• Steve LeVine covers foreign affairs for Business Week. He previously was correspondent for Central Asia and the Caucasus for The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times for 11 years. His first book, The Oil and the Glory, a history of the former Soviet Union through the lens of oil, was published in October 2007. Putin’s Labyrinth, his new book, profiles Russia through the lives and deaths of six Russians. The updated paperback was released in April 2009.



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    A Blog on Russia, Energy, the Caspian and
    Beyond

    Thursday, August 23, 2007

    Cyberattack, Schmyberattack

    Wired magazine's September issue has an interesting post-mortem on the May cyberattack on Estonia's internet system. But take a look at the Web page, which includes a critique of the hard-copy version. The upshot: the incapacitating of Estonia's internet system appears to have been by cyber-savvy nationalistic Russians (perhaps inspired by, but not necessarily led by the Kremlin), but could have been a lot worse.

    Here is the key paragraph in Kevin Poulsen's critique: There's no doubt that the May packet floods were far more disruptive to tiny Estonia than similar attacks have been to the U.S. and others. But in some ways, Estonia's attacks were less sophisticated than previous "cyberwars" -- like those between Israeli and Palestinian hackers, India and Pakistan, China and the U.S. Read story

    Steve's comment: The main issue in the "botnet" attack, as they call it, was not whether a more intrepid hacker could not have done worse, or, as Poulsen says, whether a truly dangerous cyberattack could even be mounted. What made the incident notable was the connect of events -- needle Russia's nationalist rib, and watch out.

    Putin has hopped up a segment of youth in Russia that is super-sensitive to any incitement of their patriotic sensitivities. That plays into his hands as he seeks populist support for his campaign for international respect, as he measures it. But patriotism can cut many ways, and as we've seen in other events of the last few years can lead to a multitude of errors.

    That China, Israel and so on can and have done worse is besides the point. The issue is the reflection of the Kremlin's hunt for a variety of theaters in which to make itself felt.

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    11 Comments:

    Anonymous Anonymous said...

    Steve, due to the less "professional" style of attack to Estonia from Russia, I would still believe these were from individuals, nationalist or not, and not from the Kremlin. If it were indeed the Kremlin, this would have been massive due to the expert computer scientists already working in their military complex. I would gander these were both students and older patriots letting off steam as well as possible government officials throwing some dough towards university students to mount a tiny "warning" of what could come if something really needled Russia.

    August 23, 2007 7:10 PM  
    Anonymous Anonymous said...

    A bit off topic but within the realm of "The Oil and Glory", an interesting news clip from a newservice regarding Kyrgyzstan's loss of the Turkmen pipeline. Is it really true that they are being punished for not putting a timetable on America's base in Kyrgyzstan? Interesting nonetheless:
    http://eng.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=94848

    --Vincent

    August 23, 2007 7:13 PM  
    Blogger Steve said...

    Yup, that's what the Wired story reports -- that there was a planned attack by like-minded Russians, with perhaps connivance from some within the Kremlin, rather than an actual Kremlin plot.

    On your second post -- regarding China and Kyrgyzstan. It's a fact that China is unhappy with the Manas base. But it can't also be thrilled with the Russian presence. I'd like to hear from China hands among readers on whether Beijing actually did route the pipeline as a message to Bishkek. I have my doubts.

    August 24, 2007 1:33 AM  
    Anonymous Eric said...

    Possible political motives aside, laying the pipeline through another gas producing country helps mitigate gas supply risks,doesn't it? In the case Turkmenistan fails to deliver the agreed upon amount of gas, Kazakhstan would pitch in, thus keeping supply of gas to China stable.

    August 24, 2007 7:47 AM  
    Anonymous Victor said...

    One of the US experts described them as "more like a cyber riot than a military attack."
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberattacks_on_Estonia_2007

    August 24, 2007 8:23 AM  
    Blogger Steve said...

    Eric: good point; if built, Kazakhstan (plus the foreign consortia at Karachaganak and Tengiz) would also finally have a way to sell their substantial natural gas reserves at export prices. China has a record of offering low prices, which is why it is not a complete answer to the energy-independence equation. However it is an alternative to Russia and, if a third export line gets built, that could be sufficient to support the sovereignty of the land-locked states.

    Victor - that's a great link, the Wikipedia entry. Thanks.

    August 24, 2007 10:30 AM  
    Anonymous Eric said...

    Steve: A couple of questions. But first a clarification: I don't see anything positive about China re-routing the pipeline via Kazakhstan instead of Kyrgyzstan. The latter loses access to gas and revenues from transit fees. It desperately needs both. Of course, China benefits from this re-routing for the supply risk management reasons. Now onto my questions:

    #1. Why does Kazakhstan (and probably Turkmenistan) accept low-price offers from China? It's seller's market. China desperately needs oil and gas to sustain its economic expansion which is their only hope to resolve the growing social tensions caused by the problem of the increasing (and massive) gap between haves and have-nots. In contrast, both Central Asian countries have done fine up to now without exporting anything to China. Exporting via Russia and by barges across Caspian, while sub-optimal in terms of profits, have brought in tons of money. There is no reason why they should accept low-price offers from China. Am I missing something here?

    #2. Who pays the transit fees: the buyer or the seller? It seems that transit fees and costs have the potential to really reduce the profits. Kazakh and Turkmen gas and oil have to pass through at least Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey before reaching the end user. Each of those countries charges a transit fees. Plus there is the operating costs of running the pipeline of that length. (All that assuming the undersea TCP is built and used). How much of the world price of $70 can they realistically hope to capture?

    August 24, 2007 2:14 PM  
    Blogger Steve said...

    Eric, I totally agree on Kyrgyzstan, but what does it have exclusively to offer? Seems like the cards are in Kazakhstan's hand on this one.

    On the pipeline, the companies pay the transit fees. But BP negotiated extremely hard (translation: put a squeeze on) and won total transit fees of just over $3 a barrel. The companies figured they would be profitable even at $20 a barrel; at over $70 they are profiting big time.

    Now on to the China question: China can pay less for natural gas because of Gazprom's monopolistic behavior -- the Russian gas giant has simply refused to export any natural gas for either Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, leaving a potential billions of dollars a year of the fuel stranded in the two countries.

    Until now, the foreign partners in Kazakhstan have responded by using their natural gas almost solely for reinjection, and boosting the oil recovery from Tengiz, for instance; they have refused essentially to give away their gas to Gazprom.

    Turkmenistan, however, much more hard-pressed financially than Kazakhstan, has agreed to a sweetheart deal with Gazprom for its natural gas.

    In other words, once a pipeline is built, China will simply be the only other game in town. It will be able to use the Russian leverage to its own pricing advantage. That's why a third alternative is needed.

    As for oil, likewise the oil companies have not had a surplus of export options. So over the years China has gotten away with paying less.

    August 24, 2007 3:53 PM  
    Anonymous Kevin said...

    Steve, Putin's nationalistic posturing may be the "main issue" to you, but it certainly hasn't been the focus of most of the media's coverage of the Estonia botnet attack -- Wired magazine's included. The attack is being held up as a warning for the rest of the world, the U.S. in particular, that distributed denial of service attacks are the future of warfare. That's the myth to which I was responding.

    August 24, 2007 6:35 PM  
    Blogger Steve said...

    Hi Kevin, let me rephrase: the top-line geostrategic issue is whether a determined techno-enemy can short-circuit enough of a nation's entire cyber infrastructure to cause real harm, and perhaps cripple systems such as those involving national security system. The top-line issue on my blog is what Russia -- and the Caspian states -- are up to.

    I'll leave it to Wired to explain its own package of pieces. I think your story is excellent, which is why I linked to it. Apart from the direct quote that I pulled from it, I was intrigued by your point that it could have been much worse, and skepticism about whether the panic over cyber-war of any type is justified. I hope that explains it. Thanks for your note. Best Steve

    August 24, 2007 7:16 PM  
    Anonymous Kevin said...

    Fair enough. I look forward to your book.

    August 25, 2007 1:06 AM  

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