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The Western Side of the Pipeline War: On the Brink of Failure?

Readers: apologies for the week-long absence. I am back from vacation. Now, on to the latest in the pipeline war.

Another domino has fallen in Russia's relentless advance in the European natural gas pipeline war. After Monday's visit to Budapest by Russia's probable new president, Dmitri Medvedev, Hungary's prime minister is expected to sign the deal in Moscow tomorrow.

That's after an astutely run offensive in which Medvedev and his mentor, Vladimir Putin, have already recently signed on Bulgaria, Austria and Serbia, not to mention the prize in the contest -- Turkmenistan. These countries are now Russia's partners in the construction of a huge new natural gas pipeline system, Moscow's aim being to project power into Europe through dominance of the continent's gas market. Mathematically, Moscow's aim would be represented as: Economic power = Political power.

After all this, is there any reasonable case favoring a rival pipeline plan championed by Washington and the European Union? Generally, my own rule of thumb in pipeline politics is that no deal is a deal until Sumitomo's lengths of steel cylinders actually arrive on the spot, and welding begins. And they haven't.

Consider the first battle of this East-West pipeline war -- over the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian and Mediterranean seas.

On Oct. 11, 1998, The New York Times committed a stupendous blunder. As readers of The Oil and the Glory know, the newspaper's lead story that Sunday, written by my former colleague Steve Kinzer, declared White House-backed Baku-Ceyhan to be "on the brink of failure." Less than a year later, a deal for the line was a reality.

Kinzer's mistake was in focusing on the big picture and armchair analysts in Washington and London, all of which indeed did make the strategic pipeline look to be dead. What he and these pundits missed were the facts on the ground -- from Central Asia and the Caucasus, it was clear that the pipeline was going to happen. Principally, Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev -- who had his hands on 5.4 billion barrels of oil that floundering Big Oil was desperate to develop and sell -- wanted that pipeline. It helped that essential NATO member Turkey wanted the line, too, as did the 800-pound gorilla, the White House. But the main thing was the insistence of Aliyev -- the essential man on the Caspian. Big Oil had to build it, and today, it's mightily glad it did so, since it's delivering about 1 million barrels a day of oil onto the tight world market, entirely free of interference by Moscow.

Yet today Heydar Aliyev is dead, and the Caspian is surrounded by presidents with, to put it kindly, shorter geopolitical stature. Big Oil seems to be absent the big corporate personalities who in the 1990s got in the sauna with one or more of the Caspian presidents, downed some vodka shots, and emerged with rights to huge reservoirs. And the White House lacks the vision to assign a political heavyweight -- in the 1990s, it was Clinton and Al Gore themselves, in addition to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger -- to spearhead a deal.

As for the future, there's no sign of the Bush administration suddenly changing course. The word is that Condi Rice will appoint Bush family friend Donald Evans to general the western battle. But Evans lacks the star power for instant success, and the longevity -- he will be out once the next administration takes power next year -- to manage through sheer effort.

Big Oil has been slow to snag a natural gas deal in Turkmenistan that would jump-start the western-backed Nabucco pipeline. And, short of a trip to Camp David, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov isn't suddenly going to grow a spine.

Meanwhile, Putin and his protege Medevedev are running Moscow's battle plan personally.

So, at the risk of repeating the Kinzer Blunder, Nabucco does appear to be on the brink of failure.

Of course, lightning could always strike.

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The Life of the Oligarchs

When it comes to oligarchs, Vladimir Putin is a choosy ruler. He likes some, he hates some, and sometimes an oligarch can move from one to the other category with some dispatch. So was the fate of Mikhail Gutseriev, who until recently was head of a Russian oil company called Russneft. Putin decided that he wanted one of his favored oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska, to take over the company. Gutseriev resisted. He accused Putin of forcing him to sell. Then, in a story told previously with other Russian billionaires, Russian prosecutors went after him with criminal charges. He's now wanted in Russia for alleged fraud and money laundering, and is seeking asylum in Great Britain, the home of many such Russian outcasts.

This week, the newsletter Nefte Compass has a scoop that Gutseriev has meanwhile become an Azerbaijani oil baron. With $340 million, he has purchased the Azeri holdings of Nations Energy, the Canadian company that last year sold its Kazakh oilfields to China's Citic Resources for $1.9 billion, and made a group of Westerners very rich men.

Azerbaijan, which isn't very close to Moscow these days, is apparently safe ground for Putin's enemies. The suspicion that accompanies such prosecutions is fueled by Putin's custom of pursuing them after a powerful person refuses to bend to his will.

Arctic Counter-Claims; Musharraf's Defeat

Exploring the Arctic: William Broad weighs in today with the fascinating back story to Russia’s pioneering dive to the bottom of the Arctic last summer. Russia claimed the right to half the Arctic seabed, which is probably the largest remaining untapped repository of oil and natural gas on the planet. But in Broad’s New York Times piece, the Russians are depicted as not entirely responsible for the feat.

It turns out that the plan for the dive, including how to return safely, originated with a retired American Navy submariner named Alfred McLaren. The result is a bitterly worded tit-for-tat between McLaren and the Russians. One of McLaren’s defenders, a deep sea diver named Don Walsh who worked with the Russians, calls the Russian dive an “example of how to steal your way to fame [that] will become a legend in the history of exploration.”

But Mike McDowell, an Australian who organized polar voyages that inspired the idea, sides with the Russian credited with the dive, Anatoly Sagalevitch, the expedition’s chief scientist. McLaren, he said, is afflicted with a severe case of sour grapes. “He wanted to be first to the pole. Well, it just didn’t work out that way,” McDowell says.

Pakistan's fresh challenge: Pervez Musharraf seems a lot less nefarious today than his detractors have claimed. Previously, this blog has argued that Pakistan’s leader is far more genuine and certainly no worse politically than those who would unseat him, including the since-assassinated Benazir Bhutto and her rival Nawaz Sharif. After the resounding defeat of his political allies in yesterday’s parliamentary elections, Musharraf has accepted the result, and said he's prepared to work with his opponents.

Reporting by my friend Carlotta Gall out of the country’s west – North West Frontier Province and the tribal territories – has seemed to show that many Pakistanis themselves are fed up with the violent militancy in their midst. That – and finally building up a secular education system – may be the main focus of the new government.

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What's the Book About?

Shawn Miller of Critical Compendium had a slew of questions about The Oil and the Glory. Here is his interview.

Putin: Still in Pursuit of Respect

How far will Vladimir Putin push his rejection of Kosovo independence? My own feeling is not very. And even if he does go through with his implicit threat -- to recognize breakaway regions of his favorite punching bag, Western ally Georgia -- Russia and perhaps Belarus will probably be the only nations to do so.

President Bush has announced U.S. recognition of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence yesterday. The largest European countries are likely to follow. Why? Because of Serbia's murderous rampage through Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Putin asserts that territorial integrity is supreme and that, in order to create a separate nation, the country from which it is separating must approve. As an example, he cites the two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which pulled away during the early 1990s when nationalism was sweeping through the former Soviet Union.

There are only academic and polemical links between these Georgian regions and Kosovo.

I covered the Abkhaz fighting from both sides. While there was brutality, the scale nowhere approached Serbia's pathological violence against its neighbors. And in the end, in 1993, it was the Abkhaz -- backed by Moscow -- who applied ethnic cleansing after vowing not to. They simply put the Georgians in their midst on foot out of the seaside region, and occupied their homes.

One thing I learned from my time in the former Soviet Union is that pride is king when it comes to nationalities. No one wants to feel he or she are under anyone's thumb. In the case of the Abkhaz and the Ossets, the Georgians stirred the pot with their own nationalism. Then the Russians came in with military backing, which continues to this day.

What are Putin's and Russia's genuine beef? That their view isn't accepted in the West. Ultimately, that isn't very compelling. Putin will no doubt continue to protest. And, regarding Georgia as the West's soft underbelly because of the energy pipelines running through the republic and the West's backing for President Mikheil Saakashvili, he'll keep punching there.

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The End of Big Oil

For those interested in the history and future of Big Oil, I've got a piece in The New Republic this week on how one or two of the companies might survive despite their stubborn resistance to change. TNR is a pay site but if you take a free trial subscription you can read the whole piece, plus a few other items that look interesting this week. Here are the first few paragraphs.


When historians one day dissect the long arc of humankind’s use of fossil fuels, they may very well zero in on October 9, 2006, as a turning point for Big Oil. That’s when it became clear that the major oil companies—the giants that had survived numerous predicted extinctions and gone on to ever-greater profit and influence—were undergoing a tectonic shift and would either reinvent themselves or die. It’s the day Moscow dashed the hopes of five major oil companies from three countries and announced that Russia itself, and not they, would develop the biggest new natural gas field on the planet, an undersea Arctic reservoir called Shtokman.

Shtokman is the oilman’s Angelina Jolie: much-coveted but out of reach. Experts believe it contains the carbon fuel equivalent of 23 billion barrels of oil—that in an industry that considers a field of one billion barrels gigantic. Shtokman alone contains sufficient energy to power all of Europe for several years, and the world’s big oil companies had sought rights to it for years.

In another time, Russia’s declaration that its natural gas behemoth, Gazprom, would develop such a field would have set off peals of laughter among Western oilmen. Gazprom lacked the know-how to keep production at its current fields from declining; how would it manage a technological feat under the deep, icy waters of the Barents Sea? But there was nothing humorous about Russia’s plans. Gazprom knew it wasn’t capable of drilling the field; instead, it planned to hire Big Oil to do so. Big Oil would be its employee.

That notion flew in the face of oil-industry orthodoxy, which says that big potential profits accrue to those who assume big risks. If a company developed an oilfield, it was rewarded with the gold star used by Wall Street to measure oil company value—the rights to “booked reserves,” in industry parlance. Booked reserves consist of how much oil and natural gas a company controls, and thus can sell at some point at, say, $95 per barrel or $260 per 1,000 cubic meters. The Securities and Exchange Commission measures booked reserves, and investors regard them as the main determinant of a company’s fundamental worth. Yet now Gazprom was suggesting stripping the Western oil giants of that incentive—they would be unable to book Shtokman’s natural gas. The industry mood has become even more somber over the last half-year as two European companies—France’s Total and Norway’s StatoilHydro— actually agreed to Russia’s terms.

The truth is that any of the oil majors—with the possible exception of Exxon Mobil—eventually would have. Why? Because oilmen know that, despite recent unprecedented profits—Exxon alone reported a record $11.7 billion in net income for the fourth quarter of 2007—they are on the decline. The combined booked reserves of the world’s biggest five companies have shrunk by almost 20 percent on average since 1999, according to a paper by Rice University’s James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy. Shtokman is a blueprint for how the major oil companies are increasingly being treated around the world. Today, state oil companies and ministries from countries like Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Russia control somewhere between 80 percent and 90 percent of the world’s known oil and natural gas reserves. And, over the next two decades and beyond, those countries are going to ask foreign oil companies to serve as their contract employees in the same way that Gazprom brought on Total and Statoil.

Big Oil, then—the indomitable giant symbolized by the pitiless John D. Rockefeller—is dying. At the very least, it will soon have to fundamentally change the way it does business. But the shock of Shtokman is merely a tremor compared with the coming revolutionary transition to a non- carbon energy economy. Big Oil could transcend its current woes and weather that future revolution—perhaps even lead it—if it reinvented itself as Big Energy, striving to develop renewable power sources like wind and solar, or even to deliver the industry’s holy grail: a clean energy mechanism that renders fossil fuels obsolete. True, no one yet knows what the revolution
will look like; but the odd thing is that, for the most part, the oil companies don’t seem to care.

continued (free trial subscription required)

Putin On Stage

Vladimir Putin conducted his valedictory annual news conference today, and it was a bravura performance – more than four and a half hours long (Reuters video). Among the questions posed involved the pipeline war. Putin, a consummate player of market economics whose pipeline strategy – Nord Stream and South Stream – has left the U.S. and the European Union flat-footed, accused Washington of politicizing pipelines. And he’s right – if the issue were purely economic, no one would care much about Russia’s economic inroads in Europe; his critics are apprehensive that, as it has acted in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, Russia will exploit market advantage for political leverage. Putin also pointed out that the west “has no resource base” – no natural gas to put into the alternative pipeline it favors. Again, Putin is correct. That is what makes the West's proposed trans-Caspian and Nabucco lines so far untenable.

Here are Putin’s direct remarks:

"As for what smells of oil or gas, we know how our American partners conduct dialogue in Europe. They come to certain countries, try to convince them not to buy our resources or to try to find different routes to deliver fuels, avoiding Russian territory. They put pressure on these countries and that's already in the political sphere. I think this is a wrong policy, a dumb one. Moreover, it's unprofessional, since behind all this politicization of the question, there are no calculations, there's no resource base."

"On the issue of Gazprom biting into the body of Europe [with its efforts to acquire assets there], why the Americans are so concerned for the European body, I don't know. Maybe because they want a piece of it, they like it, it's a nice body. … Yes, the economic power of Russian companies is growing, of course, but our main consumers, especially in Europe, should only be happy about that. … Gazprom isn't demanding any exclusives, it just requires fair cooperation.

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Oil and Glory at the University

For the number of professors who are assigning The Oil and the Glory to their classes, I'm happy to discuss or reply to students' questions right here on the blog or directly by email (link at the bottom of the home page).

New York University is among those reading the book. I was delighted to speak myself to one of the classes last week -- Professor Carter Page's course Energy, Environment and Resource Security. In addition, Prof. Carolyn Kissane has assigned it to her course, Transformations in Central Asia: A Global Context. Thanks to Profs. Page and Kissane for getting the topic out before the next generation.

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Rice in the Race

The Bush administration has officially announced the high-profile Caspian Envoy position we’ve been discussing on this blog for some three months. This would be Washington’s point person in the contest for petro-influence with Russia in Europe.

In reply to a question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice said she’s head-hunting for the position now:

“I do intend to appoint, and we are looking for, a special energy coordinator who could especially spend time on the Central Asian and Caspian region,” Rice said. She added, ``It is a really important part of diplomacy. In fact, I think I would go so far as to say that some of the politics of energy is warping diplomacy in certain parts of the world.”

Rice is right. Russia's Vladimir Putin is far advanced in his shrewd market strategy for dominating Europe's natural gas supply even more than Russia currently does. Putin has personally gotten most of the necessary approvals from other nations for three new natural gas pipelines stretching from Turkmenistan into the heart of Europe. Meanwhile, Washington is not yet out of the starting gate for its rival, Western-controlled pipeline system that also would begin in Turkmenistan.

But I have my doubts about Rice's seriousness given her singular focus on the Middle East as a legacy issue for the Bush administration. Even if she were actively seeking someone, it seems highly unlikely that this late in the administration she could get a commitment from anyone with enough star power to outplay the masterful Putin.

Someone such as Zbigniew Brzezinski or James Baker. And even if someone of that caliber did agree, he or she would likely be in the job just 11 months, until the next administration takes over, which doesn’t seem sufficient time to mold the Western plan into shape.

Back in November, it looked like U.S. super-diplomat Thomas Pickering was imminently to be appointed. In the end, I’m told that the lawyers couldn’t work it out given his position as an adviser to Boeing.

The most realistic question now may be whether it will be too late when the next administration gets up and running.

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Another Death in England

England is seeming less and less safe for its multitude of political exiles. The latest death is a colorful Georgian businessman named Badri Patarkatsishvili (whom I will call Badri). British authorities say they expect to finish a post-mortem on the 52-year-old Badri today after he was found dead yesterday of a possible heart attack in the county of Surrey. As is their routine in unexpected deaths, they have handed over the case to their major crimes investigation unit. (Photo by Reuters' David Mdzinarishvili)

Badri’s possible enemies list isn’t short. Just a few short weeks ago, he lost in an election for president of Georgia against Mikheil Saakashvili. He has been charged there with plotting a coup and planning a ``terrorist attack'' on a government official. He denied the charges.

But Badri was best known as the main business partner of Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky, who himself lives in England in political exile. That has put both Badri and Berezovsky on a black list in Russia. Both men have been charged with fraud there for allegedly stealing cars in the mid-1990s from AvtoVAZ, a company they controlled.

If the British deem foul play to have been involved, Badri's business dealings would also be in question. In his 2000 book on Berezovsky, American journalist Paul Klebnikov described Badri as Berezovsky's "primary emissary to the traditional underworld."

In a BBC report, Berezovsky said he had seen Badri yesterday. He said that Badri wasn’t sick but did complain about his heart. "I have lost my closest friend," Berezovsky said.

Pipeline War Watch—Russia’s Vladimir Putin has astutely assembled most of the pieces for a Gazprom triumph in its battle with the West to control Europe’s natural gas market, and win the political leverage that goes with it. By appearances, he’s got the main player on board – Turkmenistan, which has all the natural gas. And he also has the main countries along the route of his proposed South Stream pipeline – Bulgaria, Austria and even Serbia.

Now, Putin seems to be moving in to harden the market victory by tying up the second-tier buyers of Turkmen gas, the objective being to completely submerge the West’s comparatively amateurish, rival pipeline plans. The key second-tier buyers of Turkmen gas are Hungary, Slovakia and Poland.

Readers of The Oil and the Glory know that when middlemen show up, deals get murky. That’s the situation with this latest turn in the pipeline war. I’m told that two middleman companies – a Hungarian firm named Millander International, and a shadowy Ukrainian-Russian company called RosUkrEnergo – are working to seal a long-term contract selling Turkmen natural gas to Hungary. The deal would be signed by these two firms, Gazprom, Turkmenistan and Hungary. I am told that it could happen as early as this week.

Currently, no Western oil company has obtained rights to any Turkmen gas fields, so there’s no guaranteed natural gas to feed into the West’s proposed trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines.

Such Gazprom deals mean to keep it that way.

Putin, Utility Bills and Missiles

One still marvels at the notion of the president of a country announcing the successful settlement of a utility bill.

But that’s the way it is in the former Soviet Union, where the failure to pay one’s heating bill is regarded so seriously that the cutoff of service to entire other countries can result. Such as to much of Europe.

With minutes to spare before Russia planned to sever a quarter of the natural gas supply to Ukraine, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Yuri Yushchenko today announced that they had resolved their differences. Ukraine would begin to pay off somewhere over $1 billion in overdue bills to the Russian behemoth Gazprom. So, unlike in Russia's 2006 cutoff of gas to Ukraine, Ukraine's and Europe's winter heat will be spared.

That dialogue between nations at the highest levels can be disrupted over such matters is notable to say the least. It’s even more so when one looks just underneath the surface and finds the interest of a shadowy middleman company that, at least so far, Russia is highly resistant to push out of the picture.

This company, called Rosukrenergo (for Russia-Ukraine Energy company), is the official supplier of Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Ukraine. It’s half-owned by Gazprom and only partly unidentified private Ukrainian businessmen.

Who are these men? One has come forward -- a billionaire named Dmitry Firtash. But neither he nor anyone else will confirm who his partners are. One name that appears frequently is mobster Semyon Mogilevich, who before his recent arrest in Moscow was on the FBI’s Most Wanted List, and sought by other countries as well.

It can only be conjectured why actually two layers of middlemen – Gazprom and Rosukrenergo – are required to sell Turkmen gas to Ukraine. It’s also a mystery why Ukraine and Gazprom won’t identify who specifically is controlling – and earning the profit from – half of Ukraine’s natural gas supply.

The mystery is broader because Rosukrenergo also sells Turkmen gas on to Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Gazprom has said that, sure, you can cut out Rosukrenergo, but if you do, your gas bill is going to go up. Despite that warning, Yushchenko said today that a committee has been formed to unwind Rosukrenergo’s involvement. He expects it to be completed within a year. Having Putin at his side, he could speak with confidence on the full settlement of this utility issue.

For an excellent backgrounder on this company and its personalities, read pages 49-57 in this 2006 report by Global Witness.

More Missile Diplomacy: In the same news conference, Putin also raised the specter of a fresh missile dispute with the West. He said that, if Ukraine proceeds with the idea of joining NATO, and that if as part of that agreement an anti-missile shield goes up in Ukraine, “This would prompt Russia to take retaliatory action." Specifically, he said that Russia might point its missiles at Ukraine.

I have not heard of a public proposal to make Ukraine a part of the U.S.-proposed missile shield -- which has not yet been proven to work -- but according to a BBC report, Putin said, "I am not only terrified to utter this, it is scary even to think that Russia, in response to a possible deployment of... [parts of the] missile shield in Ukraine... would have to target its offensive rocket systems at Ukraine."

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Try That in Russia, Exxon

One lesson of recent years in Big Oil is that while most of the industry zigs, Exxon zags.

So it was last week, as the company won attention for court victories that froze some $12 billion in Venezuelan state assets abroad. This involves its dispute with Hugo Chavez over his demand for control over oilfields in the country. Exxon also got a judge to seize hundreds of millions of dollars due to Venezuela in a bond deal.

Is such confrontation wise corporate strategy? The rest of the industry – sitting conspicuously on the sidelines as spectators in this rumble – wants to know, too.

Some analysts have read the news as a warning to all the petro-nationalists out there that Exxon at least won’t be pushed around. And if Exxon is successful, the others might follow suit.

One sign that Exxon’s muscle-flexing is a limited tactic, and not a strategy, however, is its experience with its giant natural gas project in Russia, called Sakhalin-I.

Over the last year, the other big companies working in Russia – Shell, Total, BP – have all caved in to Russia’s demand for a controlling share of their projects. (In Venezuela, too, the other companies involved – Chevron, BP, France’s Total and Norway's Statoil – went along with the state demands and are still operating there)

So far Exxon alone hasn’t been forced to compromise. Specifically, the company is insisting on allegiance to an entirely reasonable contractual clause allowing it to sell Sakhalin’s gas to whomever it wants. It has seemed to want that customer to be China.

Russia’s behemoth Gazprom, however, has other ideas – it wants the gas. And according to a report by Reuters’ Denis Dyomkin, Gazprom at least believes it will get its way. The article quotes Gazprom's deputy head, Alexander Ananenkov, as reporting to Russia’s next president – Gazprom Chairman Dmitri Medvedev – that he expects to sign the deal with Exxon in April or May. In case there was any doubt previously, that means Exxon would be going head-to-head with the Kremlin.

Exxon knows the history of companies going to court to get their way in the former Soviet Union – despite “victories,” they mainly end up empty handed. The FSU states simply don’t honor the courts’ rulings, and leave it to the companies to figure out what to do next.

The distinction is that Russia is not Venezuela, and Vladimir Putin (and probably Medvedev) is not Hugo Chavez. Indeed, Putin and Exxon are fairly similar – both have been disagreeable about being pushed around.

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The Shadowy Game of Natural Gas

Russia is again threatening to cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine. It says the reason is accumulated debt on the part of its neighbor. Gazprom, the Kremlin’s stalking horse, says Tuesday morning is the deadline – pay $1.5 billion, or lose a quarter of your supply. Talks are supposed to be going on in Moscow.

No one is opening up his accounting books, so we don’t know the true state of affairs on the two countries’ balance sheet. But there are enough dribs and drabs to get a picture of what’s at least partly going on.

This partial answer is Rosurkenergo. An entirely opaque go-between company – half-owned by Gazprom, and the other half by Ukrainian businessmen – Rosurkenergo buys natural gas from Turkmenistan sells it on to Ukraine.

Ukraine says it will pay off whatever debt it owes if the deal with Rosurkenergo is severed. But last week, a Gazprom official named Ilya Kochevrin told the Financial Times that, if that happens, Ukraine should expect a steep hike in its bill.

That line is probably not straight out of Mario Puzo, but it could be. One might rationally ask why a joint Gazprom-Ukrainian company is more capable of negotiating cheap gas than Gazprom and Ukraine directly.

One thing to note is that it has seemed that the Kremlin is attempting to get a lot of its financial house in order before the ascension of Dmitri Medvedev to the Russian presidency in next month’s elections.

Vladimir Putin, for example, has been peripatetic in his efforts to get Gazprom's pipeline deals with Central Asia and Europe sealed fast.

It’s also been a principal suspicion in the recent arrest of Russian mobster Semyon Mogilevich, an internationally hunted fugitive who lived for years in plain sight in Moscow before Russian authorities miraculously charged him last month with tax evasion. Mogilevich has been linked as a possible shareholder in Rosurkenergo, which if true could mean that his arrest was related to the company, and how and with whom the proceeds are shared.

This is all Kreminology. At the intersection of commerce, crime and geopolitics, such questions in the end get resolved. But what of the collateral victims, such as Europe? Gazprom claims this is just between Russia and Ukraine, and has assured Europe – which receives 80% of its Russian gas through Ukraine – that its supply won’t be affected.

Does anyone really believe that Ukraine won’t pass on the crunch to Europe in order to build up leverage?

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The Same Old Game in Uzbekistan

As they say, hope springs eternal. But when it comes to Uzbekistan, it's getting ridiculous.

Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, the former Soviet Union’s most malignant president, is engaged in one of his customary mid-rule alliance shifts. After a few years of bedding with Vladimir Putin, he’s showing some leg to his former intimate, Washington. He has released some political prisoners. He’s allowing Human Rights Watch to re-open its Tashkent office. He's again allowing NATO to use Termez as an entry point to Afghanistan.

All of this has triggered remarks by some human rights activists and State Department officers that Western sanctions against him are working.

But Karimov’s about-face is predictable. He has with regularity shifted between Russia and the United States since the 1991 Soviet breakup. What does not change are his main policies – iron-fist rule, torture and repression of his people, and impoverishing, Soviet-like economic policies.

It seems a quaint notion now, but in 1996, for instance, Karimov desperately wanted what was then regarded as the ultimate recognition in this part of the world – an official state visit to the White House. Washington rubbed its hands with glee, getting Karimov “in exchange” to agree among other things to currency reform, and to allow exiled opponents to return home. Within months of his Oval Office visit with President Clinton, however, it was back to the old Karimov – the currency reform was canceled, and opponents were arrested or forced back out of the country.

Now, Human Rights Watch says that Karimov’s release of political prisoners just before last week’s visit of a European delegation to Tashkent is proof that “sustained international pressure on Tashkent is effective.”

It means nothing of the sort. What it does mean is that Karimov remains a cynical – and shrewd – geopolitical player who knows precisely how to push the right buttons in both Moscow and Washington.

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Guest Column: Iran's Cold Winter

By Paul Sampson

Iran is in the grip of an energy crisis that has left homes without heating and electricity, forced the temporary shut-down of power plants, and even led National Iranian Oil Co to stop re-injecting gas into its onshore oilfields. How could this happen in a country with the world's second-largest oil and gas reserves, you might ask?

First, this year's winter has been the coldest in a half century; Turkmenistan cut gas supplies to Iran at the beginning of the year in a pricing dispute; and, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reacted very slowly to a national emergency.

Iranians I've spoken to say the trouble with Turkmenistan was entirely avoidable. Last autumn, Turkmenistan said that in 2008 Iran would have to remit much more than the $75 per 1,000 cubic meters, the extremely low price it had been paying. But rather than deal (what even Russia's Gazprom when the Turkmen raised the same gripe), the Iranians dug in their heels and -- hey presto -- had the taps turned off.

The Turkmen pipeline supplies remote northern Iran villages that are cut off from the mainland, so there was always going to be a problem. But, as the freezing weather started to bite, the problem became a full-blown crisis.

For Ahmadinejad, whose handling of the economy has been woeful at a time Iran is being squeezed by US-led sanctions, the energy shortages should be an embarrassment. Some analysts predict he'ill pay for his shortcomings with a hammering in next month's parliamentary elections, where his conservative rivals are expected to gain ground.

But don't bet on it; friends in Tehran have said over the past few days that Ahmadinejad is as confident as ever and, backed by the all-powerful Supreme Leader and his friends in the Revolutionary Guards, is setting his sights on being re-elected in June.

For some Iranians, that would be the last straw.

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Tipping Point in Pakistan? Musharraf's Military Support Cracks

If you're a Pakistani strongman, it's not wonderful but it is survivable to lose the support of the judges and lawyers. But it's quite another to be challenged by your fellow former generals.

That's President Pervez Musharraf's current predicament, and if he doesn't do something about it, we are observing his political demise. With the steady Talibanization of the nation's northwest, the military brass will put its ultimate loyalty first -- to Pakistan's survival -- and force Musharraf out.

Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood of The New York Times weigh in with a piece today on a startlingly public demand for Musharraf's resignation by several hundred retired senior military officers. As a measure of the discontent, the retired generals among yesterday's protesters included Jamshed Gulzar Kiani, the former commander of the key Army corps in Rawalpindi.

Their outburst -- their third in two weeks -- is an important turn of events because of how the Pakistan military operates. This ultimate bedrock of Pakistani power is discreet and united. Serving and retired officers are an organic whole, sort of a society, listening to and advising each other. They regard themselves as Pakistan's fundament. When the officers decide the country's integrity is threatened, you get a government overturned.

That the retirees have gone public means that that military society has become disfunctional; Musharraf has stopped listening to the retirees. If he's stopped listening to the retirees, it's probably the same to one degree or another with serving officers.

So far, Pakistan's serving generals have been content to stay behind the scenes and allow Musharraf to rule unimpeded. But if the contagion spreads, and Musharraf can't keep his base on side, he is finished.

Photo: pingnews.com
Rights: Creative Commons

Guest Column: Wine and National Security

By Sasha Meyer

Wine is important. The drink can be a major source of revenue. For example, in Moldova winemaking accounts for 15% of the economy. It can even become a national security issue. Georgia, where wine is the third-largest export, has suffered a major blow since Vladimir Putin banned its wine imports.

Since then, Tbilisi has been trying to diversify its wine exports. Georgia has shown creativity, for instance by offering Jennifer Lopez half a million dollars to promote its wine (an offer the Hispanic celebrity declined). Overall, Georgia has been incrementally successful, getting its wines into some shops in Europe and North America. But a breakthrough has been elusive thus far.

Peculiarities of the wine market and emerging uses for grapes may offer Tbilisi a new opportunity. A study published in Wine Economics Journal found that getting on the radar of wine critics is a key. (The importance of gurus is corroborated by other sources, for instance in Robert M. Parker Jr.’s influence on patterns of wine consumption and the creation of new segments in the market.)

The study also concludes that continued critical coverage is useful, even if unfavorable at times. In other words, sending a bottle of Kindzmarauli for a review to Eric Azimov, Dorothy J. Gaiter and John Brecher and others could, in the long run, achieve as much as a pop star's expensive endorsement.

There’s also a new, emerging market for grapes. Resveratrol is a new health craze in the West. It’s extracted from grape seeds, skin and juice. Research shows that resveratrol can help delay many age-related diseases. Today, jars of resveratrol are in health stores in Europe, North America and online, where it retails for $20 each.

The market appears set only to grow: An American company is testing a resveratrol-based pill to fight diabetes. In Georgia, the loss of its biggest market combined with a bumper crop is forcing many to cut their vineyards, raising fears that the winemaking tradition could be lost. But resveratrol production could absorb some of the excess grape supply, make profitable use of residual byproducts of winemaking, and bring much-needed hard currency into Tbilisi's coffers.

Photo: ritingon
Rights: Creative Commons

Guest Column: Khanna on the Pipeline War

Parag Khanna, the director of the global governance initiative at the New America Foundation, is the author of The Second World, which Random House is publishing next month. It's already getting much attention, including an essay on the cover of The New York Times Magazine two weeks ago. One thing I noticed immediately in the book galleys is Parag's very different take from my own on Russia and the Pipeline War. In an email exchange yesterday, Parag said he agrees with Paul Sampson's more optimistic take on a win-win outcome to the pipeline competition, published Sunday on this blog. Parag writes that he agrees with Paul "at least in terms of the long-term outcome of Gazprom remaining strong while the EU pursues a more stable energy relationship with Russia." We'll try to get more of both Paul and Parag on this blog in the coming month.

Here are the rest of Parag's remarks:

One has to wonder what strategies Europe can employ to increase its negotiating position before the 2025/30 estimates of reduced dependence on Russian gas.

For example, what would be the impact of restoring friendlier ties with Turkey in the coming years given its position as a pipeline conduit and its blossoming bilateral investment relationship with Russia?

What sorts of price stability and corporate governance demands can be brought to bear on Gazprom & Co. through [Italy's] Eni and/or other potential (e.g. Hungary) partners in the new operations?

Given Boris Tadic's re-election in Serbia, what kind of incentives can the EU offer to mitigate Gazprom's strength there even if they move ahead with the deal selling Gazprom 51% of NIS?

I'd welcome anyone's comments on the way ahead in getting Europeans on the same page (finally) on this issue.