Georgia and Russia: Itching for a Fight, Now They Have One
At O and G, we usually ignore the crude language, or errantly fired shot, of the various hotheads in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The forecasts of possible calamity are almost always alarmist.
Today's flareup of direct combat between Russian and Georgian forces is not one of these cases. Remember the events and language that preceded Vladimir Putin's 1999 burn-the-fields, raze-the-cities offensive on Chechnya, and read this quote today from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev: “I am obligated to defend the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they are located. We will not allow the unpunished killing of our fellow citizens. Those who are guilty will suffer the punishment they deserve.”
Georgia and the South Ossetians had already been fighting for a year or more when I moved to Tbilisi in 1992, and the hostilities never really halted. The Ossetians rightly bristled at Georgia's misplaced nationalism, and broke away. Then, Moscow -- forever looking for a pretext to express its contempt for Georgia -- glommed onto the South Ossetian cause, granting them Russian passports and citizenship.
Times have changed. Current Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili is not one with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the early-1990s Georgian supremist whose rantings helped to trigger Georgia's loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yet the fighting goes on. Recent back-and-forth shooting between the Georgians and the Ossetians escalated today in a Georgian offensive on the Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Now Russian troops have crossed the border into South Ossetia.
In the past, Georgian troops have proven incapable of standing up to the Russians. In 1993, I watched as the Russians rolled over the Georgians in Abkhazia. The result was the near-dismemberment of Georgia itself.
That is the possible consequence of today's events. Only this time Georgia is far more important to the West -- in 1993, there were no trans-Georgian oil pipelines.
If the conflict escalates into Georgia itself, look for oil prices to escalate. And look for NATO to decide how to respond.
Today's flareup of direct combat between Russian and Georgian forces is not one of these cases. Remember the events and language that preceded Vladimir Putin's 1999 burn-the-fields, raze-the-cities offensive on Chechnya, and read this quote today from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev: “I am obligated to defend the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they are located. We will not allow the unpunished killing of our fellow citizens. Those who are guilty will suffer the punishment they deserve.”
Georgia and the South Ossetians had already been fighting for a year or more when I moved to Tbilisi in 1992, and the hostilities never really halted. The Ossetians rightly bristled at Georgia's misplaced nationalism, and broke away. Then, Moscow -- forever looking for a pretext to express its contempt for Georgia -- glommed onto the South Ossetian cause, granting them Russian passports and citizenship.
Times have changed. Current Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili is not one with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the early-1990s Georgian supremist whose rantings helped to trigger Georgia's loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yet the fighting goes on. Recent back-and-forth shooting between the Georgians and the Ossetians escalated today in a Georgian offensive on the Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Now Russian troops have crossed the border into South Ossetia.
In the past, Georgian troops have proven incapable of standing up to the Russians. In 1993, I watched as the Russians rolled over the Georgians in Abkhazia. The result was the near-dismemberment of Georgia itself.
That is the possible consequence of today's events. Only this time Georgia is far more important to the West -- in 1993, there were no trans-Georgian oil pipelines.
If the conflict escalates into Georgia itself, look for oil prices to escalate. And look for NATO to decide how to respond.
Labels: abkhazia, georgia, medvedev, ossetia, Putin, putin's labyrinth, Russia
10 Comments:
Yulia Latynina has an interesting take on the situation: South Ossetia Crisis Could Be Russia's Chance To Defeat Siloviki, http://www.rferl.org/content/South_Ossetia_Crisis_Could_Be_Russian_Chance_To_Defeat_Siloviki/1189525.html
Yulia is always a must-read, and this piece is no exception. I like Yulia a lot; I met her in Moscow, and she was essential in the research for Putin's Labyrinth.
But Yulia is conflating hope with reality. She argues that Medvedev could exercise restraint and undermine the siloviki once and for all.
Only, Medvedev will never do that. He is not the "liberal" or "reformer" that some in the West forecast before he took over; if he were, Putin would never have appointed him to the job.
The offensive is dangerous because Russia, in a lather, could roll over the Georgians in South Ossetia, and continue on right into Georgia itself.
Thanks for the link, N.
Steve,
I, too, disagree with Latynina's conclusion, expressed in the headline. Nonetheless, her piece is very informative and goes way beyond the CNN picture of the situation in N.Ossetia. She asserts that it is no ethnic-feeling driven separatist conflict. Rather, it's a joint venture between FSB and Russian military types and criminals in Ossetia. It's all about siphoning off money allocated by Moscow to N.Ossetia (both military and civilian funds). And she backs up her assertion with facts and names some names. The principals of this JV are sure to welcome the war for that would mean even more money flowing into their pockets.
The BBC is saying some 150 Russian tanks have crossed the border and are in N.Ossetia. I wonder if an open, non-proxy fight between Russian and Georgian troops is inevitable. If that's the case, I wonder if the Russian military's performance will be more like Grozny on December 31, 1994 or Dagestan in the Fall of 1999.
Looking at it clinically, Saakashvili's decision making is mind boggling. Is this a pure gamble? Or does he have some secret, brilliant strategy to reintegrate N.Ossetive quickly and without much loss?
Yes N. I want to point that out too -- Yulia's dissection of the real stakes in South Ossetia is eye-opening. This is NOT a fight for independence and against repression, but purely a matter of cash.
I think the analogy of 1993 Abkhazia is better. The reason is that the Georgians do not fight like the Chechens (or Dagestanis). I've watched all of them fight first-hand; the Georgians simply don't have the same martial ability or spirit. In short, the Russians will roll over them.
Steve,
But wasn't it the Chechens who defeated Georgian troops for the Russians and the Abkhaz? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basayev#Georgian-Abkhaz_conflict)
And they are baaack! (Chechens among Russian "peacekeepers" during incident in Georgia, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=4282&article_id=2372552)
But, to be fair, Georgians' military ability has probably improved since 1993. Back then, there was no Georgian army per se. Shevardnadze had to rely on whatever Soviet Army units Georgia had inherited two years earlier and the loyalty of Soviet officer corps to an independent Georgia was suspect at best.
Pavel Felgengauer, a respected Russian military analyst, told the BBC today that, in his view, Georgia has the best military among the CIS states. He points to their successful execution of a nighttime offensive, something, he says neither N.Ossetian nor Russian troops are capable of. Unlike Georgia, Russia has failed to carry through a military reform and the troop training and support are still at the 1990s level. Of course, the Russians have a vast quantitative superiority in manpower and hardware. But getting it into the battle ground is logistically difficult. The only road between Russia and N.Ossetia is through the Roki tunnel. And the only way to supply gasoline into the region is through a 163-km pipeline (http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1072533.html). But then there are those Chechen mercenaries on the Russian team...
Shamyl Basayev went to Abkhazia during the 1993 offensive. But the Russians, using their bases there (which I visited at the time), fought and provided the logistics, air cover, and artillery as well. Meanwhile, the Georgians were drinking wine in their bunkers. This was a Russian -- not a Chechen -- defeat of the Georgians. Whatever the case, the Georgians did not distinguish themselves.
I take your point that obviously the Georgians have to have improved since then. And I respect Felgenhauer.
Incidentally, you've repeatedly mentioned North Ossetia; I think you mean South Ossetia.
Thanks for the material, N.
Steve
Steve,
Thank you for correcting me. Yes, I meant S.Ossetia. Apologies to Russia, the rightful owner of N.Ossetia.
Well, by now Russia and Georgia are at war as their troops are fighting each other. And as far as the Georgian martial ability goes, your skepticism might be less off the mark than Felgengauer's praise. Strangely, they never bothered to seal the tunnel to prevent Russian tanks and troops from coming into S.Ossetia.
You know Steve, this was one one of the first places I looked for info and perspective when I heard the news. As usual, I was not disappointed.
You have almost an innocent giddiness about this news.
Thanks Loki. That means a lot.
Anonymous - not sure what you mean.
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