Georgia: A Mirror of Russia
Yet again Georgia is the target of a mysterious military strike, and yet again Russia is accused of responsibility. The upshot: Georgia continues to be a dramatic example for the West of what Russia's critics mean when they say it is dangerous to be vulnerable to Moscow.
Here is the beginning of a Chris Chivers piece in The New York Times:
MOSCOW, Aug. 8 — The Republic of Georgia presented what it called a mounting body of evidence today that a Russian warplane had entered deep into its airspace and fired an air-to-ground missile. It said it was seeking a special session of the United Nations Security Council to address the incident. Read rest of story
Steve's comment: Europe has wondered aloud for the last several years whether it is risky to become more and more reliant on Russia for its oil and natural gas. The latest news from Georgia is not necessarily, or even likely to be, the future of Europe.
But Russia's denials strain credibility. The trail of such incidents, and denials from Moscow, go back at least 15 years, when Russia backed Abkhazia in its bloody separation from Georgia proper. Russia was, and continues to be, responsible for Abkhazia's uprising. That makes the missile attack a compelling illustration of how Russia behaves with troubling regularity with a country that may be the most vulnerable of all.
Here is a good podcast summary from the Guardian.
Here is the beginning of a Chris Chivers piece in The New York Times:
MOSCOW, Aug. 8 — The Republic of Georgia presented what it called a mounting body of evidence today that a Russian warplane had entered deep into its airspace and fired an air-to-ground missile. It said it was seeking a special session of the United Nations Security Council to address the incident. Read rest of story
Steve's comment: Europe has wondered aloud for the last several years whether it is risky to become more and more reliant on Russia for its oil and natural gas. The latest news from Georgia is not necessarily, or even likely to be, the future of Europe.
But Russia's denials strain credibility. The trail of such incidents, and denials from Moscow, go back at least 15 years, when Russia backed Abkhazia in its bloody separation from Georgia proper. Russia was, and continues to be, responsible for Abkhazia's uprising. That makes the missile attack a compelling illustration of how Russia behaves with troubling regularity with a country that may be the most vulnerable of all.
Here is a good podcast summary from the Guardian.
Labels: European energy, georgia, missile, missile attack, natural gas, oil, pipelines, Russia
15 Comments:
I find it puzzling: why do Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan behave as if they are dependent on Russia?
Russia has nothing to offer. Technology? Flush with petrodollars, they can buy the latest technology and know-how direct from the West and the East (Japan, South Korea).
Economic aid? Western and Eastern investors are eager to invest in those two countries.
What stops them from pursuing a more independent foreign policy? In other words, what stops them from being like Azerbaijan?
Alex, it is a longstanding mystery. Some parts of the puzzle -- being on the east side of the Caspian, and that much further from Europe, appears to make a difference in terms of willingness to be brazen; being Central Asian, with its more autocratic past, rather than Caucasian, with its freer past, seems also to play a role in the willingness to ignore some of Russia's excesses. Ilan Greenberg has an excellent piece in yesterday's NY Times on the role of the nomadic mindset as well. In the end, however, there was only one Heydar Aliyev, and now he's dead.
Could Novosti (a Russian news agency) be right in saying "...despite its passionate assurances of love for Moscow, Astana is pragmatically self-centered when it comes to economic cooperation?"
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070809/70678685.html
I'm not sure that Nazarbayev ever expressed love for Moscow; indeed I'd be shocked if he did so at any time in the post-Soviet period. Nazarbayev has been known as an exceptionally pragmatic statesman since the perestroika days, when he was famously the peace-making go-between for the warring Yeltsin and Gorbachev. He has uncommon geopolitical antenna. Each powerful nation is a piece on the chessboard for him. But I'm not sure that is an illuminating observation. It simply makes it all the more baffling why he fails to take steps to create a concrete pipeline link to the West as an integral piece in the puzzle of true sovereignty. Thanks for that link -- I did not know of the uranium deal and Westinghouse, and it is fascinating.
Nazarbayev years ago expressed love for the USSR (not so much Moscow, more the "state" as it was during Soviet times), being the very last of the republics to claim independence and his support for the brutal protest suppressions that took place in Alma Ata back in the 80's (now Almaty). However, Georgia is definitely a different animal in that it has a strong independence streak that still cannot be fulfilled until their internal ethnic territories are resolved like with the Armenians, the Meshketi (Turks) and the Russian dominated regions that possibly dropped the missile near Tbilisi a few days ago. The Georgians very much want to be a part of NATO and the EU eventually but never will with Russian aircraft still over their skies. If America had more globalist interests there, or more concern for these "freedom loving" people, it would be supporting the Georgian territories with American or NATO aircraft. Instead, the Americans are tip-toe'ing around Russia to not upset the bear any more than it is already!
--Vincent
Hi Vincent, I think that NN was expressing not love for the Soviet Union, but a belief that the republics could survive economically only if they continued to band together in some form. Hence his advocacy and hosting of the first meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and his further promotion of a Eurasian union involving some of the Central Asian and Slavic states. Regarding NATO, the EU and Georgia (and Azerbaijan for that matter), these are incendiary issues indeed. My own feeling is that the U.S. and the EU have gone a fair distance in supporting Georgia's and Azerbaijan's ambitions. Given the high bar to join the organizations, and the pressures from Moscow, they may be going just about as fast as they can. I agree that it will require real statesmanship and courage to actually cross the line.
Steve: You mention Azerbaijan in the same sentence as Georgia, NATO and EU.
Has Azerbaijan officially expressed an interest in joining NATO and EU?
Steve: I'm afraid this new model nomadic-mindset-explains-foreign policy is based on tenuous correlations and is thus half-baked at best. How would it explain Mongolia? It's as nomadic as it gets and yet it aggressively embraced "third neighbor" policy from the start. ("Third neighbors" being the US and Japan).
From the same NYT that you mentioned:
“What’s almost as dangerous as ignoring the cultural context of politics is misinterpreting it,” he said. “The policy community just doesn’t have a background at looking at cultures’ differences. So even if they do the right thing and start to look at cultural intelligence, the result is they will take stereotypes of Kazakhstan’s nomadic past and call it a complete truth.”
Alex, you're right. The nomadic issue, while interesting and informative in a general sense, is a can of worms in specifics. I think Ilan makes a good stab at this, but as I say it's far too complicated to air in an 800-word piece. Instructively, take a look at the discussion, if you haven't already seen it, about the article on http://www.registan.net/.
I've seen it multiple ways -- western diplomats and businessmen going native and getting it wrong; ignoring the local ways and getting it even more wrong, and so on.
As for the U.S., I don't think as some do that it has gotten it completely wrong in Central Asia. For instance, while it did unnecessarily get into bed with Karimov, it's also been the only consistent diplomatic voice against the excesses of the republics.
In Turkmenistan, I don't see how sensitivity to 'nomadism' would have made any difference in terms of getting agreement to the trans-Caspian pipeline. First Niyazov rejected it because he couldn't get a $500 million bribe; Berdimukhamedov has his own issues, but they are not that Russia understands his nomadism better.
Eric: I stand corrected. Azerbaijan has joined the NATO Partnership for Peace, flirted with the idea of official membership, but as yet not expressed explicit interest in doing so (neither has it applied to join the EU). But Azerbaijan is understood to want to join NATO. It simply fears at this point that it would be rejected. Its military is too far behind and it lacks the will of Georgia
Steve: Apparently, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have just concluded a deal to develop tanker-based oil shipments across Caspian. Projected capacity: 500,000 b/d initially and up to 1.2 million b/d eventually. That compares well with the capacity of the proposed and ill-fated Transcaspian pipeline: initially 150,000 b/d with the potential to increase this to 400,000 b/d.
Does that mean an alternative has been found and the problem has been solved?
I wonder about the costs of shipping via pipeline vs tankers. Do you know how the two compare?
Also, Russia controls the Volga-Don channel, the only way to get big items such as tankers from the Mediterranean to Caspian via Black Sea. Should we expect more drama?
Links:
http://www.platts.com/Oil/News/8195589.xml?sub=Oil&p=Oil/News&
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Caspian_Oil_Pipeline
Dear Mr. Anonymous: big apologies for the lateness in responding. It took awhile to get the right numbers from friends in the business. The cost to ship a barrel of oil from Aktau to Batumi, by tanker and then rail, is roughly $5 a barrel. That's at least 25% more than the CPC rate, or in excess of $500,000 a day in additional cost (muliplying by the 500,000 barrels a day that the Kazakh shippers envision). But, as one shipper told me, it's worth it to them to stay out of the Russian system.
Steve: Thank you. It looks like the tanker option offers all the upside of TCP and none of its downside. Sure, their costs are up 25% but their volume goes up over 3 times. They will be making tons of money, without straining relations with Russia.
I wonder if they are also planning to use LNG tankers to transport gas across the sea. LNG used to be a super-expensive and exotic method but in recent years it has gone mainstream and the equipment costs (including tankers) have dropped.
P.S. You meant Aktau-Baku, not Batumi? I thought the plan was to use tankers between Aktau and Baku and then feed the oil into BTC.
The approximate $5-a-barrel cost is Aktau-Batumi, combining the cross-Caspian tanker and rail. The cost of getting into the BTC pipeline, and thus all the way to the Mediterranean, is subject to party-by-party negotiation.
I think the LNG prospects are limited because one is still left getting those LNG tanks from Baku to Batumi.
In general, there needs to be a grand compromise that results in Gazprom allowing the open transportation of Kazakh and Turkmen natural gas at a market price. There are levers; but a master negotiator, and not the relative amateurs that have been handling the talks so far, needs to be in charge.
I'm from Georgia, now I'm in Almaty form studing. and I undertsand the situation, what's happening. Everything is money (oil, natural gas). I think joining to NATO, EU Geogia will gain a lot, as Cent. Asia, NATO or EU. Alternative pipeline will more cheaper, more short for Europe and KZ will recieive more benefits from this pipeline. Russia will not have main manipulator to scare Europe.
Giorgi
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