviet Union for awhile know that his dismissals are not exceedingly convincing. Personal wealth is a prerequisite to rule in this rough neighborhood; one simply is not taken seriously among former Soviet power brokers unless one has one's own, enormous cash stash. But the hard evidence is almost impossible to obtain; I think the only case of such proof has involved Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev, and that emerged only after a perfect storm of bungling.

The trouble at BP: For some time, it has appeared that BP could lose control of its main asset in Russia, its share of TNK-BP. The thinking has been that Gazprom is intent on grabbing control of TNK-BP, by either forcing out BP or its Russian partners. The arrival of tax inspectors at TNK-BP's offices in recent months seemed to buttress this view, given that that's precisely what signaled trouble for Shell before it was forced to hand over control of the gigantic Sakhalin-II natural gas field to Gazprom.

But my former colleagues Guy Chazan and Greg White at The Wall Street Journal have a piece that embraces a contrarian view: that Gazprom isn't the villain; the partners themselves are in a catfight. Igor Yurgens, the adviser to President Dmitri Medvedev, told me the same thing in a phone chat a couple of weeks ago.

Robert Amsterdam does a good job of explaining the probable bigger picture -- perhaps there is infighting; but Gazprom is likely still pulling the strings behind the scenes. This Reuters piece about a phantom company suddenly suing TNK-BP is more evidence of this.

Gazprom's goal -- as expressed by Putin himself -- is to obtain energy assets overseas. In order to land a traditional oil deal in Russia today -- one that involves ownership of actual oil or natural gas reserves -- one has to give up similar assets abroad. BP is trying to work such a deal with Gazprom, and the trouble at TNK-BP seems a piece of that negotiation.

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Accumulating Shoes

We now have a better understanding of why the consortium developing the biggest new oilfield on the planet has expeled its boss, Italy's Eni -- yet another two-year delay has been announced in first oil from the offshore Kazakhstan field. From a contractual startup of 2005, the Eni-led consortium now says it will produce its first barrels from Kashagan as late as 2013, according to a statement by Kazakhstan Energy Minister Sauat Mynbayev.

So yet another shoe drops in Kazakhstan. This pearl of a field -- depending how technology advances, Kashagan contains anywhere from 15 billion barrels of recoverable reserves and up. That's fifteen elephants, the industry term for a monster oilfield -- has been beset by so many delays that one wonders when it truly will come on line.

Mostly at fault are the problems bedeviling the entire industry -- spiraling production costs, and a shortage of equipment and labor (Note to college-age O and G readers: if you study engineering or geology, you are all-but guaranteed a well-paying job).

Yet Eni has long seemed far over-stretched. From a tiny state-run oil company in the early 1990s, it has grown into a hugely successful heir to the Seven Sisters, the most successful of the West's Big Oil companies at finding comfort with the world's autocrats. Where its brethren bicker with Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Putin, Eni has found a comfortable embrace.

But that's resulted in an embarrassment of riches. Eni has too much on its plate. A few months ago, Eni lost its operatorship of Kashagan. Publicly that act was attributed to Kazakhstan's new assertiveness and demand for an equal share of Kashagan. But it's clear that Eni's partners in the field themselves would have acted sooner or later.

The problem with banks: My former colleagues at The Wall Street Journal published a scoop yesterday on the ongoing saga of some $80 million in Swiss deposits belonging to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev and a couple of associates (since a subscription is required to view, I found this link to another site). It's written by Glenn Simpson, Susan Schmidt and Mary Jacoby.

Some nine years after the money was frozen in a money-laundering investigation (the cash came from U.S. oil companies that got deals in the 1990s in Kazakhstan, including at Kashagan), the Kazakhs have said they are willing to give up the money for charitable purposes. Yet the money remains frozen, according to the piece, in part because the U.S. says the charities that the Kazakhs have in mind are too closely linked to the Kazakh government.

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Will No One Have Sympathy for a Fallen Middleman?

Readers of O and G know that Dutch oil trader John Deuss has led a largely charmed life. He earned hundreds of millions of dollars as one of the world's premier oil traders in the 1970s and 1980s. He went into oil drilling in the U.S. and Nigeria. And, in terms of the Caspian, he was in the middle of one of the era's high-tension geopolitical gambits, tying up Chevron for a couple of years in the construction of a big oil pipeline from Kazakhstan's Tengiz oilfield. To get him out, Chevron had to muster the combined weight of the U.S. government, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Still, it required the death of his chief patron in the Sultanate of Oman before he finally threw in the towel, and went on to new adventures. Here he's pictured in the 1970s, when he ran his own magazine, called Chief Executive.

But the jet-setting life seems over for Deuss, who for almost two years has been embroiled in legal trouble in the Netherlands and the U.K. in an investigation of his banking activities in Bermuda and Curacao. I'm told he's not living the high-life any longer. And a court in Bermuda recently rejected his latest effort to clean up his name.

One problem is that he can't seem to cash out of the accouterments of big wealth. His 187-foot sailing yacht Fleurtje, on which he wined and dined western oilmen during the Caspian era, has been on sale for about $14 million since late 2006. No buyers.

He's had no better luck in the sale of Windsome Farms, his uber-luxurious, 123-acre estate and champion horse-raising facility in Wellington, Florida. One O and G reader tells me it's going for $62 million. But an ad says Deuss wants $49 million. Whatever the case, you must take a peek at the photos in the link. It looks pretty relaxing (as does the yacht). Here's a map of its location.

Perhaps one of the Caspian's nouveaux riche is looking for a ready-made throne?

Meet the New Boss

Much ink has been spilled in recent months parsing the statements of Russia's new president, Dmitri Medvedev, with the aim of deciphering whether he will be more democratic than Vladimir Putin.

The result has been in the eye of the beholder -- those wishing for greater political participation from below have seen a suppressed democrat; others have said that, regardless of Medvedev's own preferences, he will be strait-jacketed by the presence of his predecessor in the prime minister's suite. No one, as far as I can tell, has predicted a traditional, strong Russian leader in the making.

History is replete with examples of seemingly meek gentlemen morphing into full-throated autocrats (among them Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, and further back, Kaiser Wilhelm II). So such a future cannot be ruled out in Medvedev's case.

But, at risk of reading someone else's mind, I think that Putin did not select his protege with that history bothering him; rather it was precisely because of that precedence that he passed over Medvedev's chief rival, Sergei Ivanov, who as a former spy himself has many friends in Russia's powerful security services. Putin selected Medvedev, a former law professor, for his loyalty, and his belief that Medvedev would be the least troubled by Putin's continued strong role in political affairs.

For fans of Robert Caro's magisterial The Power Broker, Putin wants to be Russia's Robert Moses. He wants to have long service, calling the shots regardless of who sits in the Kremlin.

Do not look for Russia to democratize in any western sense, not for some time in any case. Rather, Medvedev's role will be largely economic -- attempting to broaden the boom away from energy.

On foreign policy, to the degree he has any latitude, he seems likely to speak more softly. But the Gazprom-led economic march into Europe will continue. More worryingly at the moment, do not expect any precipitate withdrawal of the chin-out Russian activities in Georgia.

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Green's Moment of Truth?

Today's breathtaking surge of oil prices through $120 a barrel and on toward $121 underscores a possible shift in the U.S. -- Americans may be finally recovering from their seduction with the road.

An insightful piece by my Business Week colleague Christopher Palmeri details how America's demand for oil appears to be dropping. They are traveling less, and when they do, doing so in smaller vehicles -- they are buying more compact cars, and fewer SUVs.

Caution is in order, since the country is in recession, and these statistics are for a single quarter. Yet the tightness in global oil supplies isn't likely to lift -- Russian production is stuck at about 10 million barrels a day and dropping, and the Saudis are probably at or near their own production peak, according to a piece today by my former Wall Street Journal colleague Neil King. The only big unknown is whether Iraq and Iran come on the market with large new supplies. But even if they do, what are we talking about -- another collective 4 million barrels a day? Five million barrels tops? That's not much of a global cushion, and not sufficient to relieve the tightness as Asian demand continues to grow. Arjun Murti over at Goldman Sachs says that oil may soar to $150 to $200 a barrel in the next couple of years, according to a piece by Bloomberg's Nesa Subrahmaniyan.

Goldman has been prescient on oil prices. And the stars do seem lined up for high commodity prices of all types. But if demand truly is dropping in the biggest gas-guzzling country on the planet, there is reason to give some credence to the opposite outcome -- that the price will stabilize, and even drop. Not too much. Perhaps a bargain $100 a barrel? A firesale $90?

Yet that could be sufficient to trigger an era of proving time for the conviction of investors and innovators in renewable fuels. In an excellent contrarian piece, my Business Week colleague John Carey says that corn ethanol has wrongly suffered a black eye over its impact on the food supply. Corn ethanol isn't as much a villain as it's made out to be.

But that's irrelevant to the current environment. What's driven billions of dollars into venture capital has been the runup in oil prices. As long as prices keep rising, that money will probably keep flowing (although probably not into corn ethanol). But if the price surge slows, or reverses, look for an impact in the constellation of renewable companies.

Which venture capitalists have the conviction and stomach to put more into technologies many of whose genuine value won't be known for years and years? And which technology will they decide has the right stuff to succeed in the long term? The air is likely to go out of some of the fledgling companies' perceived value.

Turkmen Subjected to More Sanity: My friend David Stern, the New York Times writer in Central Asia, writes that Turkmenistan leader Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is dismantling yet another vestige of the deceased buffoon he succeeded. After having reinstated full schooling for children, and reopened local circuses, libraries and even the ballet, Berdymukhamedov is removing the Arch of Neutrality, a revolving statue of his predecessor, Saparmurat Niyazov, from the center of the capital of Ashkabad. Perhaps next he will start issuing visas to foreigners.

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Georgia: An Exercise in Image-Building

Six days before Dmitri Medvedev takes over the helm of Russia, Vladimir Putin has put the country on a war-footing with its favorite punching bag, the neighboring nation of Georgia. Putin has shifted troops to the seaside Georgian region of Abkhazia -- just in case, Moscow says, Georgia mounts a military attack against the separatist region.

As readers recall, Georgia and Abkhazia fought a brutal war during the early 1990s that left the two divided.

Igor Yurgens, a brainy and urbane Medvedev adviser who is making the rounds in Washington, London and Paris, told me in a phone chat yesterday that Moscow "will not use military force" in order to absorb Abkhazia, whose citizens already have been given Russian citizenship.

Yet Putin is still in a lather over the West's decision to recognize Kosovo's independence from Serbia, and this most recent flareup of tensions with Georgia seems to me of a different order from the countless previous flareups between the two over the last seventeen years. Putin is sticking his chin out.

NATO ambassadors said yesterday that the move "risks undermining stability." But Yurgens doesn't seem swayed. "We are not going to be pushed and bullied on this question after Kosovo, that's for sure," he told me.

What is Russia's move really all about? Surely it's not concern over Abkhaz security -- a Georgian military attack in order to bring the region back into the Georgian fold verges on ludicrous, mainly since Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili knows he would lose, either to the Abkhaz themselves or a predictable Russian counter-offensive.

Is Putin simply demonstrating yet again that Russia won't be pushed around? Is he bestowing an image-building conflict on his successor, in the way that Chechnya built up Putin's own nationalist credentials when he took power in 1999 with a popularity rating of 2%? Perhaps Putin simply couldn't resist lest anyone forget what he has done for Russia's feeling of well-being? According to Itar-Tass, he is leaving office with an almost 85% approval rating.

When pressed on its general foreign policy, Russia says the West is mired in Cold War thinking, and that its strategy is straightforward and not political. If that's true, one wonders why Putin been unable to strike win-win deals with Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltics.

The prevailing wisdom is that nothing will change under Medvedev, whom experts think will keep the wheel straight and hope that things turn out as well for him as they did for Putin. Nothing Medvedev has said seems to argue otherwise.

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