Huffing and Puffing in Georgia
With so much hyperbole flowing in the conflict in Georgia -- on numbers of casualties, on the aims of the opposing sides -- where should one focus one's attention?
I remain tuned to Georgia proper, and not South Ossetia itself, or even the town of Gori to the south that has been bombed by Russian jets.
Specifically, Georgia claims that Russian naval carriers are in position off Georgia's Black Sea coast, and are readying to offload troops. If accurate -- I've seen no confirmation -- and these troops do occupy ground in Georgia itself, and not simply within the pro-Moscow separatist enclave of Abkhazia, this will be a different war. This would be Russia declaring who is in charge, a message that would be intended not just for Georgia, but for the West, which has been considering absorbing Georgia into NATO.
It would be the same were the scores of Russian troop carriers reported to have poured into South Ossetia to cross into Georgia proper.
A far more remote possibility would be Russian bombing of the trans-Georgian oil or natural gas pipelines. Georgia claims that Russia has already targeted -- but missed hitting -- the 1,000-mile Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, but I doubt the account. Such an attack would be regarded in the West as a direct assault on Western interests.
As long as the conflict remains in and around South Ossetia, the fighting can be seen as a bloody uptick in the Caucasus version of huffing and puffing. But it is containable.
I remain tuned to Georgia proper, and not South Ossetia itself, or even the town of Gori to the south that has been bombed by Russian jets.
Specifically, Georgia claims that Russian naval carriers are in position off Georgia's Black Sea coast, and are readying to offload troops. If accurate -- I've seen no confirmation -- and these troops do occupy ground in Georgia itself, and not simply within the pro-Moscow separatist enclave of Abkhazia, this will be a different war. This would be Russia declaring who is in charge, a message that would be intended not just for Georgia, but for the West, which has been considering absorbing Georgia into NATO.
It would be the same were the scores of Russian troop carriers reported to have poured into South Ossetia to cross into Georgia proper.
A far more remote possibility would be Russian bombing of the trans-Georgian oil or natural gas pipelines. Georgia claims that Russia has already targeted -- but missed hitting -- the 1,000-mile Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, but I doubt the account. Such an attack would be regarded in the West as a direct assault on Western interests.
As long as the conflict remains in and around South Ossetia, the fighting can be seen as a bloody uptick in the Caucasus version of huffing and puffing. But it is containable.
Labels: georgia, medvedev, nato, ossetia, Putin, putin's labyrinth, Russia, saakashvili
12 Comments:
Right. On. I've already become annoyed by and frustrated at the huffing and puffing. Thank you for writing something reasonable about the conflict.
Steve, it seems to me you can count on Russia pushing further, whatever your definition, if only to test the West. So the more pertinent question is what is the West prepared to do? Not clear so far that our leaders have even thought very much about it. What was Bush doing hugging Putin in Beijing, only to have him fly to North Ossetia the next day to take charge?
Hi Josh and ECC. On Bush ... well ... what can one say? I'm speechless.
As for a Western reply? What would you think about immediate absorption of Georgia into Nato?
Steve,
Russian troops crossing into proper Georgia would raise the possibility of a new, pro-Russian government in Tbilisi. That would be a huge challenge for the Europeans. They can kiss good bye to the idea of energy security) and the independence of the Caspian states on both sides of the sea. Central Asians and Azeris can kiss good bye to any hopes of benefiting from their main export. Is West's moment of truth nigh?
P.S. My earlier puzzlement at Georgians' failure to seal the Rok i tunnel appears moot if the Russians indeed are contemplating invasion from the Black Sea or through Abkhazia.
You're kidding, right? At Bucharest, we managed both to annoy our NATO allies and to push Georgians and Russians to misbehave, as if they did not have enough incentive already. Now we have to wait for Russians to overplay their hand, as they inevitably will.
Welcome back N. I don't see a scenario in which Saakashvili steps down. This isn't Chechnya; there is no Ramzan Kadyrov in the wings; and if there were, he would not be supported at all popularly. The one thing the fractious Georgians can agree on is contempt for Russia.
ECC: I'm with you there. The West created a vacuum, and the rest has followed. Better to have been decisive one way or the other. I think Putin sees red, and we know what that means.
Russia's endgame is Kosovo Squared -- i.e., just as the West split off part of one of Russia's client states and made it into an independent nation, Russia intends to have Abkhazia and South Ossetia made into independent nations at the expense of one of the West's client states. And just as the West had no problem bombing Serbia's infrastructure into rubble despite Russian objections, Russia is going to similarly have no compunctions about Georgia's infrastructure into rubble despite the West's objections.
It's payback time for Russia. But as for all the noise about Russia going further than that and invading Georgia proper with Russian troops... uhm, probably not. Nothing can be ruled out, but Putin is a chess player, not an American football player. The West made a move in Kosovo, having the Kosovars declare their independence then the West recognizing said independence. It's now Putin's move, and it looks like he's countering West's e2-e4 pawn move with a e7-e5 pawn move of his own. Next he waits for West's response before he decides what move he'll make next. We'll have to wait to see how the game develops from here. And too bad about all the dead bodies from these jerks playing chess with real people, eh?
Thanks for the great (and refreshingly rational) coverage.
Just sharing an idle thought here, but there are ~38,000 Ossetians in Georgia proper outside of S.O. Most of them are in southern Shida Kartli region between Gori and Tsalka; not contiguous to S.O. but in the geographic dead center of Georgia.
It's not hard to imagine Georgian frustration and humiliation finding a target for reprisals in these folks, with or without state sanction. If so, Moscow could certainly conjure up worse humanitarian justifications for occupying some or all of Georgia proper.
Oh, and right over the southern horizon from there is Akhalkalaki District, where Moscow had the old 62nd Army base until '06, AND where the local ethnic Armenian majority has agitated for either autonomy or ceding themselves to Armenia since Georgia's independence.
@DJT:
Тhis 2004 report from TransitionsOnline goes into some detail regarding the local sentiments in Akhalkalaki.
Never Georgian?
25 February 2004
It may not be pushing hard for autonomy, but Javakheti’s reliance on Russia, its vulnerable economy, and a possible influx of ‘Turks’ suggest years of difficulties ahead.
by Daan van der Schriek
AKHALKALAKI, Georgia--“Akhalkalaki has never been Georgian,” an elderly local Armenian shouts angrily from within a Russian military base. “Ever since Russia conquered the region 300 years ago its flag has been flying here. And it will always be Russian,” he prophesies. “If Russia leaves there will be war.”
His might be a radical view. But Russia’s 5,000-hectare base in Akhalkalaki, capital of the Georgian region of Javakheti, is certainly popular with the locals, almost all of whom are Armenians. They give economic reasons for why the base should remain--many locals are employed at or otherwise benefit from the base--but, like the old man, they also cite security concerns: arch-foe Turkey is nearby and greatly feared.
The Turkish massacres of Armenians in 1915 and the Turkish invasion of Javakheti in 1918 might seem long ago, but they are etched deep in people’s memories. “I don’t think all that happened very long ago,” says Ararat Esoian, director of Akhalkalaki’s Center for the Support of Reforms and Democratic Development. “They killed my grandfather.”
The locals may want the Russians, but the Georgian government in Tbilisi is anxious to close Russia’s bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi as soon as possible. And it is supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United States, which has offered to help pay for Russia’s pullback. Moscow is not completely opposed to the notion--it had earlier pledged to pull out all its troops from Georgian soil by January 2004--but it is now asking for more time to close them down than Georgia is willing to grant (and more money--$500 million—than Washington is willing to cough up).
Javakheti’s Armenians may look to Russia, but some local observers harbor no illusions about Russia’s commitment to protecting the region from real or perceived threats.
“If it suits Russia, it will sell its interests in both Javakheti and Georgia,” Esoian says.
FOR MONEY, LOOK TO RUSSIA
If the base were to close immediately, which is what Tbilisi is demanding, the first threat would be to the region’s economy, which at the moment is poor and fragile, though no worse than in other parts of Georgia. Esoian says the base alone generates around 10 percent of Javakheti’s total income. Many locals are either employed at the base or provide services for it. Many local Armenians, though Georgian passport holders, serve as soldiers in the Russian army contingents stationed in Akhalkalaki.
With the base gone, there would be nothing to fill the gap on the labor market: Tbilisi has not drawn up an economic revival plan for the region after the Russian troops are pulled out. Therefore, “withdrawal must be a gradual process, to prepare the region for a life without the base,” argues Marina Elbakidze of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development.
She believes five years would be a reasonable wind-down time. Tbilisi would like an immediate withdrawal but is prepared to offer three years. Moscow will not yet accept fewer than seven years (which suggests that, since it was due to withdraw in January 2004, it is seven years behind its own schedule). The deadlock remains.
It would be difficult to integrate Javakheti into the rest of the country. The region is isolated even by Georgian standards, and Georgian is rarely heard here. The previous government of President Eduard Shevardnadze is partly to blame for that, says Elbakidze, but the local population also plays a role. “They don’t want ‘interference’ from Tbilisi,” she says. There is some physical evidence for that: the local government has shown more interest in maintaining the roads that lead into Armenia than those leading farther into Georgia.
Periodically the ethnic-Armenian parties Virk and Javakh, which are active in Javakheti, do demand autonomy for the region. Tbilisi sees that as a portent for yet another separatist conflict to add to the list of bloody conflicts in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the bloodless conflict with the semi-independent region of Ajaria.
But Tbilisi’s fears about Javakheti are probably unfounded. Virk and Javakh do not have any real influence in Javakheti. This rests with the clans of Melik Raisian, Akhalkalaki’s member of parliament in Tbilisi, Enzel Mkoian, the parliamentary deputy for Ninotsminda, and Artush Ambartsumian, the head of Akhalkalaki’s local administration. Together, they are thought to control most of the trade flowing through the region. And they do cooperate with the authorities in Tbilisi—before November 2003 with Shevardnadze and now with the new government appointed by President Mikheil Saakashvili.
“They always support whoever is in power in Tbilisi,” Elbakidze says.
But problems--separatist or otherwise--might still erupt if the base were to be closed immediately and if Georgia’s relations with Russia do not improve. Many Javakhetians have in the past headed to Russia to find work. Their relatives in Javakheti are very dependent on money sent by relatives in Russia. According to Esoian, some 70 percent of all income in Javakheti comes from remittances. Anything that might threaten the Javakhetians’ chances of working in Russia would inflame passions.
A RUSSIAN OR NATO THREAT?
The region is already beginning to get some sense of what life would be like without the base. Russia recently sacked 400 locally recruited soldiers serving five-year contracts, replacing them with troops from Russia, says a local boy whose father serves as an officer at the base.
The Russian military spokesman made no comment on this. When asked exactly how many soldiers serve at the base, he was equally unforthcoming, simply claiming “I don’t know.” Others put the figure at 1,000 to 2,000. In the past, up to 70 percent of these would have been recruited locally. (Russia is under no obligation to pull these out in case of closure.)
Not a large base, then, and, touring it, there is little hardware to be seen. It seems that withdrawing at short notice would be a relatively minor logistical problem. The real obstacles are geopolitical, and Russia’s reasons for maintaining a presence.
“I don’t understand what interest Russia has here,” confesses Esoian, a skeptic about Russia’s willingness to defend Javakheti. The notion that Russia might be interested in the base as a springboard for military action against Georgia itself never comes up in conversations.
Damien Helly, who heads the Caucasus office of the International Crisis Group, believes that, for Russia, staying in Akhalkalaki is a matter of principle. They have been there for decades and the base still guards the frontier with NATO. What happens to the base therefore lies beyond Georgia and depends instead on a deal between Russia and NATO.
“If they can come to an agreement about NATO enlargement or a NATO presence in the Caucasus, the Russians will close the base,” Helly says. “But as long as they fear NATO they will stay.”
However, the threat that the Russian base poses Georgia is exaggerated, Helly believes.
“Russia doesn’t seem ready to use force,” Helly says. If the Russians want to influence developments in Georgia, “they might use other, more subtle means.” And certainly, with nearly all of Georgia’s energy infrastructure now in Russian hands, Russia already has significant leverage over Tbilisi.
THE ‘TURKS’ ARE COMING
Russia’s base may bring its economic benefits to Javakheti, but it also carries its economic price. It was because of the base that the hugely important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will not run through Javakheti, the head of the Georgian International Oil Corp., Giorgi Chanturia, said in March 2003. One potentially valuable means of diversifying the local economy has therefore been lost.
Such problems could in future be compounded by a fresh economic challenge: an influx of Meskhetians, descendants of Georgian-speaking Muslims of mixed Georgian and Turkish descent. Deported in 1944 to Central Asia on the spurious grounds of “treason,” the Meskhetians are one of the last nations to return from their Stalinist exile. Some are already in Tbilisi; most, though, are in southern Russia, where they fled after 1989.
Javakheti is ill-equipped to cope with them. However, when Georgia joined the Council of Europe in April 2001, it promised to pass legislation by April 2004 that would facilitate the return of the Meskhetians by April 2013. Not all of the more than 300,000 Meskhetians would return to Javakheti, but their impact on the region, with its population of roughly 100,000, could be colossal.
Georgia has recently been given more time to deal with the Meskhetians’ return, a decision taken to alleviate the difficulties that the new Saakashvili administration faces.
“The West is indulgent towards the new government,” Helly says. “And the Meskhetians are no priority.”
But at some time in future, some Meskhetians might turn up in their ancestral Javakheti, where resources are scarce and the fear of “Turks”--which is how local Armenians view the Meskhetians--pervasive and readily kindled. Perhaps, then, there is some truth in the elderly Armenian’s prediction after all.
Recent articles from Georgia can be found in our Georgia country file, at http://georgia.tol.cz.
Daan van der Schriek is a Tbilisi-based journalist who writes about the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Steve,
Thanks for these comments. I've been looking around the web trying to get information about the early reports that Ukraine challenged Russia in the Black Sea early on during these events, but don't know if that was all just part of the early confusing chatter. Though the role of and consequences for Ukraine are certainly interesting here. I wonder what your thoughts are on that.
P.S. I haven't yet read Putin's Labyrinth, but I loved O&G.
David
Hi David, my understanding is that Ukraine did say it was not certain that it would allow the fleet back into port in the Crimea. But then nothing. Unclear what happened there. Best Steve
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